I argue that Plato thinks that the soul has location, surface, depth, and extension, and that the Timaeus’ composition of the soul out of eight circles is intended literally. A novel contribution is the development of an account of corporeality that denies the entailment that the soul is corporeal. I conclude by examining Aristotle’s objection to the Timaeus’ psychology and then the intellectual history of this reading of Plato.

This paper has three interdependent aims. The first is to make Reichenbach’s views on induction and probabilities clearer, especially as they pertain to his pragmatic justification of induction. The second aim is to show how his view of pragmatic justification arises out of his commitment to extensional empiricism and moots the possibility of a non-pragmatic justification of induction. Finally, and most importantly, a formal decision-theoretic account of Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification is offered in terms both of the minimax principle and the (...) dominance principle. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that Aristotle operates with a particular theoretical model in his explanation of animal locomotion, what we call the ‘centralized incoming and outgoing motions’ model. We show how the model accommodates more complex cases of animal motion and how it allows Aristotle to preserve the intuition that animals are self-movers, without jeopardizing his arguments for the eternity of motion and the necessary existence of one eternal unmoved mover in Physics VIII. The CIOM model helps to elucidate (...) Aristotle’s two central yet problematic claims, namely that the soul is the efficient cause of animal motion and that it is the internal supporting-point necessary for animal motion. Moreover, the CIOM model helps us to explain the difference between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary motions, and to square Aristotle’s cardiocentrism with his hylomorphism, but also, more generally, it provides an interesting way of thinking about the place of intentionality in the causal structure of the world. (shrink)

A topic common to both Plato’s and Aristotle’s discussions of theories of the soul is the doctrine of the soul as a harmony of the parts of the body. Plato’s Phaedo as well as Aristotle’s De anima and Eudemus present this theory and argue against the identification of the soul as a harmony. This paper has two focuses, one philosophical and one historical. First, I will focus on the argumentation used by Aristotle in his dialogue Eudemus, which is often associated (...) with Aristotle’s early attachment to Plato. On the basis of the argumentation against the harmonia theory, I will try to show that the Eudemus is not a dialogue that depicts Aristotle’s Platonic phase. Instead, by comparing the arguments of the Eudemus with both Plato and Aristotle’s mature thought, I will argue that the argumentation of the Eudemus seems to be an indirect attack on Plato’s view on the Forms and on the nature of the soul, and that it seems to be consistent with Aristotle’s mature work On the Soul. Second, given that Aristotle discusses this topic twice, I will try, also on the basis of conclusions about the Eudemus and on later reception of Aristotle’s arguments, to show why this is the case. (shrink)

A postura de Aristóteles com relação aos deuses é, às vezes, desconcertante. Diferentemente das obras do Corpus aristotelicum, os Diálogos essotericos, em particular o Peri Euches, parece testemunhar a intenção por parte de Aristóteles de pensar uma relação estrita entre o homem e a divindade, idéia esta que a Metafísica ignora. A existência de um dialogo Peri Euches seria sinal da persuasão que os deuses devem ser honrados e tal cuidado deriva do juízo que a nobreza dos deuses deve ser (...) respeitada. Esta asserção não concorda com a interpretação tradicional das passagens teológicas de Metafísica. É reconhecido que a Metafísica utiliza argumentações mais cientificas e abandona o pensamento irrefletido da divindade. Inicialmente esta foi uma das razões que levaram os interpretes a colocar em duvida a autenticidade do dialogo Peri Euches. Achamos melhor nos manter fieis aos textos e atribuir à Aristóteles a “piedade” que ele merece. O presente estudo tentará mostrar que não há razão de duvidar da autenticidade do escrito essoterico. Tentaremos dar uma interpretação do fragmento do dialogo e mostrar a relação entre este texto e as passagens teológicas de Metafísica Lambda. (shrink)

Questo articolo presenta un quadro dei problemi che il frammento B85DK di Eraclito solleva e delle interpretazioni antiche e moderne che sono state suggerite. In particolare, è esaminata la testimonianza di Aristotele, la più antica e anche la più profonda e articolata. Una panoramica sui significati di thumos, punto centrale del frammento, mostra che per Aristotele questo concetto non si esaurisce nel pathos dell’ira. Il thumos è in primo luogo una dunamis, una facoltà dell’anima che rende possibile non solo il (...) pathos, l’affezione passeggera dell’ira, ma anche il coraggio, l’impulsività, l’affetto, il senso della libertà e dell’autorità. Questa nozione aristotelica, così ricca e polimorfica da sottrarsi a una traduzione unica esaustiva, proviene in realtà dalla sistematizzazione di un materiale molto antico, omerico e presocratico, legato ai proverbi. Eraclito stesso ne offre già una formulazione che sintetizza due aspetti che Aristotele accoglie e sottolinea: la forza irresistibile e inarrestabile dello slancio impulsivo naturale, una volta che sia stato innescato, e l'estrema conseguenza a cui puo' portare, e cioè la perdita della vita stessa. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Naïve Somatism is a re-interpretation of Aristotle’s cognitive psychology in light of certain presuppositions he holds about the living animal body. The living animal body is presumed to be sensitive, and Aristotle grounds his account of cognition in a rudimentary proprioceptive awareness one has of her body. With that presupposed metaphysics under our belts, we are in a position to see that Aristotle in de Anima (cognition chapters at least) has a di erent explanatory aim in view than that (...) which the literature generally imputes to him. He is not explicating what we would call the “mental”—the private, inner realm which some take to be of a di erent kind than the physical—as most take him to be. His explanandum is content acquisition; the explanans is showing how the body becomes like various aspects of objects. Although he famously describes the mind (nous) as unmixed with the body, he is guided by functional constrains—nous cannot be limited or qualified if it is to potentially think all things. Thus, his inquiry into cognition is philosophically limited from a contemporary perspective. Aristotle is not doing philosophy of mind, for he doesn’t seem to find the “mental” philosophically perplexing. (shrink)

El presente artículo trata de reconstruir la eventual continuidad doctrinal en el tratamiento aristotélico entre el alma y el cuerpo. Primeramente, trataremos de problematizar las clásicas dicotomías en las que se ha intentado encajar la teoría hilemórfica con vistas a demostrar la imposibilidad de defender bien sea un dualismo o bien un monismo que resuma, con exactitud suficiente, el tratamiento aristotélico del alma. Finalmente, y a la luz de los planteamientos definitivos que parecen recogerse en De Anima, abordaremos un análisis (...) comparado entre este tratado tardío y el examen de la relación entre el alma y el cuerpo contenido en los textos morales del Estagirita. (shrink)