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What is it like to be a bat?

In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450 (1979)

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  1. Pigeons as communicators and thinkers: Mon oncle d'Amerique deux?Robert W. Mitchell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):655-656.
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  • A human model for animal behavior.Richard Garrett - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):648-649.
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  • Behaviorism is alive and well.Lloyd G. Humphreys - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):651-652.
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  • Networks with evolutionary potential.Günter Ehret - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):376-377.
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  • Advantages of experimentation in neuroscience.Michael A. Arbib - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):368-369.
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  • How is a toad not like a bug?Jeffrey M. Camhi - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):371-372.
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  • Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.
    Barresi & Moore's account predicts that infants deprived of visual input will be delayed in achieving social understanding, a hypothesis that receives some support from studies of language use. by blind children. It is proposed that recently developed false belief and appearance/reality tasks be used to explore this issue further. Three possibly distracting conceptual issues are also discussed.
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  • Four-year-old humans are different: Why?Katherine Nelson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134-135.
    The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.
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  • Available tools for whole brain emulation.Diana Deca - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):67-86.
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  • Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied Cognition.Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):590-617.
    In a recent paper, Andy Clark (2008) has argued that the literature on embodied cognition reveals a tension between two prominent strands within this movement. On the one hand, there are those who endorse what Clark refers to as body-centrism, a view which emphasizes the special contribution made by the body to a creature’s mental life. Among other things, body centrism implies that significant differences in embodiment translate into significant differences in cognition and consciousness. On the other hand, there are (...)
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  • The vagueness constraint and the quality space for pain.Daniel Kostic - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):929-939.
    This paper is concerned with a quality space model as an account of the intelligibility of explanation. I argue that descriptions of causal or functional roles (Chalmers Levine, 2001) are not the only basis for intelligible explanations. If we accept that phenomenal concepts refer directly, not via descriptions of causal or functional roles, then it is difficult to find role fillers for the described causal roles. This constitutes a vagueness constraint on the intelligibility of explanation. Thus, I propose to use (...)
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  • Two Forms of Dualism.David Sosa - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):307-313.
    ABSTRACT: I distinguish two sorts of motivation for dualism. One motivation is driven by the distinctive character of conscious phenomenology. The other is driven by the special character of normativity: Is rationality an even problem than consciousness? There is no dramatic climax in which I show that these two dualist currents have a common source; in fact, I think they are relatively independent.
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  • Qualia and Materialism: Introduction.Don Ross & John Thorp - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):435.
    Though the days of consciousness-raising are mostly passed, the days of consciousness seem to be upon us, or, at least, to be upon philosophers. Dennett's recentConsciousness Explainedis the flagship for a flotilla of new major works on the subject, by Flanagan, Jackendoff, Searle, Seager and others. It seems to be something of a convention in such work that one begins by complaining that consciousness is a sorely neglected topic among philosophers; this cliché has created the faintly comical situation in whicheveryoneis (...)
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  • Consciousness and false HOTs.Jonah Wilberg - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):617-638.
    In this paper I aim to defend David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory of consciousness against a prominent objection. The central claim of HOT theory is that a mental state is conscious only if one has the HOT that one is in that state. In broad outline, the objection is that HOT theory is unable to account for cases where the relevant HOTs are false. I consider two variants of the objection, corresponding to two kinds of false HOT: those that merely (...)
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  • Self as cultural construct? An argument for levels of self-representations.Alexandra Zinck, Daniela Simon, Martin Schmidt-Daffy, Gottfried Vosgerau, Kirsten G. Volz, Anne Springer & Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):687-709.
    In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does (...)
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  • A dilemma for higher-order theories of consciousness.Isabel Gois - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):143-156.
    Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail to give an account of what they set out to explain: (...)
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  • (1 other version)Dolphin natures, human virtues: Macintyre and ethical naturalism.Shane Nicholas Glackin - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 39 (3):292-297.
    Can biological facts explain human morality? Aristotelian ‘virtue’ ethics has traditionally assumed so. In recent years Alasdair MacIntyre has reintroduced a form of Aristotle’s ‘metaphysical biology’ into his ethics. He argues that the ethological study of dependence and rationality in other species—dolphins in particular—sheds light on how those same traits in the typical lives of humans give rise to the moral virtues. However, some goal-oriented dolphin behaviour appears both dependent and rational in the precise manner which impresses MacIntyre, yet anything (...)
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  • On being philosophical and being John malkovich.Daniel Shaw - 2006 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (1):111–118.
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  • Biological realism and social constructivism.John Sabini & Jay Schulkin - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (3):207–217.
    In this paper we attempt to reconcile two important, current intellectual traditions: Darwinism and social constructionism. We believe that these two schools have important points of contact that have been obscured because each school has feared that the other wanted to put it out of business. We try to show that both traditions have much to of offer psychology, a discipline that has often been too individualistic, too concerned with the private and the subjective. The spirit of American pragmatism can (...)
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  • The grain objection.Michael B. Green - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (4):559-589.
    Many philosophers, both past and present, object to materialism not from any romantic anti-scientific bent, but from sheer inability to understand the thesis. It seems utterly inconceivable to some that qualia should exist in a world which is entirely material. This paper investigates the grain objection, a much neglected argument which purports to prove that sensations could not be brain events. Three versions are examined in great detail. The plausibility of the first version is shown to depend crucially on whether (...)
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  • (1 other version)The central role of the parietal lobes in consciousness.John G. Taylor - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):379-417.
    There are now various approaches to understand where and how in the brain consciousness arises from neural activity, none of which is universally accepted. Difficulties among these approaches are reviewed, and a missing ingredient is proposed here to help adjudicate between them, that of ''perspectivalness.'' In addition to a suitable temporal duration and information content of the relevant bound brain activity, this extra component is posited as being a further important ingredient for the creation of consciousness from neural activity. It (...)
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  • Against weak psychophysical supervenience.Reinaldo Elugardo - 1988 - Dialectica 42 (2):129-43.
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  • Aspects of the unity of consciousness and everyday memory failures.Rocco J. Gennaro, Douglas J. Herrmann & Michael Sarapata - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):372-385.
    We argue that analyzing everyday memory failures in terms of the “unity of consciousness” can elucidate the bases of such failures. A perfect unity amongst one’s mental states is rare. In extreme cases the unity of consciousness can breakdown in dramatic fashion , but such breakdowns also occur in less dramatic ways that affect us in everyday life. For example, disruptions in the unity of consciousness can result in everyday memory failures, such as forgetting to put on a tie for (...)
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  • On the multiplicity of consciousness.Sidney Carls-Diamante - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    It is commonly assumed that where consciousness is present, it is a single stream. This notion is bolstered by functions attributed to consciousness, particularly providing multi-faceted experience of a perceptual scene and contributing to the production of coherent behavior, which supposedly require consciousness to be unitary. It is believed that were the unitary structure of consciousness to break down, such that multiple streams of consciousness are present, these functions would be compromised. The split-brain syndrome is widely regarded as evidence for (...)
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  • Picking up the gauntlet. A reply to Casper and Haueis.Liliana Albertazzi - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-30.
    In recent years phenomenology has attracted the interest of science, acquiring a role far beyond philosophy. Despite Husserl's clear denial of a possible naturalization of phenomenology, scientists from different fields have proposed its naturalization. To achieve this goal, different methodologies have been proposed. Most scientists seem to agree on the claim that phenomenology cannot be a science itself because it fails to respect one of the prerequisites of science, that is, the capacity to explain its phenomena. Phenomenology, thus, is forced (...)
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  • A philosophical analysis of the emergence of language.Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi & Antonio Benítez-Burraco - 2024 - Theoria 90 (1):30-55.
    There is a research programme in linguistics that is founded on describing language as an emergent phenomenon. This paper clarifies how the core concept of emergence is deployed in this emergentist programme. We show that if one adopts the weak understandings of the concept of language emergence, the emergentist programme is not fundamentally different from the other non-emergentist research programmes in linguistics. On the other hand, if one adopts the stronger understandings of emergence then the programme would have a unique (...)
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  • Sonic enrichment at the zoo.Rébecca Kleinberger - 2023 - Interaction Studies 24 (2):257-288.
    There is a strong disconnect between humans and other species in our societies. Zoos particularly expose this disconnect by displaying the asymmetry between visitors in search of entertainment, and animals often suffering from a lack of meaningful interactions and natural behaviors. In zoos, many species are unable to mate, raise young, or exhibit engagement behaviors. Enrichment is a way to enhance their quality of life, enabling them to express natural behaviors and reducing stereotypies. Prior work on sound-based enrichment and interactivity (...)
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  • Does illusionism imply skepticism of animal consciousness?Leonard Dung - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-19.
    Illusionism about consciousness entails that phenomenal consciousness doesn’t exist. The distribution question concerns the distribution of consciousness in the animal kingdom. Skepticism of animal consciousness is the view that few or no kinds of animals possess consciousness. Thus, illusionism seems to imply a skeptical view on the distribution question. However, I argue that illusionism and skepticism of animal consciousness are actually orthogonal to each other. If illusionism is true, then phenomenal consciousness does not ground intrinsic value so that the non-existence (...)
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  • Meaningful Lives in an Age of Artificial Intelligence: A Reply to Danaher.Lucas Scripter - 2022 - Science and Engineering Ethics 28 (1):1-9.
    Does the rise of artificial intelligence pose a threat to human sources of meaning? While much ink has been spilled on how AI could undercut meaningful human work, John Danaher has raised the stakes by claiming that AI could “sever” human beings from non-work-related sources of meaning—specifically, those related to intellectual and moral goods. Against this view, I argue that his suggestion that AI poses a threat to these areas of meaningful activity is overstated. Self-transformative activities pose a hard limit (...)
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  • Does the Intuition of Distinctness Result from Valid Reasoning? – Reply to Kammerer.Karol Polcyn - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (1):321-337.
    According to an influential physicalist view, the intuition of distinctness is a cognitive illusion in the sense that it results from fallacious reasoning: we erroneously infer that the referents of phenomenal and physical concepts are different, from the fact that there is a certain difference between our uses of those concepts. (Kammerer, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10:649–667, 2019) has recently argued, however, that it is psychologically implausible that the intuition of distinctness results from a fallacy: the reasoning process leading (...)
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  • Sensorimotor debilities in digital cultures.Simon Penny - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (1):355-366.
    This paper reflects on the qualities of living and learning in digital cultures, the design of digital technologies and the philosophical history that has informed that design. It takes as its critical perspective the field of embodied cognition as it has developed over the last three decades, in concert with emerging neurophysiology and neurocognitive research. From this perspective the paper considers cognitive, neurological and physiological effects that are increasingly becoming noticed in user populations, especially young populations. I call this class (...)
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  • The subject in posthumanist theory: Retained rather than dethroned.Ingrid Andersson - 2022 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 54 (4):395-403.
    The aim of this paper is to sketch a conception of a posthuman subject in which we can recognize a cognitive dimension. Through Hayles’s widened notion of cognition, I argue that we can retain the interpreting subject within posthumanism and thereby view it as entrenched in the surrounding world. Nonconscious- and conscious cognition, which are the terms that Hayles utilizes, shows how both non-human cognizing systems and the human subject widens while remaining level specific. The text concludes with a discussion (...)
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  • Emotion’s role in the unity of consciousness.Maria Doulatova - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):529-549.
    In this work I argue that emotion plays a key role in ensuring a unified perspective on the world. In particular, while many thoughts and feelings surface onto consciousness, it is not clear how they get combined into a unified point of view or what’s it’s like to be you at any given time. While many philosophers argue that reason or higher-order cognition plays a key role in delineating our point of view, I argue that higher-order cognition plays a subsidiary (...)
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  • A Relational Conception of Emotional Development.Michael Mascolo - 2020 - Emotion Review 12 (4):212-228.
    In this article, I outline a relational-developmental conception of emotion that situates emotional activity within a broader conception of persons as holistic, relational beings. In this model, emotions consist of felt forms of engagement with the world. As felt aspects of ongoing action, uninhibited emotional experiences are not private states that are inaccessible to other people; instead, they are revealed directly through their bodily expressions. As multicomponent processes, emotional experiences exhibit both continuity and dramatic change in development. Building on these (...)
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  • The Essential Tension in Phenomenal Consciousness.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2020 - Philosophical Papers 49 (1):159-190.
    The contemporary standard view of phenomenal consciousness —shared by reductionists and non-reductionists alike—takes it to be a simple, ‘low-level’, ‘pre-reflective’ feature of mental states,...
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  • Are Intuitions Quasi‐Perceptual “Presentations”?Max Deutsch - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):631-648.
    Metaphilosophy, Volume 50, Issue 5, Page 631-648, October 2019.
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  • Attention and Consciousness: A Comment on Watzl's Structuring Mind.Donnchadh O’Conaill - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):303-312.
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 8, Issue 4, Page 303-312, December 2019.
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  • II—Waking, Knowing, and Being Conscious.James Stazicker - 2019 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 93 (1):137-160.
    Being conscious, in the sense in which this state is associated with being awake as opposed to dreaming or sleepwalking, has a distinctive experiential character and epistemic role. The former is reflected in the experience of waking up, the latter in traditional problems about perceptual knowledge. I outline a conception of being wakefully conscious which identifies this state in terms of its role in explaining knowledge about one’s environment and oneself. I suggest that this dual epistemic role may be grounded, (...)
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  • What about unconscious processing during the test?Pierre Perruchet & Jorge Gallego - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):415-416.
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  • The empirical detection of creativity.Han L. J. van der Maas & Peter C. M. Molenaar - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):555-555.
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  • (1 other version)Reviews. [REVIEW]Allison Barnes, Cara Spencer, Gavin B. Sullivan & Sam Coleman - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):815-833.
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  • The metaphysical self and the self in metaphysics and religion: Ambiguities of mind and reality.Cornel W. du Toit - 2019 - HTS Theological Studies 75 (1):9.
    The thesis of this article is that the self is a construct or illusion and simultaneously real. The notion of self is constitutive in metaphysics and operates subconsciously and indirectly in all human activities. The metaphysical self constitutes its own reality. The article is critical of developments in cognitive science and neuroscience where neurocentrism reduces self to brain processes. The tenet is that the self is more than its biological make-up and the measurement of brain processes. The metaphysical as well (...)
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  • The Chimeric Self: A Neo Naturalist Bundle Theory of the Self.Lucrezia Compiani - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • (1 other version)Understanding Consciousness.Isabel Góis - 2001 - Disputatio 1 (10):2-21.
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  • A Buddhist Analysis of Affective Bias.Sean M. Smith - 2019 - Journal of Indian Philosophy (1):1-31.
    In this paper, I explore a debate between some Indian Buddhist schools regarding the nature of the underlying tendencies or anusaya-s. I focus here primarily on the ninth chapter of Kathāvatthu’s representation of a dispute about whether an anusaya can be said to have intentional object. I also briefly treat of Vasubandhu’s defense of the Sautrāntika view of anuśaya in the opening section of the fifth chapter his Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. Following Vasubandhu, I argue against the Thervādin Abhidharmikas that the underlying tendencies (...)
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  • Is there a philosophy of information?Filip Buekens, Alessandro Salice, Luciano Floridi, Bert Baumgaertner & Filippo Domaneschi - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):161-171.
    In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other (...)
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  • Can the Unconscious Image Save “No Overflow”?Nicholas D’Aloisio-Montilla - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (48):1-42.
    The question of whether phenomenal consciousness is limited to the capacity of cognitive access remains a contentious issue in philosophy. Overflow theorists argue that the capacity of conscious experience outstrips the capacity of cognitive access. This paper demonstrates a resolution to the overflow debate is found in acknowledging a difference in phenomenological timing required by both sides. It makes clear that the “no overflow” view requires subjects to, at the bare minimum, generate an unconscious visual image of previously presented items (...)
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  • The limits of decision and choice.Gabriel Abend - 2018 - Theory and Society 47 (6):805-841.
    Concepts of decision, choice, decision-maker, and decision-making are common practical tools in both social science and natural science, on which scientific knowledge, policy implications, and moral recommendations are based. In this article I address three questions. First, I look into how present-day social scientists and natural scientists use decision/choice concepts. What are they used for? Second, scientists may differ in the application of decision/choice to X, and they may explicitly disagree about the applicability of decision/choice to X. Where exactly do (...)
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  • The How and Why of Consciousness?Tim S. Meese - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Envy and us.Alessandro Salice & Alba Montes Sánchez - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):227-242.
    Within emotion theory, envy is generally portrayed as an antisocial emotion because the relation between the envier and the rival is thought to be purely antagonistic. This paper resists this view by arguing that envy presupposes a sense of us. First, we claim that hostile envy is triggered by the envier's sense of impotence combined with her perception that an equality principle has been violated. Second, we introduce the notion of â hetero-induced self-conscious emotionsâ by focusing on the paradigmatic cases (...)
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