Questo articolo presenta un quadro dei problemi che il frammento B85DK di Eraclito solleva e delle interpretazioni antiche e moderne che sono state suggerite. In particolare, è esaminata la testimonianza di Aristotele, la più antica e anche la più profonda e articolata. Una panoramica sui significati di thumos, punto centrale del frammento, mostra che per Aristotele questo concetto non si esaurisce nel pathos dell’ira. Il thumos è in primo luogo una dunamis, una facoltà dell’anima che rende possibile non solo il (...) pathos, l’affezione passeggera dell’ira, ma anche il coraggio, l’impulsività, l’affetto, il senso della libertà e dell’autorità. Questa nozione aristotelica, così ricca e polimorfica da sottrarsi a una traduzione unica esaustiva, proviene in realtà dalla sistematizzazione di un materiale molto antico, omerico e presocratico, legato ai proverbi. Eraclito stesso ne offre già una formulazione che sintetizza due aspetti che Aristotele accoglie e sottolinea: la forza irresistibile e inarrestabile dello slancio impulsivo naturale, una volta che sia stato innescato, e l'estrema conseguenza a cui puo' portare, e cioè la perdita della vita stessa. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Naïve Somatism is a re-interpretation of Aristotle’s cognitive psychology in light of certain presuppositions he holds about the living animal body. The living animal body is presumed to be sensitive, and Aristotle grounds his account of cognition in a rudimentary proprioceptive awareness one has of her body. With that presupposed metaphysics under our belts, we are in a position to see that Aristotle in de Anima (cognition chapters at least) has a di erent explanatory aim in view than that (...) which the literature generally imputes to him. He is not explicating what we would call the “mental”—the private, inner realm which some take to be of a di erent kind than the physical—as most take him to be. His explanandum is content acquisition; the explanans is showing how the body becomes like various aspects of objects. Although he famously describes the mind (nous) as unmixed with the body, he is guided by functional constrains—nous cannot be limited or qualified if it is to potentially think all things. Thus, his inquiry into cognition is philosophically limited from a contemporary perspective. Aristotle is not doing philosophy of mind, for he doesn’t seem to find the “mental” philosophically perplexing. (shrink)

This paper has three interdependent aims. The first is to make Reichenbach’s views on induction and probabilities clearer, especially as they pertain to his pragmatic justification of induction. The second aim is to show how his view of pragmatic justification arises out of his commitment to extensional empiricism and moots the possibility of a non-pragmatic justification of induction. Finally, and most importantly, a formal decision-theoretic account of Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification is offered in terms both of the minimax principle and the (...) dominance principle. (shrink)

Aristotle’s influence on D’Arcy Thompson was praised by Thompson himself and has been recognized by others in various respects, including the aesthetic and normative dimensions of biology, and the multicausal explanation of living forms. This article focuses on the relatedness of organic forms, one of the core problems addressed by both Aristotle’s History of Animals (HA), and the renowned chapter of Thompson’s On Growth and Form (G&F), “On the Theory of Transformations, or the Comparison of Related Forms.” We contend that, (...) far from being an incidental inspiration stemming from Thompson’s classicist background, his translation of HA played a pivotal role in developing his theory of transformations. Furthermore, we argue that Thompson’s interpretation of the Aristotelian method of comparison challenges the prevailing view of Aristotle as the founder of “typological essentialism,” and is a key episode in the revision of this narrative. Thompson understood that the method Aristotle used in HA to compare animal forms is better comprehended as a “method of transformations,” leading to a morphological arrangement of animal diversity, as opposed to a taxonomical classification. Finally, we examine how this approach to the relatedness of forms lay the foundation for a causal understanding of parts and their interconnections. Although Aristotle and Thompson emphasized distinct types of causes, we contend that they both differ in a fundamental sense from the one introduced by Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which was formulated as a solution to the species problem rather than the form problem. We conclude that Thompson’s interpretation of Aristotle’s approach to form comparison has not only impacted contemporary scholarship on Aristotle’s biology, but revitalized a perspective that has regained significance due to the resurgence of the problem of form in evo-devo. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es analizar la relación entre tiempo y memoria en dos escritos de Aristóteles: en la Física IV y en Acerca de la memoria y de la reminiscencia. En Física IV Aristóteles define el tiempo, en relación con el cambio y movimiento del mundo sublunar, como número del movimiento y del cambio. Por otra parte, en Acerca de la memoria y la reminiscencia realiza un análisis fenomenológico del tiempo que no requiere una concepción numérica, sino un (...) reconocimiento de que lo que se hace presente, como imagen, forma parte de una experiencia pasada, caracterizada por no ser. De esta manera, la interpretación numérica del tiempo es el método de recuperación precisa de la memoria, pero el recuerdo implica una experiencia del tiempo, a partir de la cual se constituye la memoria como negatividad. (shrink)

Twenty-five years ago Paul Wilpert called for a thorough re-examination of our knowledge of the content of Aristotle's lost workDe Philosophia. Expressing his reservations about the validity of our current reconstruction of the work, he wrote: ‘On the basis of attested fragments, we form for ourselves a picture of the content of a lost writing, and this picture in turn serves to interpret new fragments as echoes of that writing. So our joy over the swift growth of our collection of (...) fragments is clouded by the thought that we are not thereby really nearing the original character of the work, but we are entangling ourselves ever more tightly in a picture we ourselves have created.’ As a corrective Wilpert called for a critical retracing of our steps since 1830 to establish a more secure reconstruction of this important lost work.Since then there have been numerous, searching analyses of the ideas and fragments ofDe Philosophia, but at least one venerable old theory has escaped critical reappraisal: namely, the theory that inDe PhilosophiaAristotle discussed his doctrine of a fifth element, i.e. his belief that the heavenly bodies are composed of an element distinct from the four earthly elements, earth, water, air, and fire. This theory has become so widely accepted that it has virtually become a fact. When support is needed, most modern authors simply cite one or both of the two modern authorities on the early Aristotle, namely W. Jaeger and E. Bignone. The more meticulous restate the traditional evidence with complete confidence that this evidence proves their case. If Wilpert's hope for a firmly grounded reconstruction of theDe Philosophiais ever to be achieved, one of the importantdesideratatoday is a critical re-examination of the evidence for the fifth element in this work. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that Aristotle operates with a particular theoretical model in his explanation of animal locomotion, what we call the ‘centralized incoming and outgoing motions’ model. We show how the model accommodates more complex cases of animal motion and how it allows Aristotle to preserve the intuition that animals are self-movers, without jeopardizing his arguments for the eternity of motion and the necessary existence of one eternal unmoved mover in Physics VIII. The CIOM model helps to elucidate (...) Aristotle’s two central yet problematic claims, namely that the soul is the efficient cause of animal motion and that it is the internal supporting-point necessary for animal motion. Moreover, the CIOM model helps us to explain the difference between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary motions, and to square Aristotle’s cardiocentrism with his hylomorphism, but also, more generally, it provides an interesting way of thinking about the place of intentionality in the causal structure of the world. (shrink)

Philosophie grecque est un ouvrage d'histoire de la philosophie du VIe siècle av. J.-C. au XVe siècle byzantin et qui vient s'ajouter aux nombreuses histoires de la philosophie ancienne que nous a données l'historiographie française du XXe siècle. Le rythme de ces publications, même limitées à la tradition française, demeure impressionnant. En effet, une recherche rapide nous indiquerait facilement un rythme de publication d'environ une histoire de la philosophie ancienne tous les trois ans au cours de ce siècleUne recherche plus (...) poussée augmenterait sans doute cette moyenne. Un esprit malin et tant soit peu insolent pourrait soutenir que Philosophie grecque est un ouvrage de trop sur les rayons déjà amplement garnis de nos bibliothèques et poserait la question fondamentale de la pertinence d'une nouvelle histoire de la philosophie ancienne en cette fin de siècle. (shrink)

El presente artículo trata de reconstruir la eventual continuidad doctrinal en el tratamiento aristotélico entre el alma y el cuerpo. Primeramente, trataremos de problematizar las clásicas dicotomías en las que se ha intentado encajar la teoría hilemórfica con vistas a demostrar la imposibilidad de defender bien sea un dualismo o bien un monismo que resuma, con exactitud suficiente, el tratamiento aristotélico del alma. Finalmente, y a la luz de los planteamientos definitivos que parecen recogerse en De Anima, abordaremos un análisis (...) comparado entre este tratado tardío y el examen de la relación entre el alma y el cuerpo contenido en los textos morales del Estagirita. (shrink)