RÉSUMÉ: Cet article analyse le traitement du problème du scepticisme qui est mené au §43 d’Être et temps afin de proposer une nouvelle interprétation de la position philosophique de Heidegger par rapport au conflit entre le réalisme et l’idéalisme. La position heideggérienne à l’égard du scepticisme a souvent été négligée par les commentateurs comme s’il s’agissait d’une question subsidiaire ou d’un fauxproblème, attitude qui est peut-être responsable d’une perception assez répandue dans le monde philosophique qui verrait précisément s’exprimer chez Heidegger (...) une forme de scepticisme. En soulignant certaines ambiguïtés du §43, je soutiens que Heidegger, dans Être et temps, s’attache à l’élaboration d’une réfutation du scepticisme radicale et authentique, bien que celle-ci n’ait été entièrement complétée que plus tard, dans les Beiträge zur Philosophie.ABSTRACT: In this article, I wish to shed a new light on Heidegger’s philosophical position toward idealism and realism. This will be accomplished through an analysis of Heidegger’s account of the problem of scepticism in §43 of Sein und Zeit. Heidegger’s position toward scepticism has often been overlooked or treated candidly by scholars and, as a result, misunderstood in the larger philosophical world, who frequently equated Heidegger’s philosophy with some form of scepticism. By highlighting some crucial ambiguities in the unfolding of §43, I show that in Sein und Zeit Heidegger is elaborating a radical refutation of scepticism even though it will ultimately only be accomplished in the Beiträge zur Philosophie. (shrink)

In this paper, I will deal with the issue of the relationship between trust, authoritarian democratic regimes and crises. I will pay special attention to the issue of the relationship between personal trust and trust in institutions. I will try to point out the way in which distrust in institutions develops in authoritarian regimes, as well as the populist way of diminishing the importance of institutions and trust in them, which are seen as obstacles to an efficient relationship between the (...) leader and the people. Finally, I will say a few words about trust in science and its way of approaching the public. (shrink)

In den ersten Kapiteln werde ich ein ethologisches Modell von Körperlichkeit vorstellen, in dem Körper, ganz im Sinne Spinozas, als lokale Bestandteile eines weltweiten Gefüges gedacht werden. Körper sind demnach keine von ihrer Umgebung isolierbaren Substanzen, in ihnen treten vielmehr Sach-Verhalte in Erscheinung, denen ein systemisches Selbsterhaltungsstreben (conatus) innewohnt. Der den Körpern immanente Appetit, sich in ihrem Sein zu erhalten, bezieht sich daher nicht nur auf die Selbsterhaltung des eigenen Organismus, sondern auf die systemische Erhaltung des eigenen In-der-Welt-Seins, das ein (...) Organismus mit seiner Umwelt teilt. In den darauffolgenden Kapiteln analysiere ich die dunkle Alchemie, die Körper erleiden, wenn ihr Appetit, sich in ihrem Sein zu erhalten, durch äußere Ursachen gehemmt und schließlich vergiftet wird. Eine Dynamik, die Nietzsche in seiner Streitschrift Zur Genealogie der Moral treffend als Wille zum Nichts charakterisiert hatte. In ihr verkehrt sich der Lebenswille in einen Hass auf das Leben, der sich am Leben zu rächen beginnt, indem er es verdammt. Diesem destruktiven, selbstwidersprüchlichen Willen zum Nichts setzt Spinoza im fünften Buch seiner Ethik eine Glückseligkeitslehre entgegen, die den Geist der Rache immunisiert, indem sie an der Hervorbringung freudvoller Lebensverhältnisse arbeitet. Nicht der dialektische Kampf gegen das Ressentiment und seine destruktive Dynamik steht daher im Zentrum seiner Ethik. Es ist vielmehr die Kultivierung aktiver Affekte – Affekte der Freude, Liebe und Selbstzufriedenheit –, die für Spinoza das Ende der Hass- und Gewaltspirale versprechen. Damit zieht er die Konsequenzen aus der Einsicht, dass ein Affekt nur durch einen anderen, stärkeren Affekt gehemmt und schließlich außer Kraft gesetzt werden kann: Hass durch tiefgründige Liebeserfahrungen, Ressentiment durch freudvolle Erfahrungen. (shrink)

I argue that religion knows rapture and philosophy doesn't.

In response to Hegel’s thesis concerning the “end of art,” John Sallis suggests that the future or the “promise of art” may be opened in thinking through Heidegger’s essay “The Origin of the Work of Art.” Sallis proposes that this promise of art may lie in the capacity to “set forth various elements through transfigurement into shining.” In this paper I reflect on what this suggestion concerning the promise of art may mean. Furthermore, I propose that “The Origin of the (...) Work of Art” shows a resonance with Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy that Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche obscures, and that this resonance is suggested in Sallis’ earlier work on Nietzsche’s book. I suggest that the Gestalt configuration of “world” and “earth” in Heidegger’s essay echoes the configuration of the Apollonian and Dionysian in Nietzsche’s thought. I further suggest in the conclusion that this resonance enables one to draw the connection between “The Origin of the Work of Art” and Heidegger’s later work in which the promise of art opens up a different mode of dwelling upon the earth. (shrink)

Hans Jonas developed in ‘Past and Truth’ (1991) a demonstration of the existence of God based on the ‘truth of past things’. And in ‘The Concept of God after Auschwitz’ (1984) he created a new myth of divine self-alienation in order to take away God’s responsibility for human misery. Both these texts were conceived as an alternative to a more Hegelian, objective idealist perspective on theology. This article shows that Jonas’s alternative does not fully succeed in this respect because his (...) arguments bring him back to an idealist perspective. His proof of God is revisited and explained using new insights recently developed by Robert Spaemann, whose interpretation of the proof makes it clear that many important critics of Jonas are too quick to reject his claims. The arguments of Jonas now seem to show a new strength even though they still fail to give an alternative to an objective idealist theological framework. (shrink)

Philosophers of music, like Charles Swann in Proust’s novel (Proust 1913/1992, p. 360), have traditionally found it difficult to utter the word ‘profound’ unironically. But this changed with Peter Kivy’s 1990 paper ‘The profundity of music’ The problem Kivy draws our attention to is this: we do call some musical works profound. However, Kivy argues, given that a work is profound only if it is about something profound and given that music (or ‘music alone’) is not about anything, this leads (...) to something of a paradox: how can music be profound if it is not about something profound. My aim in this paper is to argue that what makes a work profound is not that it is about something profound, but that it actively challenges any straightforward interpretative activity (while at the same time nudges you to keep on trying to interpret it). I argue that this line of argument is very much in tune with Kivy’s general theoretical commitment that “music alone isn’t about anything” (Kivy 1990, p. 245). (shrink)

This essay explores the various ways in which in the history of philosophy the imperative to return to nature has been understood. Against this background, it takes up the question as to how the concept of nature is to be determined in contemporary thought.

This essay explores whether ontology is internal to traditional Chinese culture from the perspective of the view from above. Ancient Chinese philosophy, poetry, and art abound with all kinds of descriptions of viewing from above. Such views from on high, as illustrated by famous works discussed in this essay, usually admit of no fixed focus; that is, there is no ontic being, concealed or disclosed, controlling the perceiving eyes. The gaze from above, which is either fluid or decentered, in some (...) cases does not even focus on any real object. It merely reveals an abstract historical review or an attitudinal stance. As such, the fushi gaze, devoid of any concrete object of perception or any central point of reference, always points to the absence of ontology. (shrink)

Desde un futuro anterior el pensamiento de la deconstrucción _asedia_ a la filosofía del martillo nietzscheana, ya que nos permite re-escribirla a partir de la nueva perspectiva que inaugura. En este trabajo nos proponemos abordar principalmente los trabajos de Nietzsche _Sobre verdad y mentira en sentido extramoral_ y _Sobre la utilidad y el perjuicio de la historia para la vida_, para analizar el modo en que, en estos textos tempranos, la escritura derridiana reconfigura el entramado filosófico nietzscheano.

The purpose of this paper is to give an outline of digital hermeneutics understood as the encounter between hermeneutics and digital technology, particularly the Internet. In the first part, I want to raise the attention of IT researchers and hermeneuticists to the theoretic and practical relevance of the encounter of their areas of research that are sometimes considered as incompatible to each other. There is still a lot of translation work to be done in order to get these two cultures (...) come closer to and profit from each other. The second part of the paper deals with the foundation of digital hermeneutics on what I call—following Heidegger’s and Vattimo’s paths—digital ontology as opposed to digital metaphysics. (shrink)

Darwinism has become an encompassing theory, leaving the confines of science and accounting for all aspects of life. Such an outlook entails important consequences for the evaluation of life. In particular, organisms are considered mere means for species’ preservation and development, while reason is no special faculty, but rather an outgrowth of functions that are rudimentarily present in animals. Darwinism cannot, for that reason, be said to be ‘true’, but if Darwinism is the correct view, the implications for man are (...) grave, no purpose or meaning of life being discernable. Darwinists are accordingly faced with the question why they continue their inquiries. (shrink)

Our environment is changing rapidly, as is the spectrum of possible relationships we can entertain with it. Against this background, one important task emerging in contemporary philosophical discussion concerns defining the status of contemporary images and the "iconic spaces" we encounter with ever-increasing frequency in their various forms. Within this context, the dimension of perception seems to be losing its primacy over the image, making a philosophical description of the relationships between image and reality all the more necessary. Among images, (...) the classical distinction between documentary and fiction has been drastically called into question, and along with it the nature of the emotions and values we experience in these two domains. Rozzoni promotes a phenomenology of the image, that is, a return to a description of images that starts from their essential features while avoiding simplistic dichotomies. By elucidating images’ intimate relationship with phantasy and aesthetic experience and their role in shaping our experience of "reality," this book develops a perspectival notion of "truth" intended to shed light on our contemporary interactions with images and the events, emotions, and values we experience through them. (shrink)

“Don’t think, but look!” (Wittgenstein 2009: § 66). This insistient advice has served as methodological inspiration for several influential thinkers in the broad range of ‘empirically informed’ philosophy, which has flourished over the last decades. There is, however, a worrisome tension between Wittgenstein’s work and these turns to practices, history, science, field work, and everyday life: Wittgenstein is in general doing something different from what the thinkers who claim to be inspired by him are doing. An argument for the legitimacy (...) of the move from Wittgenstein to empirically informed philosophy is so far missing in the literature. This article shows how this move can be justifiable within a Wittgensteinian frame, philosophically beneficial, and at times even necessary. (shrink)