The book’s core argument is that an artificial intelligence that could equal or exceed human intelligence—sometimes called artificial general intelligence (AGI)—is for mathematical reasons impossible. It offers two specific reasons for this claim: Human intelligence is a capability of a complex dynamic system—the human brain and central nervous system. Systems of this sort cannot be modelled mathematically in a way that allows them to operate inside a computer. In supporting their claim, the authors, Jobst Landgrebe and Barry Smith, marshal evidence (...) from mathematics, physics, computer science, philosophy, linguistics, and biology, setting up their book around three central questions: What are the essential marks of human intelligence? What is it that researchers try to do when they attempt to achieve "artificial intelligence" (AI)? And why, after more than 50 years, are our most common interactions with AI, for example with our bank’s computers, still so unsatisfactory? Landgrebe and Smith show how a widespread fear about AI’s potential to bring about radical changes in the nature of human beings and in the human social order is founded on an error. There is still, as they demonstrate in a final chapter, a great deal that AI can achieve which will benefit humanity. But these benefits will be achieved without the aid of systems that are more powerful than humans, which are as impossible as AI systems that are intrinsically "evil" or able to "will" a takeover of human society. (shrink)

More intellectual modesty, but also conceptual clarity is urgently needed in AI, perhaps more than in many other disciplines. AI research has been coined by hypes and hubris since its early beginnings in the 1950s. For instance, the Nobel laureate Herbert Simon predicted after his participation in the Dartmouth workshop that “machines will be capable, within 20 years, of doing any work that a man can do”. And expectations are in some circles still high to overblown today. This paper addresses (...) the demand for conceptual clarity and introduces precise definitions of “strong AI”, “superintelligence”, the “technological singularity”, and “artificial general intelligence” which ground in the work by the computer scientist Judea Pearl and the psychologist Howard Gardner. These clarifications allow us to embed famous arguments from the philosophy of AI in a more analytic context. (shrink)

What kinds of fundamental limits are there in how capable artificial intelligence (AI) systems might become? Two questions in particular are of interest: (1) How much more capable could AI become relative to humans, and (2) how easily could superhuman capability be acquired? To answer these questions, we will consider the literature on human expertise and intelligence, discuss its relevance for AI, and consider how AI could improve on humans in two major aspects of thought and expertise, namely simulation and (...) pattern recognition. We find that although there are very real limits to prediction, it seems like AI could still substantially improve on human intelligence. (shrink)

An advanced artificial intelligence could pose a significant existential risk to humanity. Several research institutes have been set-up to address those risks. And there is an increasing number of academic publications analysing and evaluating their seriousness. Nick Bostrom’s superintelligence: paths, dangers, strategies represents the apotheosis of this trend. In this article, I argue that in defending the credibility of AI risk, Bostrom makes an epistemic move that is analogous to one made by so-called sceptical theists in the debate about the (...) existence of God. And while this analogy is interesting in its own right, what is more interesting are its potential implications. It has been repeatedly argued that sceptical theism has devastating effects on our beliefs and practices. Could it be that AI-doomsaying has similar effects? I argue that it could. Specifically, and somewhat paradoxically, I argue that it could amount to either a reductio of the doomsayers position, or an important and additional reason to join their cause. I use this paradox to suggest that the modal standards for argument in the superintelligence debate need to be addressed. (shrink)

Is it time for politics and political theory to face the challenge of artificial intelligence (AI)? It seems to be the case that political theory constantly lags behind technological developments. With rapid developments in the field of AI, a common estimate is that technological singularity will probably happen in the next 50 to 200 years. Even regardless of the time frame, the very possibility of superhumanly smart AIs poses serious political questions and calls for some serious political decisions. Luckily, some (...) scenarios are already provided by science fiction. The most common trope is that of a hostile AI taking over and destroying/enslaving humanity. Yet there is another path—AI takes over and makes itself a ruler (openly or behind the scenes), but rules in the genuine best interest of humanity. Such a turn of events, as described in Neal Asher’s Polity novels, may be an improvement compared to present political arrangements. It will, however, probably rob us of politics as such. (shrink)