Properly speaking, the corporation, considered as an entity distinct from its members, cannot be morally responsible for wrongful corporate acts. Setting aside (in this abstract) acts brought about through negligence or omissions, we may say that moral responsibility for an act attaches to that agent (or agents) in whom the act "originates" in this sense: (1) the agent formed the (mental) intention or plan to bring about that act (possibly with the help of others) and (2) the act was intentionally (...) brought about through bodily movements over which that agent had direct control (i.e. the kind of direct mental control that I have over the body I refer to as "my" body) and through which the agent carried out his (mental) intention or plan. Corporate acts do not thus originate in some corporate entity distinct from its members because the corporation has neither a mind to form intentions nor a body it directly controls: it lacks the proper mind/body unity. Instead, corporate acts originate in individual autonomous human beings who make up the corporation and who intentionally bring about corporate acts through their own bodily movements. Such human individuals, and not "the corporation," are morally responsible for corporate acts. Moreover, to say that an entity is "morally responsible" for a wrongful act is to say that the entity is liable to blame and punishment. But it is not possible to impose blame and punishment on a corporation without inflicting it on corporate members. Thus, to say that a corporation (as an entity distinct from its members) is "morally responsible" for a wrongful corporate act is to imply that a (possibly innocent) corporate member legitimately may be punished for something for which another entity was morally responsible. This violates the moral principles that underlie blame and punishment. To hold that the corporation can be morally responsible for its acts is to adopt a dangerous organicism. (shrink)

A critique of Milton Friedman's thesis that corporate executives have a fiduciary responsibility not to pursue socially desirable goals at the expense of profitability. The author argues that even under a libertarian conception of the nature of corporate property, Friedman's thesis does not follow. In particular, an executive's decision to prize "socially responsible behavior" above profit maximization does not necessarily violate the contractual rights of dissenting stockholders. Whether executives have obligations to refrain from such behavior depends entirely on the content (...) of the contract which actually exists between stockholders and executives. After an examination of the body of legal precedent which informs the content of that contract, the author concludes that there are clearly recognizable circumstances in which executives may legitimately pursue corporate altruism at the expense of profits, stockholder protestations notwithstanding. Since this contractual relationship with management is one in which stockholders have voluntarily engaged, libertarians have no grounds for complaining that the behavior of such executives constitutes a form of theft of the stockholders' property. (shrink)

The main arguments of Milton Friedman's famous and influential essay are unsuccessful: He fails to prove that the exercise of social responsibility in business is by nature an unfair and socialist practice.Much of Friedman's case is based on a questionable paradigm; a key premise is false; and logical cogency is sometimes missing.

There is a very apparent conflict between economists and ethicists over the moral standards that should be applied to the managers of business firms. The view of most economists is that moral standards in business are not relevant, beyond the normal personal obligations to speak the truth and observe the law, because profit maximizing behaviour, under market and resource constraints, leads inexorably to social welfare optimization. The opposing view of most humanists is that modern markets are not competitive enough to (...) be constraining, that profit maximization often leads to social harm, and that welfare benefits are unjustly distributed. The article examines the moral constructs in microeconomic theory and the ethical objections to that theory at both the pragmatic and theoretic levels, and concludes that inappropriate assumptions about the nature and worth of human beings in the economic paradigm require the use of moral standards for business decisions and actions. (shrink)

Professor Thomas Mulligan undertakes to discredit Milton Friedman's thesis that The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits. He attempts to do this by moving from Friedman's paradigm characterizing a socially responsible executive as willful and disloyal to a different paradigm, i.e., one emphasizing the consultative and consensus-building role of a socially responsible executive. Mulligan's critique misses the point, first, because even consensus-building executives act contrary to the will of minority shareholders, but even more importantly, because he assumes (...) that the mandate of a shareholder majority brings legitimacy to efforts of corporate managers to utilize corporate wealth in solving social problems. It is the role of our democratic institutions to deal with national agenda issues such as inflation, unemployment, and pollution, not that of the private sector. Corporations and private individuals do have a role to play in enhancing the quality of the human environment, however, and the author suggests a coherent means of developing that role in an effort rescue corporate social responsibility from Mulligan no less than from Friedman. (shrink)