The present PhD dissertation aims to examine the relation between modality and change in Aristotle’s metaphysics. -/- On the one hand, Aristotle supports his modal realism (i.e., worldly objects have modal properties - potentialities and essences - that ground the ascriptions of possibility and necessity) by arguing that the rejection of modal realism makes change inexplicable, or, worse, banishes it from the realm of reality. On the other hand, the Stagirite analyses processes by means of modal notions (‘change is the (...) actuality of what is virtual insofar as it is virtual’). In other words: to grasp what change is, one has to resort to the modal idiom of potentialities, while the fact that there is change is indicative of the fact that nature is full of modal properties. -/- Aristotle’s modal and kinetic realism finds a negative in the figure of the Megaric Diodorus Kronus. The polemical situation of Greek philosophy has indeed the dialectical advantage of not opposing the Aristotelian position to a sui generis straw man. Both in its reduction of modal judgements to temporal quantifications and in its dissolution of the reality of the state-of-being-in-motion in favour of a cinematographic view of processes, the philosophical figure of reductionist antirealism embodied by Diodorus constitutes an alternative that takes the opposite view of Aristotle’s realism. -/- The present study is structured as a discussion between these two positions. In the face of Diodorus’ antirealist challenges, Aristotle articulates modal and kinetic considerations: the answers he gives to Diodorus’ puzzles thus provide valuable insight into his metaphysics. Moreover, the examination of Aristotle’s and Diodorus’ metaphysics, because of their insight and originality, will not fail to interest the philosopher concerned with the metaphysical foundations of modern physics, insofar as the entanglement between modalities and processes is nowadays at the core of mechanics (phase spaces, path integrals, etc.). (shrink)

Paul Natorp, John Dewey and Sergius Hessen are usually considered to represent three different philosophical and pedagogical doctrines developed at the turn of the Twentieth century. These are, respectively: neo‐Kantianism, pragmatism and humanistic pedagogy widely rooted in Wil‐ helm Dilthey’s philosophy. Contrary to this common classification, Hessen himself described his own concept of pedagogy as an applied philosophy as a continuation of Natorp’s thought. However, Hessen also noted that an approach very similar to his one can be found in John (...) Dewey’s theory. In this case, the fundamental issue is to determine the relationship between philosophy and pedagogical theory and practise. The main part of this article will identify the specificity of this relationship: the specificity implied by the concept of pedagogy understood as applied philosophy. The concept of pedagogy, understood as an applied philosophy in its theoretical and practical aspects, is the basis for critical reconstruction of social life in general. It is the opinion shared by all three philosophers that this type of reconstruction should be based on the communal dimension of basic social interactions, that is, on the communal dimension of work. The only way for the renewal of a different form of social life leads through regaining through them an essential communal dimension of human work. All three authors agreed that to regain the communal dimension of human work by another form of social interaction would only be possible when certain conditions are present; that is, when work will be permeated by individual creativity. The presence of such conditions shall be ensured by the educational community. Thus, the educational community should be a starting and end point for any critical social reconstruction as well as for the pedagogy understood as an applied philosophy. (shrink)

(2005). Frameworks & foundations. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 201-218.

La théorie de l’organisme social était une approche foncièrement et largement répandue au début du 20ème siècle, qui était acceptée par de nombreuses orientations théoriques dans la sociologie et l’économie. L’approche de Rudolf Steiner s’y rapportant est bien connue. La théorie de Gerhard Stolzmann ne l’est pas autant. Ce dernier était un représentant de ce qu’on appelle le « mouvement des droits sociaux de l’économie politique » et au plan philosophique, il défendait le néo-kantisme (école de Marburg, de l’Allemagne du (...) sud-ouest). Stolzmann a connu et cité les écrits de Steiner sur l’organisme social, comme on peut le prouver. Dans cet essai, on va mettre au jour les communautés et tendances dans le concept de l’organisme social chez Stolzmann et Steiner. Tous deux ont mis en exergue l’importance du spirituel et en conséquence de la sphère du droit, pour la société et l’économie dans leur théorie. Mais Steiner eut essentiellement une amorce plus pratique. Son concept d’organisme social est plus une proposition de réforme pour l’économie et la société, alors que Stolzmann fait ressortir la signification théorique générale toujours valable de sa théorie. (shrink)

With the use of a particular metaphor, which appears at the end of the Cratylus and is taken up with perfect symmetry at the beginning of the Theaetetus, Plato certainly wanted to indicate the succession of Cratylus–Theaetetus as an order for reading the two dialogues, which Trasillus faithfully reproduced in structuring the second tetralogy of Platonic dialogues. The claim of the theory of ideas, with which the Cratylus ends, must therefore be considered the background in which to place not only (...) the analysis of the name carried out in the Cratylus, but also the discussion and criticism of the epistemological theories examined and refuted in the Theaetetus. The transition from the discussion of the name to that of the logos is another important theoretical element that connects the two dialogues. Another one is the theory of knowledge, already precisely elaborated in the Cratylus, and taken up and deepened in the Theaetetus. Finally, the theme of false and error is a third theoretical element common to the two dialogues, which, starting from Euthydemus, finds its solution in the Sophist. (shrink)

Die Theorie des sozialen Organismus war zur Zeit des Beginns des 20. Jahrhunderts ein durchaus weit verbreiteter Ansatz der von vielen verschiedenen theoretischen Richtungen in der Soziologie und Ökonomie aufgenommen wurde. Bekannt ist der diesbezügliche Ansatz von Rudolf Steiner. Eher nicht so bekannt ist die Theorie von Rudolf Stolzmann. Letzterer war ein Vertreter der sogenannten sozialrechtlichen Richtung der Nationalökonomie und philosophisch war er ein Vertreter des Neukantianismus (Marburger Schule, Südwestdeutsche Schule). Stolzmann hat Steiners Schriften zum sozialen Organismus nachweislich gekannt und (...) auch zitiert. In diesem Aufsatz sollen Gemeinsamkeiten und Trennendes im Konzept des sozialen Organismus bei Stolzmann und Steiner gefunden werden. Stolzmann und Steiner haben die Bedeutung des Geistigen und in weiterer Folge des Rechtlichen für die Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft in ihrer Theorie hervorgehoben. Steiner hatte aber den wesentlich praktischeren Ansatz. Sein Konzept des sozialen Organismus ist mehr ein Reformvorschlag für Ökonomie und Gesellschaft, während Stolzmann die theoretische und immer gültige Bedeutung seiner Theorie hervorhebt. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl’s overall diagnosis and critique of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism: First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is ‘countersensical’ in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification. Second, naturalism (...) essentially misconstrues consciousness by treating it as a part of the world. Third, naturalism is the inevitable consequence of a certain rigidification of the ‘natural attitude’ into what Husserl calls the ‘naturalistic attitude’. This naturalistic attitude ‘reifies’ and it ‘absolutizes’ the world such that it is treated as taken-for-granted and ‘obvious’. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological analysis, however, discloses that the natural attitude is, despite its omnipresence in everyday life, not primary, but in fact is relative to the ‘absolute’ transcendental attitude. The mature Husserl’s critique of naturalism is therefore based on his acceptance of the absolute priority of the transcendental attitude . The paradox remains that we must start from and, in a sense, return to the natural attitude, while, at the same time, restricting this attitude through the on-going transcendental vigilance of the universal epoché. (shrink)

Ernst Cassirer’s epistemological trilogy – Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff (1910), Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie (1921) and Determinismus und Indeterminismus (1937) – is well known to Western scholars, some of whom recently devoted a number of in-depth and interesting studies to Cassirer’s epistemology. Nonetheless, they overlooked aspects of Cassirer’s concept of idealisation and his model of science as found in his last epistemological work: Determinismus und Indeterminismus. In this essay I will consider these two almost disregarded aspects of Cassirer’s epistemology in order to (...) provide a better understanding of his idea of science. (shrink)

La interpretación evolutiva y unitaria que hace Gadamer de los escritos de Platón supone en sus fundamentos una comprensión bastante particular sobre la ‘estructura pregunta-respuesta' característica de los diálogos platónicos. Este trabajo intenta mostrar la radicalidad del planteamiento gadamereano de la dialéctica platónica, así como la conexión esencial entre esta estructura y el fenómeno central de la hermenéutica, a saber, el fenómeno de la comprensión. De esta manera, ambos elementos se presentarán bajo una mutua dependencia, en cuanto que la filosofía (...) hermenéutica se reconoce reflexivamente a sí misma en la ejecución del diálogo platónico. Gadamer's evolutionary and unitary interpretation of Plato's writings assumes a rather particular understanding of the ‘question-and-answer form' . This work intends to show the radicalism of Gadamer's views about the Platonic dialectic, as well as the essential connection between that structure and the central phenomenon of hermeneutics, i.e. the phenomenon of comprehending . In this way, both elements are shown to depend on each other, as Hermeneutic philosophy recognizes itself through the realization of the Platonic dialogue. (shrink)

Although Cassirer's four-volume Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit has long been highly regarded as an example of historical scholarship — Cassirer was awarded the golden Kuno-Fischer Medal of the University of Heidelberg in July 1914 for the first two volumes — its importance for understanding his theoretical position seems to have gone unrecognized. In the English-speaking world it is, unfortunately, only known through the fourth volume, and when this appeared in English in 1950 it met (...) with a negative, even hostile, reception. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Dans cet article, j’entreprends de clarifier le projet (frégéen) d’une logique de l’arithmétique -- tel qu’il a été discuté par Natorp et Rickert -- en distinguant trois questions directrices. Le nombre est-il un objet logique? L’arithmétique est-elle réductible à la logique? Est-il possible de déduire les opérations arithmétiques de lois purement logiques? Ma thèse est que la distinction rigoureuse de ces trois questions permet de lever une grande partie des obscurités qui affectent en généralle programme d’une logique de l’arithmétique. (...) La contribution néo-kantienne à ce programme se trouve du même coup éclairée d’une lumière nouvelle.ABSTRACT: In this article, I try to shed light on the (Fregean) project of a logic of arithmelic-as discussed by Natorp and Rickert-by outlining three main questions. Is the number a logical object? Is arithmetic reducible to logic? Is it possible to deduce the arithmetical operations from purely logical laws? I argue that rigorous distinction between these three questions makes it possible to elucidate many problems affecting the program of a logic of arithmetic. The Neo-Kantian contribution to this program is at the same time considered in a new light. (shrink)

In his essay, ‘Heidegger's Categories in Sein und Zeit’, Robert Brandom argues that Heidegger, particularly in the notion of Zuhandenheit, anticipates his own normatively pragmatist conception of intentionality. He attempts to demonstrate this by marshalling short passages from right across the relevant sections of Sein und Zeit in such a way that they do seem to say what Brandom claims. But does one reach the same conclusion when one examines, more or less in sentence‐by‐sentence fashion, the large slab of text (...) in which Heidegger introduces the notion of Zuhandenheit? I believe not. First, however, let us look at how Brandom reads Heidegger, in particular, how he interprets the notion of Zuhandenheit, which, in contrast both to Macquarrie and Robinson and to Brandom, I shall translate as ready‐to‐handedness.1. (shrink)