Business ethics serves the important social function of integrating business and society, by promoting the legitimacy ofbusiness operations, through critical reflection. Although the social function of business ethics is impliCit in leading business ethicsfoundation theories, it has never been presented in a systematic way. This article sets out to fill this theoretical lacuna, and to explore the theoretical potentials of a functional approach to business ethics. Key concepts from Parsonian functionalistic SOCiology are applied to establish the social integrative function of (...) business ethics. This produces a theoretical framework for business ethics that provides strong theoretical arguments against often-heard criticisms of business ethics. Many of these criticisms are ideological in nature, in that they systematically play down the importance of integrative functions in the bUSiness-society relationship, on the grounds of unrealistic assumptions about the performance of economic and bureaucratic institutions. However, business ethics itself can alsobecome ideological, if it forgets that the conditions for the application of ethics to business are not always ideal as well. (shrink)

Libertarianism and the shareholder model of corporate responsibility have long been thought of as natural bedfellows. In a recent contribution to the Journal of Business Ethics, Brian Schaefer goes so far as to suggest that a proponent of shareholder theory cannot coherendy and consistently embrace any moral position other than philosophical libertarianism. The view that managers have a fiduciary obligation to advance the interests of shareholders exclusively is depicted as fundamentally incompatible with the acknowledgement of natural positive duties – duties (...) to aid others that have not been acquired by some prior commitment or transaction. I argue that Schaefer is mistaken. Positive duties are incompatible with the shareholder model only if we must contribute to their fulfilment in the corporate context; only if we have some reason to think that it is not possible or not permissible to discharge these obligations entirely in our private lives or through our various other roles and capacities. But we have no good reason to accept this. I argue that individuals are presumptively free to decide how and when to discharge their positive duties, and that buying shares does not cause this presumption to lapse. Hence a non-libertarian moral theory can be held without incoherence by a proponent of the shareholder model. (shrink)

The article identifies the challenges that multinational corporations (MNCs) from the developed world face in sub-Saharan Africa and examines the direct foreign-investment and development interests of the region. In light of these challenges and interests, it also explores answers to the question What is to be done?The occurrence of MNCs' operations in culturally pluralistic societies suggest that they use, as the basis for a corporation-formulated regional code of conduct, a value-based corporate social policy process. That process should embody utilitarian and (...) situation ethics in the exercise of MNCs' prima facie operations and of their responsibilities to society. For the African normative environment, the appeal of this approach is substantiated by the notion that both utilitarian and situation ethics are at once consistent with the region's investment codes, development interests, and value systems. But more than that, utilitarian and situation ethics are consistent with corporate social policy process and can assist MNCs to meet effectively their social responsibilities by helping them reverse the economic stagnation of most of the continent. (shrink)

What types of persons are likely to believe in a narrow view of corporate social responsibility—that is, that managers should seek only to maximize profits in the interests of shareholders? Prior research suggested that such persons seemed likely to defer unquestioningly to organizational authority and thus to approve of unethical activities performed for organizational benefit. This article examined additional implications of such deferential tendencies among high social traditionalism scorers. In three samples of employed respondents ( N = 491), social traditionalists (...) emerged as Machiavellian, had an entitled pattern of equity sensitivity, had an external work locus of control, were self-denying and authoritarian, felt that misfortune accrues to deserving people, and scored low on principled moral reasoning. These findings suggest that normative views about the rightness of social responsibility are closely tied to fundamental personality traits, attitudes, values, and thinking patterns. Therefore, resolving the long-standing social responsibility debate by determining once and for all whether social responsibility is good or bad may be an elusive goal. (shrink)