5 found
Order:
See also
Ezequiel Morsella
San Francisco State University
  1. The Function of Phenomenal States: Supramodular Interaction Theory.Ezequiel Morsella - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1000-1021.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  2. Homing in on Consciousness in the Nervous System: An Action-Based Synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Christine A. Godwin, Tiffany K. Jantz, Stephen C. Krieger & Adam Gazzaley - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-70.
    What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3. Passive Frame Theory: A New Synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Godwin Christine, Jantz Tiffany, Krieger Stephen & Gazzaley Adam - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4. Conscious Thoughts From Reflex-Like Processes: A New Experimental Paradigm for Consciousness Research.Allison K. Allen, Kevin Wilkins, Adam Gazzaley & Ezequiel Morsella - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1318-1331.
    The contents of our conscious mind can seem unpredictable, whimsical, and free from external control. When instructed to attend to a stimulus in a work setting, for example, one might find oneself thinking about household chores. Conscious content thus appears different in nature from reflex action. Under the appropriate conditions, reflexes occur predictably, reliably, and via external control. Despite these intuitions, theorists have proposed that, under certain conditions, conscious content resembles reflexes and arises reliably via external control. We introduce the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  5. Conceptual Knowledge: Grounded in Sensorimotor States, or a Disembodied Deus Ex Machina?Ezequiel Morsella, Carlos Montemayor, Jason Hubbard & Pareezad Zarolia - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):455-456.
    If embodied models no longer address the symbol grounding problem and a conceptual system can step in and resolve categorizations when embodied simulations fail, then perhaps the next step in theory-building is to isolate the unique contributions of embodied simulation. What is a disembodied conceptual system incapable of doing with respect to semantic processing or the categorization of smiles?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark