Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Beyond Sympathy: Smith’s Rejection of Hume’s Moral Theory.Paul Sagar - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (4):681-705.
    Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments has long been recognized as importantly influenced by, and in part responding to, David Hume’s earlier ethical theory. With regard to Smith’s account of the foundations of morals in particular, recent scholarly attention has focused on Smith’s differences with Hume over the question of sympathy. Whilst this is certainly important, disagreement over sympathy in fact represents only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with – and eventual attempted rejection of – Hume’s core moral theory. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Sentientism, Motivation, and Philosophical Vulcans.Luke Roelofs - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Role of Imagination in Decision-Making.Bence Nanay - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):126-142.
    The psychological mechanism of decision-making has traditionally been modeled with the help of belief-desire psychology: the agent has some desires (or other pro-attitudes) and some background beliefs and deciding between two possible actions is a matter of comparing the probability of the satisfaction of these desires given the background beliefs in the case of the performance of each action. There is a wealth of recent empirical findings about how we actually make decisions that seems to be in conflict with this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • The Fellow-Feeling Paradox: Hume, Smith and the Moral Order.Elias L. Khalil - 2015 - Philosophy 90 (4):653-678.
    Hume and Smith advance different answers to the question of whether sympathy can ever be the foundation of the moral order. They hold contradictory views of sympathy, called here ‘the Fellow-Feeling Paradox’. For Hume, fellow-feeling tends to reverberate in society, leading to the socialization of the individual and even mob (collective) psychology. Hence, sympathy cannot be the foundation of the moral order. In contrast, for Smith, fellow-feeling develops into critical judgment of the emotions/actions, leading to individual moral autonomy even self-command. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • SIMPATÍA, RESENTIMIENTO Y PERDÓN: UN ANÁLISIS DEL ROL DEL RESENTIMIENTO EN LA TMS DE ADAM SMITH.Rodríguez Baños Jeyver & Jeyver Rodríguez Baños - 2017 - Universitas Philosophica (núm. 68):197-218.
    El artículo analiza el papel del resentimiento en la Teoría de los sentimientos morales de Adam Smith y su conexión con el proceso de la simpatía mutua por medio del cual el “espectador imparcial” asume plenamente el resentimiento de la víctima, al considerar que su pasión se rige por los principios de la propiedad y la justicia. Se sostiene que el resentimiento no solo cumple un rol central en la teoría del castigo de Adam Smith, en la medida en que (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Making Sense of Smith on Sympathy and Approbation: Other-Oriented Sympathy as a Psychological and Normative Achievement.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (4):735-755.
    Two problems seem to plague Adam Smith’s account of sympathy and approbation in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). First, Smith’s account of sympathy at the beginning of TMS appears to be inconsistent with the account of sympathy at the end of TMS. In particular, it seems that Smith did not appreciate the distinction between ‘self-oriented sympathy’ and ‘other-oriented sympathy’, that is, between imagining being oneself in the actor’s situation and imagining being the actor in the actor’s situation. Second, Smith’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Limits of Sympathetic Concern and Moral Consideration in Adam Smith.Ryan Pollock - 2019 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 36 (3):257-277.
    Smith thinks it possible to sympathize with certain non-sentient beings, such as the human dead. Consequently, some commentators argue that Smith’s theory supports ecocentrism. I reject that Smith’s theory has this implication. Sympathizers in Smith’s theory can imagine themselves as non-sentient beings, but they will lack the relevant evaluative concerns. The situation of a non-sentient being, as that being confronts the situation, remains inaccessible to the sympathizer. I will also address the limits of sympathetic concern within Smith’s theory,; highlight a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark