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  1. Know-How, Ability, and the Ability Hypothesis.Torin Alter - 2001 - Theoria 67 (3):229-39.
    David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow claim that knowing what an experience is like is knowing-how, not knowing-that. They identify this know-how with the abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize experiences, and Lewis labels their view ‘the Ability Hypothesis’. The Ability Hypothesis has intrinsic interest. But Lewis and Nemirow devised it specifically to block certain anti-physicalist arguments due to Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson . Does it?
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  • Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism.Ephraim Glick - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):398-434.
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  • Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis.Bence Nanay - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
    According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability todiscriminate imagining or having experience E from imagining or having any (...)
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  • ?Knowing What It's Like? And the Essential Indexical.Carolyn McMullen - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (September):211-33.
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  • Enlightening the Fully Informed.Michael Pelczar - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):29-56.
    This paper develops a response to the knowledge argument against physicalism. The response is both austere, in that it does not concede the existence of non-physical information , and natural, in that it acknowledges the alethic character of phenomenal knowledge and learning. I argue that such a response has all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of existing objections to the knowledge argument. Throughout, the goal is to develop a response that is polemically effective in addition to theoretically sound.
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  • A New Challenge for the Physicalist: Phenomenal Indistinguishabilty.Ran Lahav - 1994 - Philosophia 24 (1-2):77-103.
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  • The Knowledge Argument, Abilities, and Metalinguistic Beliefs.Uwe Meyer - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (3):325-347.
    In this paper I discuss a variant of the knowledge argument which is based upon Frank Jackson's Mary thought experiment. Using this argument, Jackson tries to support the thesis that a purely physical – or, put generally: an objectively scientific – perspective upon the world excludes the important domain of `phenomenal' facts, which are only accessible introspectively. Martine Nida-Rümelinhas formulated the epistemological challenge behind the case of Mary especially clearly. I take her formulation of the problem as a starting-point and (...)
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  • A Defense of the Knowledge Argument.Brie Gertler - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (3):317-336.
    This paper calls into question the viability of materialist reduction of the phenomenal. I revisit the 'Knowledge Argument', which claims that there is information about the phenomenal which is not reducible to, nor even inferable from, information about the physical. I demonstrate the failure of the two chief strategies for blocking the Knowledge Argument: analyzing phenomenal knowledge as an ability, and construing it as knowledge of facts which are ontologically reducible to physical facts. Materialist reduction of the phenomenal is, thus, (...)
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  • The Knowledge Argument, the Open Question Argument, and the Moral Problem.Michael Pelczar - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):25 - 45.
    Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical nature could, apparently, suffer from ignorance about various aspects of conscious experience. Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical and mental nature could, apparently, suffer from moral ignorance. Does it follow that there are ways the world is, over and above the way it is physically or psychophysically? This paper defends a negative answer, based on a distinction between knowing the fact that p and knowing that p. This distinction is made (...)
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  • Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham and Horgan.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):189-202.
    In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” , George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the socalled Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look.
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  • Keeping Students Out of Mary’s Room: Approaches to Supporting Students’ Acquisition of Non-Propositional Knowledge in Science Education.Richard Brock & David Hay - 2019 - Science & Education 28 (9-10):985-1000.
    Whilst many science educators, it is reported, associate knowledge with justified true belief, epistemologists have observed that the JTB model is an incomplete account of knowledge. Moreover, researchers from several fields have argued that developing scientific expertise involves not only the acquisition of knowledge that can be expressed in the form of a sentence, propositional knowledge, but also knowledge that cannot be articulated. This article examines the Mary’s room thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson and applies it to the context (...)
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  • Hylomorphism and the Construct of Consciousness.William Jaworski - forthcoming - Topoi.
    The hard problem of consciousness has held center stage in the philosophy of mind for the past two decades. It claims that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences—what it’s like to be in them—cannot be explained by appeal to the operation of physiological subsystems. The hard problem arises, however, only given the assumption that hylomorphism is false. Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. A human is not a random collection of physical materials, but an individual (...)
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  • Semantic Gaps and Protosemantics.Benj Hellie - 2019 - In Acacio de Barros & Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Mind and Quanta. Berlin: Springer.
    Semantic gaps between physical and mental discourse include the 'explanatory', 'epistemic' (Black-and-White Mary), and 'suppositional' (zombies) gaps; protosemantics is concerned with what is fundamental to meaning. Our tradition presupposes a truth-based protosemantics, with disastrous consequences for interpreting the semantic gaps: nonphysicalism, epiphenomenalism, separatism. Fortunately, an endorsement-based protosemantics, recentering meaning from the world to the mind, is technically viable, intuitively more plausible, and empirically more adequate. But, of present significance, it makes room for interpreting mental discourse as expressing simulations: this blocks (...)
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  • Subjektiivisten kokemusten todellisuudesta.Panu Raatikainen - 2001 - Niinandnäin 1.
    Luonnontieteiden kiistattoman menestyksen sekä kartesiolaisen mieli-ruumis -dualismin ylipääsemättömiksi osoittautuneiden sisäisten ongelmien seurauksena mielenfilosofiassa ovat viime vuosikymmeninä olleet vallalla erilaiset materialistiset tai fysikalistiset opit. Niiden mukaan mentaaliset ilmiöt ovat joko identtisiä tiettyjen fysikaalisten ilmiöiden kanssa tai ainakin täysin riippuvaisia sellaisista – siis fysikaalisten asioiden määräämiä.
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  • Thomas Versus Thomas: A New Approach to Nagel's Bat Argument.Yujin Nagasawa - 2003 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):377-395.
    i l l ustrat es t he di ffi cul t y of providing a purely physical characterisation of phenomenal experi ence wi t ha vi vi d exampl e about a bat ’ s sensory apparatus. Whi l e a number of obj ect i ons have al ready been made to Nagel.
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  • The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-How.Yuri Cath - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):137-156.
    What follows for the ability hypothesis reply to the knowledge argument if knowledge-how is just a form of knowledge-that? The obvious answer is that the ability hypothesis is false. For the ability hypothesis says that, when Mary sees red for the first time, Frank Jackson’s super-scientist gains only knowledge-how and not knowledge-that. In this paper I argue that this obvious answer is wrong: a version of the ability hypothesis might be true even if knowledge-how is a form of knowledge-that. To (...)
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  • Something About Mary.Alex Byrne - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):27-52.
    Jackson's black-and-white Mary teaches us that the propositional content of perception cannot be fully expressed in language.
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  • The Knowledge Argument and the Implications of Phenomenal Knowledge.Robert J. Howell - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):459-468.
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