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  1. Value Capture.Christopher Nguyen - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (3).
    Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...)
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  • Transparency as morally and politically corrupting.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):1-16.
    It is widely held that transparency incentivizes good behavior. Though that may be, sometimes, there are tradeoffs here: transparency incentivizes people to conceal genuine reasons for action and instead manufacture insincere reasons for public consumption. The evidence for this comes from moral psychology and economics: when people are observed, they acquire an incentive to make more deontological and intuitive moral judgments than they would otherwise. In contrast, transparency incentivizes politicians and leaders to make more consequentialist and calculated moral judgments than (...)
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  • Building Epistemically Healthier Platforms.Dallas Amico-Korby, Maralee Harrell & David Danks - forthcoming - Episteme.
    When thinking about designing social media platforms, we often focus on factors such as usability, functionality, aesthetics, ethics, and so forth. Epistemic considerations have rarely been given the same level of attention in design discussions. This paper aims to rectify this neglect. We begin by arguing that there are epistemic norms that govern environments, including social media environments. Next, we provide a framework for applying these norms to the question of platform design. We then apply this framework to the real-world (...)
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  • Limits of the Numerical: The Abuses and Uses of Quantification, ed. C. Newfield, A. Alexandrova and S. John. University of Chicago Press, 2022, 317 pages. [REVIEW]Kate Vredenburgh - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-6.
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  • Do Political Convictions Infect Every Fibre of Our Being?Joseph Ulatowski & David Lumsden - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    1. The current political scene in many countries is populated by polarised groups with sharply contrasting loyalties and beliefs implying that there are fundamental schisms between opposing groups....
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  • Scaffolding knowledge.Alessandra Tanesini - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):367-381.
    In this article I argue that often propositional knowledge is acquired and retained by extensive reliance on physical and social scaffolds that create an environment or niche conducive to knowledge. It is incumbent on epistemologists to subject these aids to epistemic assessments. I show that several of the activities involved in the creation of niches within which inquiry can thrive are carried out by whole cultures. New generations benefit from inheriting these niches whilst being able to improve upon them to (...)
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  • Intellectual arrogance: individual, group-based, and corporate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-20.
    In the article I argue that intellectual arrogance can be an individual, collective and even corporate vice. I show that arrogance is in all these cases underpinned by defensive positive evaluations of epistemic features of the evaluator in the service of buttressing its illegitimate social dominance. Individual arrogance as superbia or as hubris stems from attitudes biased by the motive of self-enhancement. Collective arrogance is underpinned by positive defensive attitudes to a one’s social identity that seeks to maintain its unwarranted (...)
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  • Demonstrating Trustworthiness to Patients in Data‐Driven Health Care.Paige Nong - 2023 - Hastings Center Report 53 (S2):69-75.
    Patient data is used to drive an ecosystem of advanced digital tools in health care, like predictive models or artificial intelligence‐based decision support. Patients themselves, however, receive little information about these technologies or how they affect their care. This raises important questions about patient trust and continued engagement in a health care system that extracts their data but does not treat them as key stakeholders. This essay explores these tensions and provides steps forward for health systems as they design advanced (...)
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  • Hostile Epistemology.C. Thi Nguyen - 2023 - Social Philosophy Today 39:9-32.
    Hostile epistemology is the study of how environmental features exploit our cognitive vulnerabilities. I am particularly interested in those vulnerabilities arise from the basic character of our epistemic lives. We are finite beings with limited cognitive resources, perpetually forced to reasoning a rush. I focus on two sources of unavoidable vulnerability. First, we need to use cognitive shortcuts and heuristics to manage our limited time and attention. But hostile forces can always game the gap between the heuristic and the ideal. (...)
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  • Building trust with digital democratic innovations.Anna Mikhaylovskaya & Élise Rouméas - 2023 - Ethics and Information Technology 26 (1):1-14.
    Digital Democratic Innovations (DDIs) have largely been conceived of, by the academic community, as a possible solution to the crisis of representative democracy. DDIs can be defined as initiatives or institutions designed with the goal of deepening citizens’ participation and influence on political decisions through the use of digital tools and platforms. There is a hope that DDIs (as well as usual, non-digital DIs) could help nurture political trust in governing institutions. Yet the vast majority of research on trust and (...)
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  • Caveat Auditor: Epistemic Trust and Conflicts of Interest.Justin P. McBrayer - 2024 - Social Epistemology 38 (3):290-301.
    To place epistemic trust in someone is to take their word for something. Much of the existing literature on epistemic trust concerns epistemic authorities. But as important as authority is to epistemic trust, it pales in comparison to the epistemic importance of conflicts of interests. In economics, we say that buyers shouldn’t take the word of sellers. Caveat emptor: let the buyer beware. I argue for a similar principle in epistemology. Caveat auditor: let the hearer beware. Others often have incentives (...)
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  • Shopping for experts.Gabriele Contessa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-21.
    This paper explores the socio-epistemic practice of shopping for experts. I argue that expert shopping is particularly likely to occur on what Thi Nguyen calls cognitive islands. To support my argument, I focus on macroeconomics. First, I make a prima-facie case for thinking that macroeconomics is a cognitive island. Then, I argue that ordinary people are particularly likely to engage in expert shopping when it comes to macroeconomic matters. In particular, I distinguish between two kinds of expert shopping, which I (...)
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  • Group intellectual transparency: a novel case for non-summativism.T. Ryan Byerly - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-22.
    Philosophical reflection on transparency, including group transparency, is beginning to gain steam. This paper contributes to this work by developing a conceptualization of transparency as an intellectual character trait that groups can possess, and by presenting a novel argument for thinking that such transparency should be understood along non-summativist lines. According to the account offered, a group’s being intellectually transparent consists in the group’s tending to attend well to its perspective and to share its perspective faithfully with others in order (...)
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  • Intellectual Honesty and Intellectual Transparency.T. Ryan Byerly - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):410-428.
    The purpose of this paper is to advance understanding of intellectually virtuous honesty, by examining the relationship between a recent account of intellectual honesty and a recent account of intellectual transparency. The account of intellectual honesty comes from Nathan King, who adapts the work of Christian Miller on moral honesty, while the account of intellectual transparency comes from T. Ryan Byerly. After introducing the respective accounts, I identify four potential differences between intellectual honesty and intellectual transparency as understood by these (...)
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  • AI, Opacity, and Personal Autonomy.Bram Vaassen - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (4):1-20.
    Advancements in machine learning have fuelled the popularity of using AI decision algorithms in procedures such as bail hearings, medical diagnoses and recruitment. Academic articles, policy texts, and popularizing books alike warn that such algorithms tend to be opaque: they do not provide explanations for their outcomes. Building on a causal account of transparency and opacity as well as recent work on the value of causal explanation, I formulate a moral concern for opaque algorithms that is yet to receive a (...)
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  • Trusting groups.Matthew Bennett - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):196-215.
    Katherine Hawley was skeptical about group trust. Her main reason for this skepticism was that the distinction between trust and reliance, central to many theories of interpersonal trust, does not apply to trust in groups. Hawley’s skeptical arguments successfully shift the burden of proof to those who wish to continue with a concept of group trust. Nonetheless, I argue that a commitments account of the trust/reliance distinction can shoulder that burden. According to that commitments account, trust is a distinctive kind (...)
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  • Varieties of transparency: exploring agency within AI systems.Gloria Andrada, Robert William Clowes & Paul Smart - 2023 - AI and Society 38 (4):1321-1331.
    AI systems play an increasingly important role in shaping and regulating the lives of millions of human beings across the world. Calls for greater _transparency_ from such systems have been widespread. However, there is considerable ambiguity concerning what “transparency” actually means, and therefore, what greater transparency might entail. While, according to some debates, transparency requires _seeing through_ the artefact or device, widespread calls for transparency imply _seeing into_ different aspects of AI systems. These two notions are in apparent tension with (...)
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  • Tackling Hermeneutical Injustices in Gender-Affirming Healthcare.Nick Clanchy - forthcoming - Hypatia.
    Previously proposed strategies for tackling hermeneutical injustices take for granted the interests people have in certain things about them being intelligible to them and/or to others, and seek to enable them to satisfy these interests. Strategies of this sort I call interests-as-given strategies. I propose that some hermeneutical injustices can instead be tackled by doing away with certain of these interests, and so with the possibility of their unfair non-satisfaction. Strategies of this sort I call interests-in-question strategies. As a case (...)
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  • Meritocracy and the Tests of Virtue in Greek and Confucian Political Thought.Justin Tiwald & Jeremy Reid - 2024 - Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture 41:111–147.
    A crucial tenet of virtue-based or expertise-based theorizing about politics is that there are ways to identify and select morally and epistemically excellent people to hold office. This paper considers historical challenges to this task that come from within Greek and Confucian thought and political practice. Because of how difficult it is to assess character in ordinary settings, we argue that it is even more difficult to design institutions that select for virtue at the much wider political scale. Specifically, we (...)
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