Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. De Se Preferences and Empathy for Future Selves.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):7-39.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Rewarding one’s Future Self: Psychological Connectedness, Episodic Prospection, and a Puzzle about Perspective.Christopher Jude McCarroll & Erica Cosentino - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):449-467.
    When faced with intertemporal choices, which have consequences that unfold over time, we often discount the future, preferring smaller immediate rewards often at the expense of long-term benefits. How psychologically connected one feels to one’s future self-influences such temporal discounting. Psychological connectedness consists in sharing psychological properties with past or future selves, but connectedness comes in degrees. If one feels that one is not psychologically connected to one’s future self, one views that self like a different person and is less (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.
    Many of our beliefs behave irrationally: this is hardly news to anyone. Although beliefs’ irrational tendencies need to be taken into account, this paper argues that beliefs necessarily preserve at least a minimal level of rationality. This view offers a plausible picture of what makes belief unique and will help us to set beliefs apart from other cognitive attitudes.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Common Frame for Formal Imagination.Joan Casas-Roma, M. Elena Rodríguez & Antonia Huertas - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (4):603-634.
    In this paper, we review three influential theories of imagination in order to understand how the dynamics of imagination acts could be modeled using formal languages. While reviewing them, we notice that they are not detailed enough to account for all the mechanisms involved in creating and developing imaginary worlds. We claim those theories could be further refined into what we call the Common Frame for Imagination Acts, which defines a framework that can be used to study the dynamics of (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Visual Phenomenology Versus Visuomotor Imagery: How Can We Be Aware of Action Properties?Gabriele Ferretti - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3309-3338.
    Here is a crucial question in the contemporary philosophy of perception: how can we be aware of action properties? According to the perceptual view, we consciously see them: they are present in our visual phenomenology. However, this view faces some problems. First, I review these problems. Then, I propose an alternative view, according to which we are aware of action properties because we imagine them through a special form of imagery, which I call visuomotor imagery. My account is to be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Logic of Imagination Acts: A Formal System for the Dynamics of Imaginary Worlds.Joan Casas-Roma, Antonia Huertas & M. Elena Rodríguez - 2019 - Erkenntnis:1-29.
    Imagination has received a great deal of attention in different fields such as psychology, philosophy and the cognitive sciences, in which some works provide a detailed account of the mechanisms involved in the creation and elaboration of imaginary worlds. Although imagination has also been formalized using different logical systems, none of them captures those dynamic mechanisms. In this work, we take inspiration from the Common Frame for Imagination Acts, that identifies the different processes involved in the creation of imaginary worlds, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Parental Choices and the Prospect of Regret: An Alternative Account.Katrien Schaubroeck & Kristien Hens - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):586-607.
    ABSTRACTIs the question ‘will you regret it if you do this?’ helpful when people face difficult life decisions, such as terminating a pregnancy if a disability is detected or deciding to become a parent? Despite the commonness of the question in daily life, several philosophers have argued lately against its usefulness. We reconstruct four arguments from recent literature on regret, transformative experience and the use of imagination in deliberation. After analysis of these arguments we conclude that the prospect of regret (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Brill.
    This book aims to show that recent developments in neuroscience permit a defense of free will. Through language, human beings can escape strict biological determinism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Logic of Imagination Acts: A Formal System for the Dynamics of Imaginary Worlds.Joan Casas-Roma, Antonia Huertas & M. Elena Rodríguez - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):875-903.
    Imagination has received a great deal of attention in different fields such as psychology, philosophy and the cognitive sciences, in which some works provide a detailed account of the mechanisms involved in the creation and elaboration of imaginary worlds. Although imagination has also been formalized using different logical systems, none of them captures those dynamic mechanisms. In this work, we take inspiration from the Common Frame for Imagination Acts, that identifies the different processes involved in the creation of imaginary worlds, (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Rational preference in transformative experiences.Saira Khan - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    L. A. Paul’s Transformative Experience makes the claim that many important life decisions are epistemically and personally transformative in a way that does not allow us to assign subjective values to their outcomes. As a result, we cannot use normative decision theory to make such decisions rationally, or when we modify it to do so, decision theory leads us to choose in a way that is in tension with our authenticity. This paper examines Paul’s version of decision theory, and whether (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Biased by Our Imaginings.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.
    I propose a new model of implicit bias, according to which implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. I begin by endorsing a principle of parsimony when confronted with unfamiliar phenomena. I introduce implicit bias in terms congenial to what most philosophers and psychologists have said about their nature in the literature so far, before moving to a discussion of the doxastic model of implicit bias and objections to it. I then introduce unconscious imagination and argue that appeal to it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Fiction, Imagination, and Normative Rationality.Malvina Ongaro - 2020 - Argumenta 1 (6):135-146.
    -/- Rationality is a cornerstone of economics. The properties defining rationality are embodied by the Rational Agent, whose actions are prescriptive for economic agents. However, the Rational Agent is a fictional character: so why should real agents act like it? The Rational Agent takes its normative force from the arguments in support of the properties it embodies. In this paper, I explore the grounds for the normative force of the Rational Agent by looking at one of them. I explain the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Unconscious Imagination and the Mental Imagery Debate.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Traditionally, philosophers have appealed to the phenomenological similarity between visual experience and visual imagery to support the hypothesis that there is significant overlap between the perceptual and imaginative domains. The current evidence, however, is inconclusive: while evidence from transcranial brain stimulation seems to support this conclusion, neurophysiological evidence from brain lesion studies (e.g., from patients with brain lesions resulting in a loss of mental imagery but not a corresponding loss of perception and vice versa) indicates that there are functional and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Imagination.Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Gendler - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To imagine is to form a mental representation that does not aim at things as they actually, presently, and subjectively are. One can use imagination to represent possibilities other than the actual, to represent times other than the present, and to represent perspectives other than one’s own. Unlike perceiving and believing, imagining something does not require one to consider that something to be the case. Unlike desiring or anticipating, imagining something does not require one to wish or expect that something (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • A Common Frame for Formal Imagination.Joan Casas-Roma, M. Elena Rodríguez & Antonia Huertas - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (4):603-634.
    In this paper, we review three influential theories of imagination in order to understand how the dynamics of imagination acts could be modeled using formal languages. While reviewing them, we notice that they are not detailed enough to account for all the mechanisms involved in creating and developing imaginary worlds. We claim those theories could be further refined into what we call the Common Frame for Imagination Acts, which defines a framework that can be used to study the dynamics of (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    Many agree that one cannot consciously form a belief just because one wants to. And many also agree this is a puzzling component of our conscious belief-forming processes. I will look at three views on how to make sense of this puzzle and show that they all fail in some way. I then offer a simpler explanation that avoids all the pitfalls of those views, which is based instead on an analysis of our conscious reasoning combined with a commonly accepted (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Interface Problems in the Explanation of Action.Daniel C. Burnston - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):242-258.
    When doing mental ontology, we must ask how to individuate distinct categories of mental states, and then, given that individuation, ask how states from distinct categories interact. One promising proposal for how to individuate cognitive from sensorimotor states is in terms of their representational form. On these views, cognitive representations are propositional in structure, while sensorimotor representations have an internal structure that maps to the perceptual and kinematic dimensions involved in an action context. This way of thinking has resulted in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • The imagination model of implicit bias.Anna Welpinghus - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1611-1633.
    We can understand implicit bias as a person’s disposition to evaluate members of a social group in a less favorable light than members of another social group, without intending to do so. If we understand it this way, we should not presuppose a one-size-fits-all answer to the question of how implicit cognitive states lead to skewed evaluations of other people. The focus of this paper is on implicit bias in considered decisions. It is argued that we have good reasons to (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Fodor on Imagistic Mental Representations.Daniel C. Burnston - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):71-94.
    : Fodor’s view of the mind is thoroughly computational. This means that the basic kind of mental entity is a “discursive” mental representation and operations over this kind of mental representation have broad architectural scope, extending out to the edges of perception and the motor system. However, in multiple epochs of his work, Fodor attempted to define a functional role for non-discursive, imagistic representation. I describe and critique his two considered proposals. The first view says that images play a particular (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Imagination.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2011 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Intending, Believing, and Supposing at Will.Joshua Shepherd - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):321-330.
    In this paper I consider an argument for the possibility of intending at will, and its relationship to an argument about the possibility of believing at will. I argue that although we have good reason to think we sometimes intend at will, we lack good reason to think this in the case of believing. Instead of believing at will, agents like us often suppose at will.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations