This article argues that time‐asymmetric processes in spacetime are enantiomorphs. Subsequently, the Kantian puzzle concerning enantiomorphs in space is reviewed to introduce a number of positions concerning enantiomorphy, and to arrive at a dilemma: one must either reject that orientations of enantiomorphs are determinate, or furnish space or objects with orientation. The discussion on space is then used to derive two problems in the debate on the direction of time. First, it is shown that certain kinds of reductionism about the (...) direction of time are at variance with the claim that orientation of enantiomorphic objects is intrinsic. Second, it is argued that reductive explanations of time‐asymmetric processes presuppose that enantiomorphic processes do not have determinate orientation. (shrink)

Le chiasme de l’être: une exploration de l’ontologie du sens de Merleau-PontyLa question de l’ontologie inclut celle de savoir comment un être se détermine et acquiert son sens, autrement dit comment il instaure sa différenciation par desorientations, des significations et des différences en général. Cette étude explore l’idée que le sens d’un être provient d’une « chiralité ontologique », c’est-à-dire d’un type de différence ontologique présentant un apparentement caractéristique de ses deux côtés droit et gauche. L’étude montre tout d’abord comment (...) l’ontologie merleau-pontienne de la réversibilité conduit à la question de la chiralité. On fait ensuite entrer dans la discussion des résultats obtenus dans les domaines de la chimie, de la biologie et de la géométrie, pour mieux mettre en lumière l’importance des différences en chiralité et pour élaborer une définition de la « chiralité ontologique » en étroite liaison avec l’ontologie du sens.Il chiasma dell’essere: un’esplorazione dell’ontologia del senso merleau-pontianaIl problema dell’ontologia include il problema di come l’essere sia determinato e acquisisca senso, acquisisca cioè gli orientamenti, i significati, tutte quelle differenze che fanno la differenza. Questo saggio esplora il pensiero secondo il quale il senso dell’essere deriva da una ‘chiralità ontologica,’ una sorta di differenza ontologica con caratteristiche affini alle differenze fra le mani destra e sinistra. Il testo illustra in primo luogo come l’ontologia merleau-pontyana della reversibilità porti alle questioni della chiralità. I risultati della ricerca attuale, in chimica, biologia e geometria sono poi discussi per illuminare l’importanza delle differenze chirali e per sviluppare una definizione della chiralità ontologica che si connette ad una ontologia del senso. (shrink)

Incongruent counterparts are pairs of objects which cannot be enclosed in the same spatial limits despite an exact similarity in magnitude, proportion, and relative position of their parts. Kant discerns in such objects, whose most familiar example is left and right hands, a “paradox” demanding “demotion of space and time to mere forms of our sensory intuition.” This paper aims at an adequate understanding of Kant’s enigmatic idealist argument from handed objects, as well as an understanding of its relation to (...) the other key supports of his idealism. The paper’s central finding is that Kant’s idealist argument from incongruent counterparts rests essentially on his theory of freedom. The surprising result sheds new light on deep and overlooked links among the pillars of transcendental idealism, pointing the way to a comprehensive and unified reading of Kant’s system of idealist arguments. (shrink)

This paper outlines a new interpretation of an argument of Kant's for the existence of absolute space. The Kant argument, found in a 1768 essay on topology, argues for the existence of Newtonian-Euclidean absolute space on the basis of the existence of incongruous counterparts (such as a left and a right hand, or any asymmetrical object and its mirror-image). The clear, intrinsic difference between a left hand and a right hand, Kant claimed, cannot be understood on a relational view of (...) space - for in terms of the spatial relations of their parts, there is no difference to be found. Kant's argument has been interpreted by, among others, Graham Nerlich (in 1973, Hands, Knees and Absolute Space, The Journal of Philosophy). I briefly discuss Nerlich, and then offer a different reconstruction of the argument, one that appears to be closer to Kant's text. The reconstruction, however, essentially involves ascription of primitive identity to parts of space. Comparing the Kantian absolutist account of incongruous counterparts using primitive identity to the correct relationist account, I conclude that the absolutist account pays a heavy metaphysical price, without buying any genuine explanatory advantage over the relationist. I go on to examine recent suggestions that parity-non-conservation phenomena in quantum physics allow a stronger version of Kant's challenge to relationism. On closer examination, it turns out that here too the absolutist or substantivalist must be appealing to space parts with primitive identity in order to claim an advantage over relationists; and here too, I argue the substantivalist story really has no advantage over the correct relationist account. (shrink)

The traditional absolutist-relationist controversy about space and time conflates four distinct issues: existence, abstraction, relationality and relativity. Terms which are relational, relative or abstract may denote items which possess contingent properties. Possession of such properties, including topological and geometrical properties, is therefore no indication of logical type. To fail to recognise the possibility of spaces, times and space-times of various logical types is to risk conflating two distinct ontological issues: a metaphysical issue concerning the existence of abstract objects and a (...) question of physics concerning the existence of causally efficacious substrata which may or may not be needed to explain the contingent properties of the abstract objects. (shrink)

The article attempts to reconsider the relationship between Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophy of geometry on the one hand and the nineteenth century debate on the foundation of geometry on the other. The author argues that the examples used by Leibniz and Kant to explain the peculiarity of the geometrical way of thinking are actually special cases of what the Jewish-German mathematician Felix Hausdorff called “transformation principle”, the very same principle that thinkers such as Helmholtz or Poincaré applied in a more (...) general form in their celebrated philosophical writings about geometry. The first two parts of the article try to show that Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies of geometry, despite their differences, appear to be preoccupied with the common problem of the impossibility to grasp conceptually the intuitive difference between two figures (such as a figure and its scaled, displaced or mirrored copy). In the third part, it is argued that from the perspective of Hausdorff’s philosophical-geometrical reflections, this very same problem seems to find a more radical application in Helmholtz’s or Poincaré’s thought experiments on the impossibility of distinguishing distorted copies of our universe from the original one. I draw the conclusion that in Hausdorff’s philosophical work, which has received scholarly attention only recently, one can find not only an original attempt to frame these classical arguments from a set-theoretical point of view, but also the possibility of considering the history of philosophy of geometry from an uncommon perspective, where especially the significance of Kant’s infamous appeal to “intuition” can be judged by more appropriate standards. (shrink)

In 1768 Immanuel Kant presented an argument showing the necessity of absolute space, i.e. substantivalism in contrast to relationalism, based on the property of handedness. While there is large consensus about the fallacy of Kant’s argument, a more recent debate exists – mainly stimulated by John Earman – about the status of the Kantian argument in view of modern physics and its fundamentally built-in parity violation, which leads to a preferred handedness. According to Earman the relationalist has no means to (...) distinguish one handedness in the cosmos without reference to an absolute structure of space. After recapitulating the historical background of the Newton/Leibniz debate on the ontological status of space as well as the Kantian argument, this paper offers a systematic consideration of arguments about handedness in modern physics. The goal is to show that “Earman’s challenge” can be rejected. (shrink)