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What is it like to be a bat?

Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50 (1974)

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  1. A promissory note is paid, but has this bought into an illusion?Philip N. Hineline - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):650-651.
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  • Difference without discontinuity.Max Hocutt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):651-651.
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  • Behaviorism is alive and well.Lloyd G. Humphreys - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):651-652.
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  • A human model for animal behavior.Richard Garrett - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):648-649.
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  • Communication versus discrimination.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):649-650.
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  • Plausible reconstruction? No!E. J. Capaldi & Robert W. Proctor - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):646-647.
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  • No report; no feeling.Lawrence H. Davis - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):647-648.
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  • The outside route to the inside story.Marc N. Branch - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):644-645.
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  • Animal communication of private states does not illuminate the human case.Selmer Bringsjord & Elizabeth Bringsjord - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):645-646.
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  • Communication and internal states: What is their relationship?Michael Bamberg - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):643-644.
    Common folks “have” emotions and talk to others; and sometimes they make “their” emotions the topic of such talk. The emotions seem to be “theirs,” since they can be conceived of as private states ; and they can be topicalized, because we seem to be able to attribute or lend a conventionalized public form to some inner state or event. This is the way much of our folk-talk and folk-thinking about emotions, the expression thereof, the role of language in these (...)
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  • The status of private events in behavior analysis.William M. Baum - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):644-644.
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  • Perhaps Sisyphus is the relevant model for animal-language researchers.Donald M. Baer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):642-643.
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  • Species and individual differences in communication based on private states.David Lubinski & Travis Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):627-642.
    The way people come to report private stimulation arising within their own bodies is not well understood. Although the Darwinian assumption of biological continuity has been the basis of extensive animal modeling for many human biological and behavioral phenomena, few have attempted to model human communication based on private stimulation. This target article discusses such an animal model using concepts and methods derived from the study of discriminative stimulus effects of drugs and recent research on interanimal communication. We discuss how (...)
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  • Toad's prey-catching: A complex system with heuristic value.Jörg-Peter Ewert - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):389-405.
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  • Implicit versus explicit computation.Kent A. Stevens - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):387-388.
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  • Intelligent neurons.G. Székely - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):388-389.
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  • Neuroethology and color vision in amphibians.S. L. Kondrashev - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):385-385.
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  • Worm detector replaced by network model – but still a bit worm-infested.Gerhard Roth & Kiisa Nishikawa - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):385-386.
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  • Sensorimotor maps in the tectum.A. Roucoux & M. Crommelinck - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):386-387.
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  • Sampling and information processing.Edward Gruberg - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):381-382.
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  • Presumptions based on keyhole peeping.G. A. Horridge - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):382-383.
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  • Ewert's model: Some discoveries and some difficulties.David Ingle - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):383-385.
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  • The compleat visual system: From input to output.M. A. Goodale - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):379-380.
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  • The nervous system/behavior interface: Levels of organization and levels of approach.Paul Grobstein - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):380-381.
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  • Ethological invariants: Boxes, rubber bands, and biological processes.John C. Fentress - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):377-378.
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  • Prey-catching in toads: An exceptional neuroethological model.Seven O. E. Ebbesson - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):375-376.
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  • Networks with evolutionary potential.Günter Ehret - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):376-377.
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  • Toward a reformulation of the command concept.Randolf DiDomenico & Robert C. Eaton - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):374-375.
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  • Has the greedy toad lost its soul; and if so, what was it?Robert W. Doty - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):375-375.
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  • Sensorimotor functions: What is a command, that a code may yield it?Christopher M. Comer - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):372-372.
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  • Advantages of experimentation in neuroscience.Michael A. Arbib - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):368-369.
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  • Ethology and physiology: A happy marriage.Gerard P. Baerends - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):369-370.
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  • After the sensory analysers: Problems with concepts and terminology.D. M. Broom - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):370-371.
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  • How is a toad not like a bug?Jeffrey M. Camhi - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):371-372.
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  • Neuroethology of releasing mechanisms: Prey-catching in toads.Jörg-Peter Ewert - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):337-368.
    Abstract“Sign stimuli” elicit specific patterns of behavior when an organism's motivation is appropriate. In the toad, visually released prey-catching involves orienting toward the prey, approaching, fixating, and snapping. For these action patterns to be selected and released, the prey must be recognized and localized in space. Toads discriminate prey from nonprey by certain spatiotemporal stimulus features. The stimulus-response relations are mediated by innate releasing mechanisms (RMs) with recognition properties partly modifiable by experience. Striato-pretecto-tectal connectivity determines the RM's recognition and localization (...)
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  • More on prosopagnosia.Andrew W. Young - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-271.
    Some cases of prosopagnosia involve a highly circumscribed loss of A-consciousness. When seen in this way they offer further support for the arguments made in Block's target article.
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  • Feeling of knowing and phenomenal consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.
    In Feeling of Knowing cases, subjects have a form of consciousness about the presence of a content (such as an item of information) without having access to it. If this phenomenon can be correctly interpreted as having to do with consciousness, then there would be a P-conscious mental experience which is dissociated from access.
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  • Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.
    It is argued that there is no fallacy in the reasoning in the example of the thirsty blindsight subject, on one reconstruction of that reasoning. Neither the case of orgasm nor the case of a visual versus an auditory experience as of something overheard shows that phenomenal content is not representational.
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  • Consciousness is not a natural kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.
    Blocks distinction between “phenomenal feel” consciousness and “thought/cognition” consciousness is a cultural construction. Consciousness (and its “subspecies”) is not a natural kind. Some crosscultural data are presented to support this.
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  • Should we continue to study consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.
    Block has attempted to reduce the confusion and controversy concerning the term “consciousness” by suggesting that there are two forms or types of consciousness, each of which has several characteristics or properties. This suggestion appears to further becloud the topic, however. Perhaps consciousness cannot be defined adequately and should not be considered as a topic that can be studied scientifically.
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  • How access-consciousness might be a kind of consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.
    In response to the objection that his “access-consciousness” is not really consciousness but a matter of the availability of certain information for certain kinds of processing, Block will probably have to argue that consciousness in a more basic, familiar, traditional sense is an essential component of any instance of access-consciousness and thus justifies the name.
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  • Conscious and nonconscious control of action.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266.
    I criticize Block's examples of P-consciousness and A-consciousness for being flawed and the notion of A-consciousness for not being a notion of consciousness at all. I argue that an empirically important distinction can be made between behavior that is supported by an underlying conscious experience and behavior that is brought about by nonconscious action-control mechanisms. This distinction is different from that made by Block.
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  • Block's philosophical anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.
    Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
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  • Access and what it is like.Bernard W. Kobes - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):260-260.
    Block's cases of superblindsight, the pneumatic drill, and the Sperling experiments do not show that P-consciousness and Aconsciousness can come apart. On certain tendentious but not implausible construals of the concepts of P- and A-consciousness, they refer to the same psychological phenomenon.
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  • Phenomenal access: A moving target.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.
    Basically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.
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  • Access denied.Dan Lloyd - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-262.
    The information processing that constitutes accessconsciousness is not sufficient to make a representational state conscious in any sense. Standard examples of computation without consciousness undermine A-consciousness, and Block's cases seem to derive their plausibility from a lurking phenomenal awareness. That is, people and other minded systems seem to have access-consciousness only insofar as the state accessed is a phenomenal one, or the state resulting from access is phenomenal, or both.
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  • Phenomenal and attentional consciousness may be inextricable.Adam Morton - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):263-264.
    In common sense consciousness has a fairly determinate content – the (single) way an experience feels, the (single) line of thought being consciously followed. The determinacy of the object may be achieved by linking Block's two concepts, so that as long as we hold on to the determinacy of content we are unable to separate P and A.
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  • On distinguishing phenomenal consciousness from the representational functions of mind.Leonard D. Katz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):258-259.
    One can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind.
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  • Triangulating phenomenal consciousness.Patricia Kitcher - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):259-260.
    This commentary offers two criticisms of Block's account of phenomenal consciousness and a brief sketch of a rival account. The negative points are that monitoring consciousness also involves the possession of certain states and that phenomenal consciousness inevitably involves some sort of monitoring. My positive suggestion is that “phenomenal consciousness” may refer to our ability to monitor the rich but preconceptual states that retain perceptual information for complex processing.
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