In Categories 7, Aristotle gives two different accounts of relatives, and presents the principle of cognitive symmetry, which seems to help distinguish between relatives and some secondary substances. I suggest that the long-disputed difference between the two accounts lies in a difference in the determination of the categorial status of the object in question, and I formulate the principle of cognitive symmetry such that it plays a crucial role in making explicit how one conceptualizes the categorial status of the object. (...) I then set out some consequences following from this understanding for certain interpretive issues, such as the unity of the Categories. (shrink)

La exposición y crítica de las doctrinas antiguas tiene un lugar importante en los escritos de Aristóteles. Sin embargo, ciertas dudas se han vuelto corrientes acerca de la confiabilidad de sus descripciones. Más aún, se ha sostenido que Aristóteles deforma la comprensión histórica a través de la introducción de conceptos y términos propios. En este libro se aborda el problema a través de un análisis de las críticas que Aristóteles dirige a la teoría platónica de las Ideas, que permite explicar (...) la constitución y desarrollo de importantes conceptos aristotélicos a partir de la confrontación dialéctica con las doctrinas de su maestro. En efecto, las dificultades genuinas que Aristóteles descubre en el platonismo constituyen el motor para gestar nuevos conceptos, que no son ajenos, sino que surgen como implicaciones del examen crítico. Así, la imposición de términos propios no debe interpretarse como distorsión, sino como el modo que Aristóteles adopta para exhibir su particular solución a los problemas que los filósofos anteriores dejaron sin solución. (shrink)

"However that may be, Aristotelian syllogistic concerned itself exclusively with monadic predicates. Hence it could not begin to investigate multiple quantification. And that is why it never got very far. None the less, the underlying grammar of Aristotle's logic did not in itself..

Desde hace varias décadas, numerosos especialistas han mantenido interpretaciones contrapuestas sobre la teoría aristotélica de la verdad ante la presencia de pasajes que parecen sugerir teorizaciones diferentes para el caso de lo compuesto y para el caso de lo simple. En este trabajo, partimos de la conceptualización de la categoría de "relativo" para esclarecer el modo en que ambos casos se encuentran conectados en una única teoría de la verdad: tanto la verdad de lo compuesto como de lo simple poseen (...) la estructura categorial de los relativos. Esta hipótesis interpretativa encuentra arraigo en los textos donde Aristóteles define la categoría de relativo y donde conceptualiza la prioridad natural de lo cognoscible frente al conocimiento. In the past decades, a number of scholars have argued for opposed interpretations of Aristotle's theory of Truth: they point out that different theorizations for the case of compounds and for the case of simples are present in the corpus. In this essay, we argue that both cases are connected in one unique theory of truth because they both have the structure of relatives. This interpretive hypothesis is rooted in the texts where Aristotle defines the category of relative and where he conceptualizes the natural priority of the knowable towards knowledge. (shrink)

When Aristotle argues at the Metaphysics Z.17, 1041b11–33 that a whole, which is not a heap, contains ‘something else’, i.e. the form, besides the elements, it is not clear whether or not the form is a proper part of the whole. I defend the claim that the form is not a proper part within the context of the relevant passage, since the whole is divided into elements, not into elements and the form. Different divisions determine different senses of ‘part’, and (...) thus the form is not a part in the same sense as the elements are parts. I object to Koslicki’s (2006) interpretation, according to which the form is a proper part along the elements in a single sense of ‘part’, although she insists that the form and the elements belong to different categories. I argue that Koslicki’s reading involves a category mistake, i.e. the conjunction of items that do not belong to the same category (Goldwater 2018). Since for Aristotle parthood presupposes some kind of similarity of parts, the conjunction of form and elements requires treating these items as somehow belonging to the same category, e.g. ‘being’, but no such category exists. (shrink)

A formalização dos raciocínios a que Aristóteles se consagra nos Primeiros Analíticos é restrita, como sabemos, a proposições da forma categórica. Embora reco- nheça certas especificidades formais nas proposições encerrando predicados relacionais, Aristóteles parece reservar-lhes um estatuto secundário, considerando-as, em alguma medida, redutíveis a proposições categóricas. Neste artigo, pretendo examinar algumas passagens de Categorias 7 que possam lançar alguma luz sobre o estatuto que Aristóte- les confere às atribuições relativas, visando melhor precisar as razões que o teriam conduzido a negligenciar (...) um tratamento formal mais rigoroso das proposições relacionais nos Primeiros Analíticos. (shrink)

AtCategories7, 6a36-7 Aristotle defines relatives, but at 8a13-28 worries that the definition may include some substances. Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives to solve the problem. Recent commentators have held that Aristotle intends to solve the extensional adequacy worry by restricting the extension of relatives. That is, R2 counts fewer items as relative than R1. However, this cannot explain Aristotle’s attitude to relatives, since he immediately returns to using R1. I propose a non-extensional reading. R1 and R2 do not (...) specify different sets of relatives, but rather different ways to understand each relative. (shrink)