This book argues for the need to put into practice a profound and comprehensive intellectual revolution, affecting to a greater or lesser extent all branches of scientific and technological research, scholarship and education. This intellectual revolution differs, however, from the now familiar kind of scientific revolution described by Kuhn. It does not primarily involve a radical change in what we take to be knowledge about some aspect of the world, a change of paradigm. Rather it involves a radical change in (...) the fundamental, overall intellectual aims and methods of inquiry. At present inquiry is devoted to the enhancement of knowledge. This needs to be transformed into a kind of rational inquiry having as its basic aim to enhance personal and social wisdom. This new kind of inquiry gives intellectual priority to the personal and social problems we encounter in our lives as we strive to realize what is desirable and of value – problems of knowledge and technology being intellectually subordinate and secondary. For this new kind of inquiry, it is what we do and what we are that ultimately matters: our knowledge is but an aspect of our life and being. (shrink)

There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for scientific theory appraisal and acceptance. The second task is to explain how application of this methodology leads to advance toward the aim(s) of science. In other words, the goal of the theory of method is to provide an integrated explanation of both rational scientific theory choice and scientific progress.

My main concern in this work is answering the question: does parallel distributed processing as a model of the mind offer a genuine alternative to traditionalism? There has been vigorous debate within the last eight years on the subject of the relative merits of the one model over the other; however, a detailed examination of the nature of their respective differences has not been attempted. ;The mental realm is that realm in which causal interaction is governed by laws quantifying over (...) representational states. Traditionalism is the thesis that the law-governed transitions between mental states are transitions between computational states. PDP is the thesis that the transitions between mental states are transitions between distributed representational states in a PDP-type system. The representational content of a distributed state is determined by the causal history of the system as a whole, and results from the changing of system parameters via learning so as to insert this state in the causal chain between the perception of some external state-of-affairs and behavior. ;Traditionalism and PDP are best considered not as providing a detailed picture of the causal processes involved in mental activity, but rather as providing a general framework that sets broad constraints on how such law-governed transitions proceed. I describe two aspects of qualitative distinctness that can be used even when comparing such non-specific models. The first involves examining the ontological commitment of each: assuming a realist interpretation, what must exist if traditionalism is a true model of the mind? If the two models make the same commitments, one may ask the further question: do the constraints imposed on the form that mental causal transitions take allow the possibility of an isomorphism between causal sequences permitted by the one model with those permitted by the other? An examination of the manner in which representational content is determined within PDP systems shows that there is no possible isomorphism. Therefore, the two models are qualitatively distinct. (shrink)

Knowledge of residual perturbations in the orbit of Uranus in the early 1840s did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation but instead to the discovery of Neptune in 1846. Karl Popper asserts that this case is atypical of science and that the law of gravitation was at least prima facie falsified by these perturbations. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position I call, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism'. Further, on the (...) evidence the law was not prima facie false and was not generally considered so by astronomers at the time. Many of Popper's commentators presuppose WPF and their views on this case and its implications for scientific rationality and method suffer from this same defect. (shrink)

What is the relation between coherence and truth? This paper rejects numerous answers to this question, including the following: truth is coherence; coherence is irrelevant to truth; coherence always leads to truth; coherence leads to probability, which leads to truth. I will argue that coherence of the right kind leads to at least approximate truth. The right kind is explanatory coherence, where explanation consists in describing mechanisms. We can judge that a scientific theory is progressively approximating the truth if it (...) is increasing its explanatory coherence in two key respects: broadening by explaining more phenomena and deepening by investigating layers of mechanisms. I sketch an explanation of why deepening is a good epistemic strategy and discuss the prospect of deepening knowledge in the social sciences and everyday life. (shrink)

(1983). RATIONALISM AND THE STRONG PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEKE: RECONCILIATION WITHOUT TEARS. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1-31.