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  1. Hume’s Conception of Proper Reflection.Lisa Ievers - 2012 - Hume Studies 38 (2):129-155.
    The concept of reflection plays an equivocal role in the Treatise. It is identified as both the key to the formation of more accurate beliefs and the means to the destruction of belief altogether. I attempt to resolve this apparent paradox by showing that there are two distinct kinds of reflection in Book 1: legitimate, or “proper,” reflection and illegitimate reflection. Despite evidence to the contrary—including Hume’s own claim that he cannot establish that excessive reflections should not affect our beliefs—I (...)
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  • Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question.Hsueh M. Qu - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):301-323.
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  • Hume on the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities.Jani Hakkarainen - 2011 - In Dana Jalobeanu & Peter Anstey (eds.), Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Nature: Descartes and Beyond. London: Routledge. pp. 235-259.
    In this paper, I argue that Hume has an insight into the heart of most of “new philosophy” when he claims that according to it, proper sensibles are not Real properties of material substance and Real bodies. I call this tenet “the Proper Sensibles Principle” (PSP). In the second part of the paper, I defend the interpretation - mainly against Don Garrett’s doubts - that the PSP is a rational tenet in Hume’s view and he thus endorses it. Its rationality (...)
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  • Hume on External Existence: A Sceptical Predicament.Dominic K. Dimech - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
    This thesis investigates Hume’s philosophy of external existence in relation to, and within the context of, his philosophy of scepticism. In his two main works on metaphysics – A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and the first Enquiry (first ed. 1748) – Hume encounters a predicament pertaining to the unreflective, ‘vulgar’ attribution of external existence to mental perceptions and the ‘philosophical’ distinction between perceptions and objects. I argue that we should understand this predicament as follows: the vulgar opinion is our (...)
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  • Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):53-92.
    In this paper, I examine three mutually inconsistent claims that are commonly attributed to Hume: all beliefs are involuntary; some beliefs are subject to normative appraisal; and that ‘Ought implies Can’. I examine the textual support for such ascription, and the options for dealing with the puzzle posed by their inconsistency. In what follows I will put forward some evidence that Hume maintains each of the three positions outlined above. I then examine what I call the ‘prior voluntary action’ solution. (...)
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  • Hume's Scepticism and Realism - His Two Profound Arguments Against the Senses in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.Jani Hakkarainen - 2007 - Tampere, Finland: University of Tampere.
    The main problem of this study is David Hume’s (1711-76) view on Metaphysical Realism (there are mind-independent, external, and continuous entities). This specific problem is part of two more general questions in Hume scholarship: his attitude to scepticism and the relation between naturalism and skepticism in his thinking. A novel interpretation of these problems is defended in this work. The chief thesis is that Hume is both a sceptic and a Metaphysical Realist. His philosophical attitude is to suspend his judgment (...)
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  • Laying Down Hume's Law.Hsueh Qu - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):24-46.
    In this paper, I argue for an interpretation of Hume's Law that sees him as dismissing all possible arguments from is to ought on the basis of a comparison with his famous argument on induction.
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  • Hume's Scepticism and Realism.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):283-309.
    In this article, a novel interpretation of one of the problems of Hume scholarship is defended: his view of Metaphysical Realism or the belief in an external world (that there are ontologically and causally perception-independent, absolutely external and continued, i.e. Real entities). According to this interpretation, Hume's attitude in the domain of philosophy should be distinguished from his view in the domain of everyday life: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgement on Realism, whereas Hume the common man firmly believes in (...)
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  • ‘Naturalism’ and ‘Skepticism’ in Hume'sTreatise of Human Nature.Sean Greenberg - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):721-733.
    Hume begins the Treatise of Human Nature by announcing the goal of developing a science of man; by the end of Book 1 of the Treatise, the science of man seems to founder in doubt. Underlying the tension between Hume's constructive ambition – his 'naturalism'– and his doubts about that ambition – his 'skepticism'– is the question of whether Hume is justified in continuing his philosophical project. In this paper, I explain how this question emerges in the final section of (...)
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