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  1. Tacit beliefs and other doxastic attitudes.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):95-117.
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  • An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.Laurence Jonathan Cohen - 1992 - New York: Clarendon Press.
    In this incisive new book one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And (...)
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  • Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief'.Steven Horst - 1995 - Synthese 104 (1):123-45.
    It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms 'theoretical' and 'belief' are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of 'theoretical' that is of use to the eliminativist, and in (...)
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  • Folk psychology is here to stay.Terence Horgan & James Woodward - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (April):197-225.
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  • Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will.Daniel M. Wegner & T. Wheatley - 1999 - American Psychologist 54:480-492.
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  • The illusion of conscious will.Peter Carruthers - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):197 - 213.
    Wegner (Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press) argues that conscious will is an illusion, citing a wide range of empirical evidence. I shall begin by surveying some of his arguments. Many are unsuccessful. But one—an argument from the ubiquity of self-interpretation—is more promising. Yet is suffers from an obvious lacuna, offered by so-called ‘dual process’ theories of reasoning and decision making (Evans, J., & Over, D. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press; Stanovich, K. (1999). Who is (...)
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  • The function of phenomenal states: Supramodular interaction theory.Ezequiel Morsella - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1000-1021.
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  • On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of visual imagery.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):35-53.
    Philosophers tend to assume that we have excellent knowledge of our own current conscious experience or 'phenomenology'. I argue that our knowledge of one aspect of our experience, the experience of visual imagery, is actually rather poor. Precedent for this position is found among the introspective psychologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two main arguments are advanced toward the conclusion that our knowledge of our own imagery is poor. First, the reader is asked to form a visual (...)
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  • Epiphenomenalism.William Robinson - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley (1874), who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of (...)
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  • Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments.David M. Rosenthal - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):203-214.
    Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state.
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  • Neither hot nor cold: An alternative account of consciousness.Robert W. Lurz - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    I identify three dominant positions in the philosophy of mind on the nature and distribution of consciousness: the exclusive HOT position, the inclusive HOT position, and the COLD position. I argue that each of these positions has its own rather counterintuitive consequence and, as a result, is not entirely satisfying. To avoid these consequences, I argue, a common assumption of the dominant positions ought to be rejected -- namely, that to be conscious of one's mental states is to be conscious (...)
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  • A Minimalist Threshold for Epistemically Irrational Beliefs.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.
    This paper aims to shed light on the nature of belief and provide support to the view that I call ‘Minimalism’. It shows that Minimalism is better equipped than the traditional approach to separating belief from imagination and addressing cases of belief’s evidence- resistance. The key claim of the paper is that no matter how epistemically irrational humans’ beliefs are, they always retain a minimal level of rationality.
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  • On the Epistemic Value of Reflection.Pranav Ambardekar - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy:1-43.
    Against philosophical orthodoxy, Hilary Kornblith has mounted an empirically grounded critique of the epistemic value of reflection. In this paper, I argue that this recent critique of the epistemic value of reflection fails even if we concede that (a) the empirical facts are as Kornblith says they are and (b) reliability is the only determinant of epistemic value. The critique fails because it seeks to undermine the reliability of reflection in general but targets only one of its variants, namely individual (...)
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  • People underestimate the influence of repetition on truth judgments (and more so for themselves than for others).Simone Mattavelli, Jérémy Béna, Olivier Corneille & Christian Unkelbach - 2024 - Cognition 242 (C):105651.
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  • Pluralism about introspection.Kateryna Samoilova Franco - 2024 - Mind and Language (2):293-309.
    If we can and do have some self‐knowledge, how do we acquire it? By examining the ways in which we acquire self‐knowledge—by introspection—we can try shedding some light onto the nature and the breadth of self‐knowledge, as others have tried to do with other forms of knowledge. My aim is to show that introspection involves multiple (that is, at least two) distinct processes, a view I call “pluralism about introspection”. One of the virtues of pluralism is that it explains how (...)
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  • Methodological reductionism or methodological dualism? In search of a middle ground.Morten Overgaard - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.
    The contrasts between so-called objective and subjective measures of consciousness have been a dominating topic of discussion for decades. The debate has classically been dominated by two positions – that subjective measures may be completely or partially reduced to objective measures, and, alternatively that they must exist in parallel. I argue that many problems relate to subjective reports as they can be imprecise and vulnerable to a number of potential confounding factors. However, I also argue that despite the fact that (...)
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  • What is Interesting about Conspiracy Theories?Melina Tsapos - manuscript
    It is not clear that scholars, when they use the term ‘conspiracy theory’, are in fact interested in investigating the phenomenon of conspiracy theories and belief in them as such. I consider two perspectives found in the fast-growing literature on conspiracy theories: The Faux-pas View and The Neutral View. I argue that there is a difference in scholarly motivation, or at a very minimum a difference in the sustaining motivation for the research paradigms. What the motivations are is much too (...)
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  • The space between rationalism and sentimentalism: A perspective from moral development.Joshua Rottman - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e165.
    May interprets the prevalence of non-emotional moral intuitions as indicating support for rationalism. However, research in developmental psychology indicates that the mechanisms underlying these intuitions are not always rational in nature. Specifically, automatic intuitions can emerge passively, through processes such as evolutionary preparedness and enculturation. Although these intuitions are not always emotional, they are not clearly indicative of reason.
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  • Mental measurement and the introspective privilege.Michael Pauen - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.
    According to a long-standing belief, introspection provides privileged access to the mind, while objective methods, which we denote as “extrospection”, suffer from basic epistemic deficits. Here we will argue that neither an introspective privilege exists nor does extrospection suffer from such deficits.We will focus on two entailments of an introspective privilege: first, such a privilege would require that introspective evidence prevails in cases of conflict with extrospective information. However, we will show that this is not the case: extrospective claims can (...)
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  • The Origins of Distinctively Human Mindreading: A Bio-social-technological Co-evolutionary Account.Armin W. Schulz - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
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  • Herbert Simon’s Computational Models of Scientific Discovery.Stephen Downes - 1990 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 (1):97-108.
    Herbert Simon’s work on scientific discovery deserves serious attention by philosophers of science for several reasons. First, Simon was an early advocate of rational scientific discovery, contra Popper and logical empiricist philosophers of science (Simon 1966). This proposal spurred on investigation of scientific discovery in philosophy of science, as philosophers used and developed Simon’s notions of “problem solving” and “heuristics” in attempts to provide rational accounts of scientific discovery (See Nickles 1980a, Wimsatt 1980). Second, Simon promoted and developed many of (...)
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  • Aphantasia, Unsymbolized Thinking and Conscious Thought.Raquel Krempel - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    According to a common view, conscious thoughts necessarily involve quasi-perceptual experiences, or mental images. This is alleged to be the case not only when one entertains conscious thoughts about perceptible things, but also when one thinks about more abstract things. In the case of conscious abstract propositional thoughts, the idea is that they occur in inner speech, which is taken to involve imagery (typically auditory) of words in a natural language. I argue that unsymbolized thinking and total aphantasia cast doubt (...)
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  • Non-commitment in mental imagery.Eric J. Bigelow, John P. McCoy & Tomer D. Ullman - 2023 - Cognition 238 (C):105498.
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  • Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.
    Uncontroversially, individuals exercise agency in acting; can we say the same about believing? This paper argues that subjects do indeed exercise agency over their beliefs and provides an account by which this is possible. On my picture, self-awareness is fundamental to the nature of doxastic agency. Drawing on work in the philosophy of action, I argue that subjects exercise agency in performing mental actions that form and sustain their beliefs, where they are aware of these actions as part of reasoning (...)
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  • Is it Good to Conceive of One’s Life Narratively?Sally Latham & Mark Pinder - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2005-2014.
    Grace Hibshman has developed a new explanation for why narrative self-conceptions might contribute to one’s flourishing: conceiving of one’s life narratively, she argues, can facilitate an improved self-understanding. In this short paper, we argue that, pace Hibshman, life narratives tend to misrepresent and mislead. So while they may give the impression of an improved self-understanding, that impression is typically mistaken. In this respect, conceiving of one’s life narratively hinders flourishing.
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  • Virtue for affective engines.Chris Zarpentine - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Practical reasoning is reasoning about what to do. Practical wisdom is the traditional ideal of practical reasoning associated with virtue ethics. Practical wisdom requires the knowledge and skills necessary to act rightly across a wide range of situations. Critics allege that this notion does not cohere well with what contemporary cognitive science tells us about the production of human behavior. After briefly discussing these criticisms, I sketch an alternative account of these cognitive processes that I call affective engine theory. I (...)
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  • Forgiveness: Overcoming versus Forswearing Blame.Julius Schönherr - 2024 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 41 (1):66-84.
    Philosophers often identify forgiveness with either overcoming or forswearing blaming attitudes such as, paradigmatically, resentment for the right reasons; yet there is little debate as to which of the two (if either) is correct. In this article, I present three arguments that aim to strengthen the forswearing view. First, on the overcoming view, many paradigm cases of forgiveness would turn out to be mere ‘letting go’ instead. Second, only the forswearing view plausibly allows for forgiveness in cases where the victim (...)
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  • Moral Intuitions About Stigmatizing Practices and Feeding Stigmatizing Practices: How Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory Relates to Infectious Disease Stigma.C. Damsté & K. Kramer - 2023 - Public Health Ethics 16 (1):102-111.
    Despite extensive stigma mitigation efforts, infectious disease stigma remains common. So far, little attention has been paid to the moral psychology of stigmatizing practices (i.e. beliefs, attitudes, actions) rather than the experience of being stigmatized. Addressing the moral psychology behind stigmatizing practices seems necessary to explain the persistence of infectious disease stigma and to develop effective mitigation strategies. Our article proposes building on Jonathan Haidt’s moral foundations theory, which states that moral judgements follow from intuitions rather than conscious reasoning. Conceptual (...)
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  • Epistemic Libertarian Paternalism.Kengo Miyazono - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    Libertarian paternalism is a weak form of paternalism that recommends nudges rather than bans, restrictions, or other strong interventions. Nudges influence people’s choice by modifying contextual factors (the “choice architecture”). This paper explores the possibility of an epistemic analogue of libertarian paternalism. What I call “epistemic libertarian paternalism” is a weak form of epistemic paternalism that recommends “epistemic nudges” rather than stronger paternalistic interventions. Epistemic nudges influence people’s beliefs and judgments by modifying contextual factors (the “epistemic choice architecture”). The main (...)
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  • Rationalizing our Way into Moral Progress.Jesse S. Summers - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):93-104.
    Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. This is troubling for views of moral progress according to which moral progress proceeds from our engagement with our own and others’ reasons. I consider an account (...)
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  • What do laypeople believe about the voluntary and involuntary retrieval of memories?Mevagh Sanson, Søren Risløv Staugaard & Krystian Barzykowski - 2023 - Consciousness and Cognition 110 (C):103491.
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  • Four Problems of Mind and Body: Celebrating the 80 th Birthday of Max Velmans.John F. Kihlstrom - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (1):87-109.
    Inspired by the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans, this paper considers four problems of mind and body. (1) The traditional mind–body problem, including the 'easy' problem of identifying the neural correlates of consciousness, and the 'hard' problem of determining just how neural processes generate conscious states. (2) The distinction between automatic (unconscious) and controlled (conscious) processes, raising the question about the relative roles they play in experience, thought, and action, as well as the question of free will. (3) Psychosomatic effects, (...)
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  • Predicting Outcomes in a Sequence of Binary Events: Belief Updating and Gambler's Fallacy Reasoning.Kariyushi Rao & Reid Hastie - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (1):e13211.
    Beliefs like the Gambler's Fallacy and the Hot Hand have interested cognitive scientists, economists, and philosophers for centuries. We propose that these judgment patterns arise from the observer's mental models of the sequence-generating mechanism, moderated by the strength of belief in an a priori base rate. In six behavioral experiments, participants observed one of three mechanisms generating sequences of eight binary events: a random mechanical device, an intentional goal-directed actor, and a financial market. We systematically manipulated participants’ beliefs about the (...)
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  • Two Kinds of Process or Two Kinds of Processing? Disambiguating Dual-Process Theories.Rafael Augusto - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (1):277-298.
    Dual-Process Theories (D-PTs) claim there are two qualitatively different types of processes in the human brain-mind. Despite forming the basis for several areas of cognitive science, they are still shrouded in ambiguity: critics erroneously attack D-PTs as a whole (e.g., Evans and Stanovich Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 2013), the qualitative/quantitative distinction is not clear enough (De Neys Perspectives on Psychological Science 16 (6): 1412–1427, 2021; Dewey 2022) and, given this criterion, deciding between qualitative or quantitative differences may even be (...)
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  • External world scepticism and self scepticism.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):591-607.
    A general trend in recent philosophical and empirical work aims to undermine various traditional claims regarding the distinctive nature of self-knowledge. So far, however, this work has not seriously threatened the Cartesian claim that (at least some) self-knowledge is immune to the sort of sceptical problem that seems to afflict our knowledge of the external world. In this paper I carry this trend further by arguing that the Cartesian claim is false. This is done by showing that a familiar sceptical (...)
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  • The limits of moral dumbfounding.Danielle Wylie - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (4):610-626.
    In moral psychology, “psychological rationalism” is the view that moral judgments are caused by a process of reasoning. Jonathan Haidt argues against this view by showing that people succumb to “moral dumbfounding”—they cannot adequately provide reasoning for their moral judgment. I argue that this evidence undermines psychological rationalism only if the view is committed to two claims about reasoning: (a) reasoning must meet an adequacy condition, and (b) reasoning must be sufficiently conscious. I argue that plausible variants of psychological rationalism (...)
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  • Situated Affectivity and Mind Shaping: Lessons from Social Psychology.Sven Walter & Achim Stephan - 2023 - Emotion Review 15 (1):3-16.
    Proponents of situated affectivity hold that “tools for feeling” are just as characteristic of the human condition as are “tools for thinking” or tools for carpentry. An agent’s affective life, they argue, is dependent upon both physical characteristics of the agent and the agent’s reciprocal relationship to an appropriately structured natural, technological, or social environment. One important achievement has been the distinction between two fundamentally different ways in which affectivity might be intertwined with the environment: the “user-resource-model” and the “mind-invasion-model.” (...)
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  • Psychophysiological factors as predictors of second language writing achievement in a computer-based test.Shu-Ping Lee, Shujen Lee Chang, Hui-Kai Su, Zhen-Yang Cui & Shin-Da Lee - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Sleep quality, personality, and cognitive load potentially increase second language writing anxiety and subsequently affect SLW achievement. This study investigates the predictions of sleep quality, personality, and cognitive load toward SLW anxiety and achievement in a computer-based test. Participants included 172 voluntary undergraduates majoring in English as foreign language. SLW anxiety in a computer-based test, sleep disturbance, personality and cognitive load was assessed with the SLW Anxiety Inventory, Pittsburg Sleep Quality Index, Type-D Personality, and cognitive load questionnaires. A structural equation (...)
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  • Self-Regulation and Political Confabulation.Kathleen Murphy-Hollies - 2022 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 92:111-128.
    In this paper, I discuss the nature and consequences of confabulation about political opinions and behaviours. When people confabulate, they give reasons for their choices or behaviour which are ill-grounded and do not capture what really brought the behaviour about, but they do this with no intention to deceive and endorse their own accounts. I suggest that this can happen when people are asked why they voted a certain way, or support certain campaigns, and so on. Confabulating in these political (...)
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  • Rebiasing: Managing automatic biases over time.Aleksey Korniychuk & Eric Luis Uhlmann - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Automatic preferences can influence a decision maker’s choice before any relevant or meaningful information is available. We account for this element of human cognition in a computational model of problem solving that involves active trial and error and show that automatic biases are not just a beneficial or detrimental property: they are a tool that, if properly managed over time, can give rise to superior performance. In particular, automatic preferences are beneficial early on and detrimental at later stages. What is (...)
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  • Optimism in unconscious, intuitive morality.Cory J. Clark & Bo M. Winegard - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e150.
    Moral cognition, by its very nature, stems from intuitions about what is good and bad, and these intuitions influence moral assessments outside of conscious awareness. However, because humans evolved a shared set of moral intuitions, and are compelled to justify their moral assessments as good and rational (even erroneously) to others, moral virtue and moral progress are still possible.
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  • A framework for application of consumer neuroscience in pro-environmental behavior change interventions.Nikki Leeuwis, Tom van Bommel & Maryam Alimardani - 2022 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 16:886600.
    Most consumers are aware that climate change is a growing problem and admit that action is needed. However, research shows that consumers’ behavior often does not conform to their value and orientations. This value-behavior gap is due to contextual factors such as price, product design, and social norms as well as individual factors such as personal and hedonic values, environmental beliefs, and the workload capacity an individual can handle. Because of this conflict of interest, consumers have a hard time identifying (...)
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  • The cognitive approach to the process of interpersonal understanding.Alberto Greco - manuscript
    The basic problem of this investigation concerns how is it that an individual "understands" or "comprehends" what another communicates and, sometimes, even what he does not communicate but of which he has experience. We would like here to take stock of the models that psychology currently has available to study the phenomenon of interpersonal understanding,using a cognitive approach, and to propose some working hypotheses that in our opinion could guide further research.
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  • Self-Knowledge and Epistemic Virtues: between Reliabilism and Responsibilism.César Schirmer Santos - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):579-593.
    This paper is about the role of self-knowledge in the cognitive life of a virtuous knower. The main idea is that it is hard to know ourselves because introspection is an unreliable epistemic source, and reason can be a source of insidious forms of self-deception. Nevertheless, our epistemic situation is such that an epistemically responsible agent must be constantly looking for a better understanding of her own character traits and beliefs, under the risk of jeopardizing her own status as a (...)
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  • The lived experience of remembering a ‘good’ interview: Micro-phenomenology applied to itself.Katrin Heimann, Hanne Bess Boelsbjerg, Chris Allen, Martijn van Beek, Christian Suhr, Annika Lübbert & Claire Petitmengin - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (1):217-245.
    Micro-phenomenology is an interview and analysis method for investigating subjective experience. As a research tool, it provides detailed descriptions of brief moments of any type of subjective experience and offers techniques for systematically comparing them. In this article, we use an auto-ethnographic approach to present and explore the method. The reader is invited to observe a dialogue between two authors that illustrates and comments on the planning, conducting and analysis of a pilot series of five micro-phenomenological interviews. All these interviews (...)
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  • Why people choose deliberate ignorance in times of societal transformation.Ralph Hertwig & Dagmar Ellerbrock - 2022 - Cognition 229 (C):105247.
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  • Evocative Advocates and Stirring Statesmen: Law, Politics, and the Weaponization of Imagery.Carlton Patrick - 2018 - Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 2 (2):33-46.
    This article shows how descriptive imagery can be used to hijack evolved psychological instincts and prejudice the judgment of others, particularly in the legal and political domains. By mimicking the cues that represented threats to our ancestors, those wishing to color the perception of others can subtly trigger the affective responses that evolved to help navigate ancestral threats. When this happens, logic may be unseated in favor of deep-seated instinctual responses, often to a problematic degree. In this way, lawyers, politicians, (...)
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  • What Philosophy Contributes to Emotion Science.Ronald De Sousa - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (4):87.
    Contemporary philosophers have paid increasing attention to the empirical research on emotions that has blossomed in many areas of the social sciences. In this paper, I first sketch the common roots of science and philosophy in Ancient Greek thought. I illustrate the way that specific empirical sciences can be regarded as branching out from a central trunk of philosophical speculation. On the basis of seven informal characterizations of what is distinctive about philosophical thinking, I then draw attention to the fact (...)
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  • No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):337-352.
    Many agree that one cannot consciously form a belief just because one wants to. And many also agree this is a puzzling component of our conscious belief-forming processes. I will look at three views on how to make sense of this puzzle and show that they all fail in some way. I then offer a simpler explanation that avoids all the pitfalls of those views, which is based instead on an analysis of our conscious reasoning combined with a commonly accepted (...)
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