- Accentuate the Negative.Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.details
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Analytic epistemology and experimental philosophy.Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.details
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Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.details
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Beyond the Courtroom: Agency and the Perception of Free will.Edouard Machery, Markus Kneer, Pascale Willemsen & Albert Newen - 2023 - In Samuel Murray & Paul Henne (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Bloomsbury.details
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Piercing the smoke screen: Dualism, free will, and Christianity.Samuel Murray, Elise Dykhuis & Thomas Nadelhoffer - forthcoming - Journal of Cognition and Culture.details
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The phenomenology of free will.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179.details
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Judgments of moral responsibility: a unified account.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - In Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (eds.), The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility. Blackwell. pp. 1–10.details
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Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions.Eddy Nahmias & Dylan Murray - 2010 - In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 189--215.details
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(In)compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2023 - In Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will. Wiley. pp. 58-83.details
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Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will.Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.) - 2023 - Wiley.details
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Experimental philosophy and moral responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 494–516.details
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Do people understand determinism? The tracking problem for measuring free will beliefs.Samuel Murray, Elise Dykhuis & Thomas Nadelhoffer - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy.details
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Sizing Up Free Will: The Scale of Compatibilism.Stuart Doyle - 2021 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 42 (3 & 4):271-289.details
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Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.details
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Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Ethics, X-Phi, and the Expanded Methodological Toolbox: How the Think Aloud Method and Interview Reveal People’s Judgments on Issues in Ethics and Beyond.Kyle Thompson - 2019 - Dissertation, Claremont Graduate Universitydetails
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Questioning the free will comprehension question.E. Cokely & A. Feltz - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 2440--2445.details
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Remaking responsibility: complexity and scattered causes in human agency.Joshua Fost & Coventry Angela - 2013 - In Tangjia Wang (ed.), Proceedings of the 1st International Conference of Philosophy: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow. Global Science and Technology Forum. pp. 91-101.details
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Freedom and chance.Mark Wulff Carstensen - unknowndetails
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Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydneydetails
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The Relevance of Folk Intuitions to Philosophical Debates.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Dissertation, Florida State Universitydetails
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Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology.Antti Kauppinen - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Helsinkidetails
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The Nature, Common Usage, and Implications of Free Will and Determinism.Shirley Matile Ogletree & Crystal D. Oberle - 2008 - Behavior and Philosophy 36:97 - 111.details
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Free will is about choosing: The link between choice and the belief in free will.Gilad Feldman, Roy Baumeister & Kin Fai Wong - 2014 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 55:239-245.details
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