The present PhD dissertation aims to examine the relation between modality and change in Aristotle’s metaphysics. -/- On the one hand, Aristotle supports his modal realism (i.e., worldly objects have modal properties - potentialities and essences - that ground the ascriptions of possibility and necessity) by arguing that the rejection of modal realism makes change inexplicable, or, worse, banishes it from the realm of reality. On the other hand, the Stagirite analyses processes by means of modal notions (‘change is the (...) actuality of what is virtual insofar as it is virtual’). In other words: to grasp what change is, one has to resort to the modal idiom of potentialities, while the fact that there is change is indicative of the fact that nature is full of modal properties. -/- Aristotle’s modal and kinetic realism finds a negative in the figure of the Megaric Diodorus Kronus. The polemical situation of Greek philosophy has indeed the dialectical advantage of not opposing the Aristotelian position to a sui generis straw man. Both in its reduction of modal judgements to temporal quantifications and in its dissolution of the reality of the state-of-being-in-motion in favour of a cinematographic view of processes, the philosophical figure of reductionist antirealism embodied by Diodorus constitutes an alternative that takes the opposite view of Aristotle’s realism. -/- The present study is structured as a discussion between these two positions. In the face of Diodorus’ antirealist challenges, Aristotle articulates modal and kinetic considerations: the answers he gives to Diodorus’ puzzles thus provide valuable insight into his metaphysics. Moreover, the examination of Aristotle’s and Diodorus’ metaphysics, because of their insight and originality, will not fail to interest the philosopher concerned with the metaphysical foundations of modern physics, insofar as the entanglement between modalities and processes is nowadays at the core of mechanics (phase spaces, path integrals, etc.). (shrink)

At the outset it is worth remembering how Heidegger in the 1970s first appeared prominently, though very differently, at the intersection of rhetoric and philosophy. The "rhetoric of figures and tropes" then seemed compelling due in part to Derrida's Heidegger, who played a key role in the famous Derrida essay translated into English with the added subtitle "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy." Compelling for many was the history there referenced from Cicero, book 3 of Aristotle's Rhetoric, book (...) 8 of Quintilian's Institutes through the later French treatises of Fontanier and Du Marsais, which, if read in a certain way, destroyed the language transparency model that seemed threatening at the time.1... (shrink)

As Aristotle himself says, A.Po. 2.13 is an attempt to provide some rules to hunt out the items predicated in what something is, namely to discover definitions. Since most of this chapter is devoted to the discussion of some rules of division, it may be inferred that somehow division plays a central role in the discovery of definitions. However, in the following pages I shall not discuss what this role is. Nor shall I discuss what place division has in the (...) wider discussion of definition and explanation as it emerges from A.Po. 2. 1 shall rather focus on the argument that Aristotle reports and discusses in A.Po. 2.13.97a6–22, and which our extant sources ascribe to Speusippus. As will become clear later on, this argument undermines the possibility of giving any definition, and Aristotle deals with it here because he can block it by exploiting some properties of the method of division. (shrink)

This research is about altruism. In our first chapter, our quest to find whether we are essentially altruistic starts with questioning particular ways of inquiry and proposes a philosophy of unbracketing. In our second chapter, we realise that our proposal starts with an imperative – a prescription. We begin by meditating on the phenomenon of prescription which seems to precede all ways of inquiry. Our analysis of prescription reveals that altruism is to prescribe oneself towards an Other. This type of (...) prescription is to promise a future for an Other. To promise is to give one’s word and to undertake to realising it. In our third chapter, we explore the act of “giving one’s word.” To give one’s word is beyond a speech act. In fact, it is to give one’s logos. An altruistic attempt is carried out in this chapter to liberate ‘logos’ from particular conceptions and allow for its universal meaning to emerge. Logos is traced back to its inceptual conception as existence or will to power – a will to future. This philosophical excavation leads us to our fourth chapter where we re-encounter our original paradox. That is, while human reality starts with a promise of helping someone to make sense – to understand – we have been trying to understand understanding, or how we make sense, by removing the Other and by focusing only on subjective conditions. In this chapter, we reveal how to understand an Other is an altruistic act. In our final chapter, we carefully observe that human existence is a gift from the Other. We describe this gift as a metaphysical passage from being to existence – an altruistic act. A passage which is created by an Other who promises to give us the means to be able to create meaning, that is to say, to exist. (shrink)

Diogenes Laertius' list of Aristotle's works includes a Homeric Puzzles in six books, as does the list in the biography of Aristotle attributed to Hesychius. This latter also includes a Homeric Problems in ten books, which appears to be the same as an item in the biography attributed to Ptolemy al-Gharib. The later and more derivative Vita Marciana attributes to Aristotle a Homeric Questions. The only other reference to the title of such a work by Aristotle is from the anonymous (...) Antiatticista, a second-century a.d. lexicon : ‘They say Alcaeus the comic poet and Aristotle in Homeric Puzzles said this.’ Finally, Poetics 25 – which begins περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων – is a summary, with examples, of just such a work, and a description of how to undertake such an inquiry. (shrink)

As Aristotle himself says, A.Po. 2.13 is an attempt to provide some rules to hunt out the items predicated in what something is, namely to discover definitions. Since most of this chapter is devoted to the discussion of some rules of division , it may be inferred that somehow division plays a central role in the discovery of definitions. However, in the following pages I shall not discuss what this role is. Nor shall I discuss what place division has in (...) the wider discussion of definition and explanation as it emerges from A.Po. 2. 1 shall rather focus on the argument that Aristotle reports and discusses in A.Po. 2.13.97a6–22, and which our extant sources ascribe to Speusippus. As will become clear later on, this argument undermines the possibility of giving any definition, and Aristotle deals with it here because he can block it by exploiting some properties of the method of division. (shrink)

Burnet's text should be emended or repunctuated at three points. At d I we should follow Moreschini and with BT omit Proclus' γε: the unanimous voice of our best manuscripts must be allowed to drown the unreliable Neoplatonist. At e 2, as I shall argue, should be excised. And at e 2–3 the clause is to be attributed to Aristoteles, as Brumbaugh advocates. This attribution gives a better and more typical question and answer sequence, although I can find no other (...) example where Aristoteles ventures sua sponte. (shrink)

A postura de Aristóteles com relação aos deuses é, às vezes, desconcertante. Diferentemente das obras do Corpus aristotelicum, os Diálogos essotericos, em particular o Peri Euches, parece testemunhar a intenção por parte de Aristóteles de pensar uma relação estrita entre o homem e a divindade, idéia esta que a Metafísica ignora. A existência de um dialogo Peri Euches seria sinal da persuasão que os deuses devem ser honrados e tal cuidado deriva do juízo que a nobreza dos deuses deve ser (...) respeitada. Esta asserção não concorda com a interpretação tradicional das passagens teológicas de Metafísica. É reconhecido que a Metafísica utiliza argumentações mais cientificas e abandona o pensamento irrefletido da divindade. Inicialmente esta foi uma das razões que levaram os interpretes a colocar em duvida a autenticidade do dialogo Peri Euches. Achamos melhor nos manter fieis aos textos e atribuir à Aristóteles a “piedade” que ele merece. O presente estudo tentará mostrar que não há razão de duvidar da autenticidade do escrito essoterico. Tentaremos dar uma interpretação do fragmento do dialogo e mostrar a relação entre este texto e as passagens teológicas de Metafísica Lambda. (shrink)