During the 1980s, empirical social sciences and normative theory seemingly converged within ethical debates. This tendency kindled new debates about the limits and possibilities of empirical-normative collaboration. The article asks for adequate ways of collaboration by taking a closer look at the philosophy of science of empirical social sciences as well as normative theory development and its logical groundings. As a result, three possible modes of cooperation are characterized: first, the empirical assessment of conditions that actually necessitate the translation of (...) normatively derived basic principles into practice rules; second, the empirical assessment of conditions for application of a moral norm which are formulated by bridging principles; third, the empirical assessment of social practice which allows to measure whether adopted norms actually are implemented in practice or not and to encounter new moral problems which are in need of ethical guidance. Finally, the article defends a symbiotic position in Weaver ’s and Trevino's triad of possible approaches to empirical-normative collaboration in ethics. (shrink)

Objective: To survey members of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and of the Society for Medical Decision Making to elicit the similarities and differences in their reasoning about two clinical cases that involved ethical dilemmas.Cases: Case 1 was that of a patient refusing treatment that a surgeon thought would be beneficial. Case 2 dealt with end-of-life care. The argument was whether intensive treatment should be continued of an unconscious patient with multiorgan failure.Method: Four questions, with structured multiple alternatives, (...) were asked about each case: identified core problems, needed additional information, appropriate next steps and who the decision maker should be.Observations and results: Substantial similarities were noticed between the two groups in identifying the core problems, the information needed and the appropriate next steps. SMDM members gave more weight to outcomes and trade-offs and ASBH members had patient autonomy trump other considerations more strongly. In case 1, more than 60% of ASBH respondents identified the patient alone as the decision maker, whereas members of SMDM were almost evenly divided between having the patient as the solo decision maker or preferring a group of some sort as the decision maker, a significant difference . In case 2, both groups agreed that the question of discontinuing treatment should be discussed with the family and that the family alone should not be the decision maker.Conclusion: Despite distinctively different methods of case analysis and little communication between the two professional communities, many similarities were observed in the actual decisions they reached on the two clinical dilemmas. (shrink)

While the bioethics literature demonstrates that the field has spent substantial time and thought over the last four decades on the goals, methods, and desired outcomes for service and training in bioethics, there has been less progress defining the nature and goals of bioethics research and scholarship. This gap makes it difficult both to describe the breadth and depth of these areas of bioethics and, importantly, to gauge their success. However, the gap also presents us with an opportunity to define (...) this scope of work for ourselves and to help shape the broader conversation about the impact of academic research. Because of growing constraints on academic funding, researchers and scholars in many fields are being asked to demonstrate and also forecast the value and impact of their work. To do that, and also to satisfy ourselves that our work has meaningful effect, we must understand how our work can motivate change and how that change can be meaningfully measured. In a field as diverse as bioethics, the pathways to and metrics of change will likewise be diverse. It is therefore critical that any assessment of the impact of bioethics research and scholarship be informed by an understanding of the nature of the work, its goals, and how those goals can and ought to be furthered. In this paper, we propose a conceptual model that connects individual bioethics projects to the broader goals of scholarship, describing the translation of research and scholarly output into changes in thinking, practice, and policy. One of the key implications of the model is that impact in bioethics is generally the result of a collection of projects rather than of any single piece of research or scholarship. Our goal is to lay the groundwork for a thoroughgoing conversation about bioethics research and scholarship that will advance and shape the important conversation about their impact. (shrink)

Moral pluralism is the norm in contemporary society. Even the best philosophical arguments rarely persuade moral opponents who differ at a foundational level. This has been vividly illustrated in contemporary debates in bioethics surrounding contentious issues such as abortion and euthanasia. It is readily apparent that bioethics discourse lacks an empirical explanation for the broad differences about various topics in bioethics and health policy. In recent years, social and cognitive psychology has generated novel approaches for defining basic differences in moral (...) intuitions generally. We propose that if empirical research using social intuitionist theory explains why people disagree with one another over moral issues, then the results of such research might help people debate their moral differences in a more constructive and civil manner. We illustrate the utility of social intuitionism with data from a national physician survey. (shrink)

Social scientists often lament the fact that philosophically trained ethicists pay limited attention to the insights they generate. This paper presents an overview of tendencies in sociological and anthropological studies of morality, ethics and bioethics, and suggests that a lack in philosophical interest might be related to a tendency among social scientists to employ either a deficit model (social science perspectives accommodate the sense of context that philosophical ethics lacks), a replacement model (social scientists have finally found the “right way” (...) of doing ethics), or a dismissal model (ethics should be abandoned all together as a misconstrued veil of power). Increased awareness of differences in styles of reasoning and objects of research interest might help to overcome the hostility, and an anthropological project is presented as an invitation to a dialogue informed by awareness of such differences. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer vorliegende Beitrag setzt sich mit der Frage nach angemessenen Methodologien und Methoden zur Erhebung und Integration empirischen Wissens in der Bio- und Medizinethik auseinander. Ausgehend von Überlegungen zum Haupt-Gegenstandsbereich der Ethik, dem Menschen als bio-psycho-sozialem Wesen und dessen Moral, wird argumentiert, dass die Sozialwissenschaften die zentralen empirischen Basiswissenschaften der Ethik darstellen. Im zweiten Abschnitt, der sich mit wissenschaftstheoretischen Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Ethik, Empirie, Methodologien und Theorie und praktischen Beispielen der Integration empirischen Wissens befasst, wird nach den Ursachen für (...) das erkennbare Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Sozialwissenschaften, allgemeiner und angewandter Ethik gefragt, welches sich in der noch zu definierenden empirischen Ethik anders darstellt als in der traditionellen angewandten Ethik. Wie eine Bio- Ethik aussehen könnte, die diese Qualitätskriterien aufnimmt und in ihrem Feld fruchtbar macht, wird abschließend beschrieben. (shrink)

Anthropologists and sociologists offer numerous critiques of bioethics. Social scientists criticize bioethicists for their arm-chair philosophizing and socially ungrounded pontificating, offering philosophical abstractions in response to particular instances of suffering, making all-encompassing universalistic claims that fail to acknowledge cultural differences, fostering individualism and neglecting the importance of families and communities, and insinuating themselves within the “belly” of biomedicine. Although numerous aspects of bioethics warrant critique and reform, all too frequently social scientists offer ungrounded, exaggerated criticisms of bioethics. Anthropological and sociological (...) critiques of bioethics are hampered by the tendency to equate bioethics with clinical ethics and moral theory in bioethics with principlist bioethics. Also, social scientists neglect the role of bioethicists in addressing organizational ethics and other “macro-social” concerns. If anthropologists and sociologists want to provide informed critiques of bioethics they need to draw upon research methods from their own fields and develop richer, more informed analyses of what bioethicists say and do in particular social settings. (shrink)

A selection of recent sociological literature dealing with bioethics, concentrating particularly on its interface with research ethics, is reviewed to reveal that the two disciplines of bioethics and sociology have tendencies to approach subject matters from opposed perspectives. These differences in approach have now been generally recognized, accepted and accommodated by proponents of both disciplines. A turning point in the relationship between the two disciplines may have been reached which augers greater mutual respect, appreciation and even learning.

ZusammenfassungDer vorliegende Beitrag setzt sich mit der Frage nach angemessenen Methodologien und Methoden zur Erhebung und Integration empirischen Wissens in der Bio- und Medizinethik auseinander. Ausgehend von Überlegungen zum Haupt-Gegenstandsbereich der Ethik, dem Menschen als bio-psycho-sozialem Wesen und dessen Moral, wird argumentiert, dass die Sozialwissenschaften die zentralen empirischen Basiswissenschaften der Ethik darstellen. Im zweiten Abschnitt, der sich mit wissenschaftstheoretischen Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Ethik, Empirie, Methodologien und Theorie und praktischen Beispielen der Integration empirischen Wissens befasst, wird nach den Ursachen für (...) das erkennbare Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Sozialwissenschaften, allgemeiner und angewandter Ethik gefragt, welches sich in der noch zu definierenden empirischen Ethik anders darstellt als in der traditionellen angewandten Ethik. Wie eine Bio-(psycho-soziale) Ethik aussehen könnte, die diese Qualitätskriterien aufnimmt und in ihrem Feld fruchtbar macht, wird abschließend beschrieben. (shrink)

In this article we explore the contribution from social anthropology to the medical ethical debates about the use of informed consent in research, based on blood samples and other forms of tissue. The article springs from a project exploring donors’ motivation for providing blood and healthcare data for genetic research to be executed by a Swedish start-up genomics company. This article is not confined to empirical findings, however, as we suggest that anthropology provides reason to reassess the theoretical understanding of (...) autonomy as generally defined by Beauchamp and Childress. Careful consideration of the trust expressed by donors through the act of donation, furthermore, suggests that there is reason to redirect the ethical scrutiny from informed consent to issues concerning institutional arrangements and social responsibility. In particular, we suggest that an anthropological approach could facilitate a reconsideration of the political implications of using informed consent as a regulatory practice in tissue-based research. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article attempts to show a way in which social science research can contribute in a meaningful and equitable way to philosophical bioethics. It builds on the social science critique of bioethics present in the work of authors such as Renée Fox, Barry Hoffmaster and Charles Bosk, proposing the characteristics of a critical bioethics that would take social science seriously. The social science critique claims that traditional philosophical bioethics gives a dominant role to idealised, rational thought, and tends to (...) exclude social and cultural factors, relegating them to the status of irrelevancies. Another problem is the way in which bioethics assumes social reality divides down the same lines/categories as philosophical theories. Critical bioethics requires bioethicists to root their enquires in empirical research, to challenge theories using evidence, to be reflexive and to be sceptical about the claims of other bioethicists, scientists and clinicians. The aim is to produce a rigorous normative analysis of lived moral experience. (shrink)

Most contributions to the current debate about the consideration and application of empirical information in ethics scholarship deal with epistemological issues such as the role and the meaning of empirical research in ethical reasoning. Despite the increased publication of empirical data in ethics literature we still lack systematic analyses and conceptual frameworks that would help us to understand the rarely discussed methodological and practical problems in appraising empirical research. This paper demonstrates the need for critical appraisal and its crucial methodological (...) role in the application of empirical information in ethical reasoning. Furthermore, it systematically examines the criteria and the appropriate appraisal of empirical research and the associated challenges by highlighting current problems in empirical ethics literature. These problems reveal the following challenges for a critical and responsible consideration of empirical information in ethical reasoning: (i) training in the basic skills of locating and communicating empirical data from the relevant studies; (ii) training in basic knowledge of how to critically appraise empirical (qualitative and quantitative) research and its results; (iii) determination of quality standards for empirical ethics research; (iv) adequate reporting of the methodology and results of empirical ethics research in scientific journals. (shrink)

Most of the literature on pharmacogenetics assumes that the main problems in implementing the technology will be institutional ones and that although it involves genetic testing, the ethical issues involved in pharmacogenetics are different from, even less than, ‘traditional’ genetic testing. Very little attention has been paid to how clinicians will accept this technology, their attitudes towards it and how it will affect clinical practice.This paper presents results from interviews with clinicians who are beginning to use pharmacogenetics and explores how (...) they view the ethics of pharmacogenetic testing, its use to exclude some patients from treatment, and how this kind of testing fits into broader debates around genetics. In particular this paper examines the attitudes of breast cancer and Alzheimer’s disease specialists. The results of these interviews will be compared with the picture of pharmacogenetics painted in the published literature, as a way of rooting this somewhat speculative writing in clinical practice. (shrink)

Whether sociology should be part of bioethics has been extensively debated and critiqued. Feminist bioethics has long recognized the role of empirical work in bioethical inquiry; however, much feminist work in bioethics has been sidelined due to critiques of the role of social and sociological theory in bioethics research. In this essay, I examine how sociology plays a much deeper role in bioethical inquiry beyond the contribution of empirical methods. Building on these approaches, I show, through a case study, how (...) social and sociological theory play as vital a role in conducting comprehensive bioethical inquiry as sociological methods and methodology, and thus should no longer be sidelined in empirical bioethics. (shrink)

Hume's is/ought distinction has long limited the role of empirical research in ethics, saying that data about what something is cannot yield conclusions about the way things ought to be. However, interest in empirical research in ethics has been growing despite this countervailing principle. We attribute some of this increased interest to a conceptual breakdown of the is/ought distinction. MacIntyre, in reviewing the history of the is/ought distinction, argues that is and ought are not strictly separate realms but exist in (...) a close relationship that is clarified by adopting a teleological orientation. We propose that, instead of recovering a teleological orientation, society tends to generate its own goals via democratic methods like those described by Rousseau or adopt agnosticism about teleology such as described by Richard Rorty. In both latter scenarios, the distinction between is and ought is obscured, and the role for empirical research grows, but for controversial reasons. MacIntyre warns that the is/ought distinction should remain, but reminds ethicists to make careful arguments about when and why it is legitimate to move from is to ought. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Henk ten Have's Genetics and Culture: The Geneticization thesis . In it, I refute Ten Have's suggestion that geneticization is not the sort of process that can be measured and commented on in terms of empirical evidence,even if he is correct in suggesting that it should be seen as part of ‘philosophical discourse’. At the end, I relate this discussion to broader debates within bioethics between the social science and philosophy, and suggest the need (...) for philosophical approaches to take the social sciences seriously. (shrink)