Aristotle’s divine nous of Metaphysics Λ.9 is generally understood to exclusively characterise the Prime Mover-God. This paper challenges this view by (1) drawing out the strong congruity between our ‘best state’ and that of the Prime Mover in Λ.7 and (2) removing certain key obstacles to a more inclusive reading of Λ.9: our thought is not limited to the ‘human’ kind (ho anthrōpinos nous, 1075a7), nor is our self-knowledge always a ‘by-product’ (en parergōi, 1074b36). Noēsis noēseōs, I contend, equally applies (...) to some forms of our thought. Hence, divine thought is accessible—indeed, even commendable—to us, just as the ‘divine life’ of Nicomachean Ethics X.7 is. (shrink)

Aristotle’s theory of human happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics explicitly depends on the claim that contemplation (theôria) is peculiar to human beings, whether it is our function or only part of it. But there is a notorious problem: Aristotle says that divine beings also contemplate. Various solutions have been proposed, but each has difficulties. Drawing on an analysis of what divine contemplation involves according to Aristotle, I identify an assumption common to all of these proposals and argue for rejecting it. (...) This allows a straightforward solution to the problem and there is evidence that Aristotle would have adopted it. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to discover the object of Aristotle’s God’s νόησις in Metαphysics Λ.9. In Section I, I catalogue existing interpretations and mention the two key concepts of (i) God’s substancehood and (ii) his metaphysical simplicity. In Section II, I explore the first two aporiae of Λ.9 – namely (1) what God’s οὐσία is and (2) what God intelligizes. In Section III, I show how Aristotle solves these aporiae by contending that God’s οὐσία is actually intelligizing, and being (...) determined to do so by himself, and that the object of his νόησις is himself, such that he intelligizes his own οὐσία, and I explain what this means. In Section IV, I present the second pair of aporiae in Λ.9 and show how, by solving these, Aristotle clarifies the position arrived at in Section III. Lastly, in Section V, I present the final aporia and its solution, and conclude that Aristotle’s God is a radically-unified Narcissus-God who intelligizes his own οὐσία. (shrink)

La investigación asume el estudio de la " otredad " en el pensamiento aristo-télico, profundizando el carácter del θεός. Se procura responder a la pregun-ta: ¿Qué es " otro " (ἄλλος)? y ¿Cómo es entendida la otredad (ἑτερότης) por Aristóteles? para así, en un último escenario. esbozar una reflexión a propó-sito de θεός como otredad (ἑτερότης), radicalizando las tesis aristotélicas.

The question posed in the title of this paper is an historical one. I am not, for example, primarily interested in the term 'Platonism' as used by modern philosophers to stand for a particular theory under discussion – a theory, which it is typically acknowledged, no one may have actually held.1 I am rather concerned to understand and articulate on an historical basis the core position of that 'school' of thought prominent in antiquity from the time of the 'founder' up (...) until at least the middle of the 6th century C.E.2 Platonism was unquestionably the dominant philosophical position in the ancient world over a period of more than 800 years. Epicureanism is perhaps the sole major exception to the rule that in the ancient world all philosophers took Platonism as the starting-point for speculation, including those who thought their first task was to refute Platonism. Basically, Platonism sent the ancient philosophical agenda. Given this fact, understanding with some precision the nature of Platonism is obviously a desirable thing for the historian of ancient philosophy. (shrink)

How Does the Environment Affect the Person? Mark H. Bickhard invited chapter in Children's Development within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues, Erlbaum. edited by L. T. Winegar, J. Valsiner, in press.

There is a certain conventional interpretation of Aristotle's argument, in Metaphysics Λ.7, for the identification of the first unmoved mover as God, according to which that argument has the following outline.

El último Schelling desarrolla un aristotelismo anti-hegeliano cuyo mejor ejemplo es su interpretación de la “pura actualidad” en el libro Lambda de la Metafísica. Contra la lectura “entelequial” de Hegel, Schelling subraya que dicha actualidad es pura ἐνέργεια, libre de toda potencialidad, es decir, de todo contenido y sin relación a movimiento alguno o su culminación. En este artículo, analizo las diferencias entre ambas interpretaciones desde la perspectiva de Schelling. Finalmente, discuto cuál es la ventaja que gana la propia filosofía (...) tardía de Schelling al distinguir tan nítidamente entre ἐνέργεια y ἐντελέχεια. (shrink)

O presente artigo escrutina dois momentos da obra de Nietzsche em que ele se detém sobre o fenômeno da inspiração poética, com o fito de ressaltar suas diferenças e de mostrar como cada um deles é reminiscente das reflexões de Platão e Aristóteles sobre esse tema. No primeiro caso, comenta dois parágrafos do livro Humano, demasiado humano, salientando como Nietzsche desenvolve neste caso visão secular e psicofisiológica da inspiração, a qual relembra várias reflexões de Aristóteles. No segundo, examina o que (...) ele escreve no Ecce Homo sobre sua inspiração ao compor o Zaratustra, argumentando que ele avança então perspectiva divina da inspiração, a qual recorda, por sua vez, vários traços da Inspirationslehre de Platão. Como conclusão, elaboram-se alguns pensamentos baseados em Pierre Hadot sobre a transmissão da filosofia através do conceito retórico de tópos. (shrink)

The position on the question of divine providence of the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. A.D. 200) is of particular interest. It marks an attempt to find avia mediabetween the Epicurean denial of any divine concern for the world, on the one hand, and the Stoic view that divine providence governs it in every detail, on the other.2As an expression of such a middle course it finds a place in later classifications of views concerning providence.3It is also of (...) topical interest: Alexander's fullest discussion, in his treatiseDe providentia (On Providence)(surviving only in two Arabic versions), has only recently been edited and translated,4although some aspects of his position had long been known from other texts preserved in Greek.5. (shrink)

Highlighting the relations between De Anima II.5 and De Anima III.4, this paper argues that Aristotle held a surprisingly dynamic view of the intellect. According to this view, the intellect is in...