The paper analyzes Quentin Meillassoux’s conception of the fideistic approach to religious faith intrinsic to the “strong correlationism” that he considers pervasive in contemporary thought. Backman presents the basic elements of Meillassoux’s speculative materialism and especially the thesis according to which strong correlationism involves a “fideistic” approach to religiosity. In doing so, Backman critically examines Meillassoux’s notions of post-metaphysical faith, religious absolutes, and contemporary fanaticism, especially against the background of Heidegger’s philosophy. According to Backman, Meillassoux’s logical and conceptual critique of (...) strong correlationism is innovative, and it may remain legitimate if its presuppositions are accepted. And yet, Backman argues that Meillassoux’s allegations of fideism seem to rely on the questionable application of Enlightenment conceptions to the contemporary situation. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of Witgensteinian approaches to philosophy of religion. In particular, it provides a close critique of the views of D. Z. Phillips.

Jurgen Habermas is a second-generation social philosopher of the Frankfurt school, the birthplace of critical theory. He suggests that modernity is a project of substituting rationality for religion. In his analysis, such a succession is the result of a process of social evolution, in which each developmental stage has its basic concepts and modes of understanding subjective, objective, and social worlds. For him, the salient feature of rationality consists of differentiation between various validity claims of truth, truthfulness, and sincerity which (...) are indistinguishable in religious language. The rationalization of religion, hence, progresses in terms of a differentiation between validity claims, a decentration of human understanding, the disenchantment of the world, and the linguistification of the sacred. Habermas proposes a universal pragmatics in which two modes of language use are separated: instrumental-strategic, and communicative. He thinks that the failure of the enlightenment movement to replace religion with reason stems from its preoccupation with instrumental reason and language use, dispensing with communicative rationality; and the remedy lies in communicative rationality. (shrink)

In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a ”factorization model’ which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent ”factors’ -- the belief’s content and the belief-attitude -- appears to be behind the idea that one could, for example, have the religious (...) attitude alone or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a fundamental change in attitude. In this article I will argue that such a ”factorization model’ severely distorts Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief. (shrink)

This article aims to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things (...) as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one’s own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess two principal merits. Firstly, it demonstrates that there is no tension between Wittgenstein’s remarks on the nature of philosophy and his remarks on religious belief and religious statements. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to philosophize about religion in a manner that does not assume that this has to consist either in presenting an apology for or critique of religion or in formulating philosophical theories regarding the nature of religious belief and the meaning of religious language. (shrink)

It is argued that standard accounts of the epistemology of religious commitmentfail to be properly sensitive to certain important features of the nature of religious conviction. Once one takes these features of religious conviction seriously, then it becomes clear that we are not to conceive of the epistemology of religious conviction along completely rational lines.But the moral to extract from this is not fideism, or even a more moderate proposal that casts the epistemic standing of basic religious beliefs along nonrational (...) lines. Rather, one needs to recognise that in an important sense religious convictions are not beliefs at all, but that this is compatible with the idea that many other religious commitments are beliefs. This picture of the nature of religious commitment is shown to fit snugly with the Wittgensteinian account of hinge commitments, such that all rational belief essentially presupposes certain basic arational hinge commitments, along lines originally suggested by John Henry Newman. We are thus able to marshal a parity-style argument in defence of religious commitment. Although religious belief presupposes basic arational religious convictions, it is not on this score epistemically amiss since all belief presupposes basic arational convictions, or hinge commitments. The resulting view of the epistemology of religious commitment is a position I call quasi-fideism. (shrink)

Careful readers of Wittgenstein tend to overlook the significance his engineering education had for his philosophy; this despite Georg von Wright’s stern admonition that “the two most important facts to remember about Wittgenstein were, firstly, that he was Viennese, and, secondly, that he was an engineer.” Such oversight is particularly tempting for those of us who come to philosophy late, having first been schooled in math and science, because our education tricks us into thinking we understand engineering by extension. But (...) we do not. I will illustrate this common tendency to misread Wittgenstein by examining three engineering concepts that have little significance for science but played important roles in Wittgenstein’s philosophical thinking. These are: method of projection, dynamical similarity, and satisfactoriness. The upshot of this analysis will be a strong challenge to the myth of his putative fideism because neither fideism nor its contrary simply would have occurred to Wittgensteinthe-engineer. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious and magical practices are often thought to harbour troubling fideistic and relativistic views. Unsurprisingly, commentators are generally resistant to the idea that religious belief constitutes a ‘language‐game’ governed by its own peculiar ‘rules’, and is thereby insulated from the critical assessment of non‐participants. Indeed, on this fideist‐relativist reading, it is unclear how mutual understanding between believers and non‐believers (even between different sorts of believers) would be possible. In this paper I do three things: (i) show why (...) the fideist‐relativist reading of Wittgenstein is not wildly implausible (Sections 1–2); (ii) argue that, despite its initial plausibility, this reading fails to take into account Wittgenstein’s naturalism (Sections 3–4); and (iii) explain what sort of naturalism this is, and how it sheds light on Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief (Sections 5–6). (shrink)

I argue that grammatical thomism helps to clarify certain problems in philosophical theology by focusing attention on the parameters of coherent God-talk. By drawing on figures like David Burrell, Brian Davies, Kathryn Tanner, and Denys Turner, I show that the first rule of theological grammar is to avoid talking about God as if God were some sort of thing existing alongside the world. In fact, Aquinas concedes that we cannot really know what God is at all. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s later emphasis (...) on meaning as use helps us to see why we can still talk intelligibly about God by focusing on the use of the word more than its referent. I connect this with the work of Stephen Mulhall and Cora Diamond on the nature of riddles, and suggest that this genre is one way of illuminating the peculiar grammar of certain Christian doctrines: in particular, the doctrine of the incarnation and of creation out of nothing. Finally, I look outside Christian contexts to the Hindu tradition of Advaita Vedānta, and argue that the language and imageries of non-dualism can provoke us into reconsidering the essence of Christian grammar and alert us to some of the therapeutic possibilities of grammatical thomism. (shrink)

Rush Rhees oli Ludwig Wittgensteinin oppilas, ystävä ja työtoveri, joka on toistaiseksi tullut parhaiten tunnetuksi opettajansa kirjoitusten tulkitsijana ja julkaisijana. Hän oli myös omaperäinen filosofi, jonka ajattelu on saanut osakseen varsin vähän huomiota. Tässä artikkelissa tarkastellaan Rheesin filosofiakäsitystä, johon liittyvä tematiikka on Rheesin, samoin kuin Wittgensteinin, kohdalla erottamattomasti sidoksissa kysymykseen kielen, puhumisen ja ymmärtämisen mahdollisuudesta. Rhees ajattelee, että Wittgensteinin kieltä koskevat tutkimukset ovat jatkumoa antiikin filosofien todellisuuden luonnetta koskeville pohdinnoille. Rhees kuitenkin näkee vakavia ongelmia Wittgensteinin tavassa käsitellä kieltä koskevaa filosofian (...) ydinkysymystä. Kritiikin kärki koskee Wittgensteinin käsitystä kielipeleistä. Rhees katsoo, että Wittgenstein antaa kielipelin käsitteelle liian keskeisen aseman kielen yleistä luonnetta koskevissa huomautuksissaan. Rhees korostaa, ettei kieltä ja puhumista voi kuvata sen avulla tyhjentävästi. Kielestä ja puhumisesta ei voi esittää teoriaa eikä yleistä formaalista mallia. Lisäksi hän näkee kielipelimetaforan liian mekanistisena kuvaamaan kieltä ja ihmisten välistä kommunikointia. Rhees kuitenkin puhuu ”kielen ykseydestä” tai ”kielen yhtenäisyydestä” viittaamalla keskustelun käsitteeseen ja ajattelee, että kielen ykseyden ymmärtäminen keskusteluna valaisee paremmin kielen luonnetta kuin ajatus kielestä kielipelien joukkona. Rheesin filosofiakäsitystä ja hänen tapaansa harjoittaa filosofiaa leimaakin vahvasti dialogin merkityksen korostaminen, mikä näkyy kiinnostavalla tavalla hänen uskontoa ja etiikkaa käsittelevissä kirjoituksissaan. Rhees edustaa sellaista näkemystä filosofiasta ja sen metodista, jossa itse filosofisella keskustelulla ja tutkimuksella on itseisarvo. Filosofin tehtävänä ei ole olla elämänopas, joka tarjoaa vastauksia elämänongelmiin tai uskonnollisten kysymysten rationaalisuuteen. Filosofian tehtävänä on jatkuva ihmettely, dialogi ja ymmärryksen etsiminen. Filosofisten kysymysten vaikeuden ymmärtäminen on tärkeämpää kuin niiden ratkaiseminen. (shrink)

The question of paradox in Christian theology continues to attract attention in contemporary philosophical theology. Much of this attention understandably centers on the epistemological problems paradoxical claims pose for Christian faith. But even among those who conclude that certain points of Christian theology are paradoxical and that belief in paradoxical points of doctrine is epistemically supportable, concepts of the nature and function of paradox in Christian theology differ significantly. In this essay, after briefly noting the diversity of phenomena that count (...) as paradoxes in contemporary discourse, I critique two of the most helpful accounts of paradox in Christian theology available – James Anderson's and C. Stephen Evans's – on the way to proposing an alternative definition. That definition combines the most helpful features of those two accounts while correcting certain weaknesses in each. The result is a definition of paradox as a particular kind of mystery that fits the Reformed strand of Christian theology particularly well and involves a compelling analysis of the spirituality of the phenomenon of paradox in theology. (shrink)

This paper examines recent deployments of Wittgenstein’s thought, by Mustafa (2018) and Asad (2020), in defense of the Islamic “traditionalism” of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Hanbali school. I will briefly summarize the key features of Wittgenstein’s thought crucial to this, and then examine their ramifications. I argue that Wittgenstein’s position actually undermines any claim to interpretive authority, whether of the “rationalist” or salafi “traditionalist” sort. Secondly, the approach to religious language most commonly associated with Wittgenstein—so-called “Wittgensteinian Fideism” may pose bigger (...) problems for traditionalists than the influence of classical philosophy or “rationalist” theological responses to modern skeptical challenges. (shrink)

Can a contemplative philosopher describe a particular religious practice as superstitious, or is he thereby overstepping his boundaries? I will discuss the way in which the Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion D. Z. Phillips uses ‘Superstition’ as a contemplative term. His use of the distinction between genuine religion and superstition is not a weakness as is often supposed, but a necessity. Without contemplating ‘Superstition’ and ‘genuine religion’ Phillips would not have been able to elucidate the meaning that religious beliefs have in (...) the lives of both the faithful and their critics. I will defend the aptness of Phillips’s use of this term and illustrate his approach using examples such as the concept of genuine friendship or gratitude, and then I apply this approach to the question whether, from a philosophical point of view, particular Christian practices such as the prosperity gospel are genuinely religious or should be called superstitious. (shrink)

This article sets out by distinguishing Wittgenstein’s own views in the philosophy of religion from a school of thought in the philosophy of religion that relies on later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. After a survey of distinguishing features of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the third section explores Wittgenstein’s treatment of Frazer’s account of magic among primitive peoples. The following section offers an account of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, including the use of the notions of a language game and superstition. I conclude (...) by criticizing a very influential argument of Wittgenstein’s to the effect that the meaning of words like ‘belief’ and ‘object’ varies from context to context without having any one thing in common. (shrink)

In his 1985 book on philosophy and atheism, the Canadian thinker Kai Nielsen, a prolific writer on the subject, wonders why the philosophy of religion is ‘so boring’, and concludes that it must be ‘because the case for atheism is so strong that it is difficult to work up much enthusiasm for the topic.’ Indeed, Nielsen even regards most of the contemporary arguments for atheism as little more than ‘mopping up operations after the Enlightenment’ which, on the whole, add little (...) to the socio-anthropological and socio-psychological accounts of religion provided by thinkers like Feuerbach, Marx and Freud, as any ‘reasonable person informed by modernity’ will readily acknowledge. On this view, the answer to Kant's question – ‘What may we hope?’ – does not gesture towards a resurrection and personal immortality, but instead to the death of religious discourse itself: I think, and indeed hope, that God-talk, and religious discourse more generally, is, or at least should be, dying out in the West, or more generally in a world that has felt the force of a Weberian disenchantment of the world. This sense that religious convictions are no longer a live option is something which people who think of themselves as either modernists or post-modernists very often tend to have. (shrink)

This thesis explores possibilities that arise from regarding theodicy as the activity of descriptive understanding of Christian belief and practice as found in the classical theistic framework. First, any theodicy as an activity is analysed in terms of the role of philosophy, the place of epistemology, the basis of theology, and the taking of an apologetic stance. It is then argued that traditional approaches to theodicy suffer from methodological weaknesses which derive from formulating theodicy in terms of unbelief, and from (...) strictly theoretical analysis. The superiority of philosophical description is argued as better suited to understanding religious belief as held in the community of believers, with especial reference to relationships that hold between language and reality. A critical exploration follows of the approach to theodicy of a proponent of philosophical description, D.Z. Phillips, and consideration is given to the status of evaluations made by believers. In the light of this critique, two attempts are made to describe the shape of Christian theodicy using the interperson model of theological language. The first attempt, based on a description of actual interpersonal relationships, is found eventually to be open to serious objections. A second attempt is then made, based not only on interpersonal language, but using a distinction between "surface" and "depth" in religious language, and by arguing for the presence of an epistemological "direction" in religious belief. On this basis, a Theodicy of Dependence is developed as best describing the shape of Christian belief held in a world which is frequently hostile. (shrink)

Recently, hinge epistemologists have applied Wittgenstein’s metaphor of hinges to religious belief. The most prominent proposal in this context is Pritchard’s “quasi-fideism”. This paper examines some historical precursors of the notion of religious hinges, with the aim of shedding more light on it. After outlining the framework of hinge epistemology and its application to religious belief, I briefly examine the views of Thomas Reid and John Henry Newman as acknowledged forerunners of this framework (or cognate views). Next, I turn to (...) two hitherto unacknowledged forerunners, the pragmatists William James and Charles S. Peirce. I then focus on some insights that the pragmatists offer. On this basis, I conclude that religious beliefs are a special class of hinges. As such, while they can be defended through hinge epistemology, they cannot constitute a model through which we can interpret the nature of hinges in general. (shrink)

This article considers the relationship between philosophy of religion and an approach to the study of religion, which prioritises the experience of lived religion. Considering how individuals and communities live out their faith challenges some of the assumptions of analytic philosophers of religion regarding the position the philosopher should adopt when approaching the investigation of religion. If philosophy is understood principally as a means for analysing belief, it will have little space for an engagement with what it feels like to (...) live out one’s faith. (shrink)

I examine what I shall call meta-philosophy: a philosophical examination into what philosophy is, can be, should be, something of what it has been, what the point (if any) of it is and what, if anything, it can contribute to our understanding of and the making sense of our lives, including our lives individually and together, and of the social order in which we live.