Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Oswald revisited: the effect of focus and context.Eugenia Kulakova & Stefan Rinner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-15.
    In this paper, we will present an analysis of the Oswald example that takes a closer look at the antecedents of the Oswald minimal pair. We will argue that diverging foci in the antecedents of the Oswald example result in different truth conditions of the conditionals, explaining the difference in truth values between the two sentences. Although the explanation will incorporate aspects of Stalnaker’s theory of conditionals, it will go beyond Stalnaker’s analysis of the Oswald example on one crucial point. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Explaining Away, Augmentation, and the Assumption of Independence.Nicole Cruz, Ulrike Hahn, Norman Fenton & David Lagnado - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A New Probabilistic Explanation of the Modus Ponens–Modus Tollens Asymmetry.Stephan Hartmann, Benjamin Eva & Henrik Singmann - 2019 - In Stephan Hartmann, Benjamin Eva & Henrik Singmann (eds.), CogSci 2019 Proceedings. Montreal, Québec, Kanada: pp. 289–294.
    A consistent finding in research on conditional reasoning is that individuals are more likely to endorse the valid modus ponens (MP) inference than the equally valid modus tollens (MT) inference. This pattern holds for both abstract task and probabilistic task. The existing explanation for this phenomenon within a Bayesian framework (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2008) accounts for this asymmetry by assuming separate probability distributions for both MP and MT. We propose a novel explanation within a computational-level Bayesian account of reasoning (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Ranking Theory.Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Niels Skovgaard-Olsen & Wolfgang Spohn - 2021 - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), The Handbook of Rationality. London: MIT Press. pp. 337-345.
    Ranking theory is one of the salient formal representations of doxastic states. It differs from others in being able to represent belief in a proposition (= taking it to be true), to also represent degrees of belief (i.e. beliefs as more or less firm), and thus to generally account for the dynamics of these beliefs. It does so on the basis of fundamental and compelling rationality postulates and is hence one way of explicating the rational structure of doxastic states. Thereby (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Bayesian Argumentation and the Value of Logical Validity.Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - unknown
    According to the Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, the norms by which everyday human cognition is best evaluated are probabilistic rather than logical in character. Recently, the Bayesian paradigm has been applied to the domain of argumentation, where the fundamental norms are traditionally assumed to be logical. Here, we present a major generalisation of extant Bayesian approaches to argumentation that (i)utilizes a new class of Bayesian learning methods that are better suited to modelling dynamic and conditional inferences than (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Causal reasoning is one of our most central cognitive competencies, enabling us to adapt to our world. Causal knowledge allows us to predict future events, or diagnose the causes of observed facts. We plan actions and solve problems using knowledge about cause-effect relations. Without our ability to discover and empirically test causal theories, we would not have made progress in various empirical sciences. In the past decades, the important role of causal knowledge has been discovered in many areas of cognitive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Probabilities, causation, and logic programming in conditional reasoning: reply to Stenning and Van Lambalgen.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2016 - Thinking and Reasoning 22 (3):336-354.
    ABSTRACTOaksford and Chater critiqued the logic programming approach to nonmonotonicity and proposed that a Bayesian probabilistic approach to conditional reasoning provided a more empirically adequate theory. The current paper is a reply to Stenning and van Lambalgen's rejoinder to this earlier paper entitled ‘Logic programming, probability, and two-system accounts of reasoning: a rejoinder to Oaksford and Chater’ in Thinking and Reasoning. It is argued that causation is basic in human cognition and that explaining how abnormality lists are created in LP (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Probabilistic Alternatives to Bayesianism: The Case of Explanationism.Igor Douven & Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    There has been a probabilistic turn in contemporary cognitive science. Far and away, most of the work in this vein is Bayesian, at least in name. Coinciding with this development, philosophers have increasingly promoted Bayesianism as the best normative account of how humans ought to reason. In this paper, we make a push for exploring the probabilistic terrain outside of Bayesianism. Non-Bayesian, but still probabilistic, theories provide plausible competitors both to descriptive and normative Bayesian accounts. We argue for this general (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • The role of explanatory considerations in updating.Igor Douven & Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - Cognition 142 (C):299-311.
    There is an ongoing controversy in philosophy about the connection between explanation and inference. According to Bayesians, explanatory considerations should be given weight in determining which inferences to make, if at all, only insofar as doing so is compatible with Strict Conditionalization. Explanationists, on the other hand, hold that explanatory considerations can be relevant to the question of how much confidence to invest in our hypotheses in ways which violate Strict Conditionalization. The controversy has focused on normative issues. This paper (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • When analytic thought is challenged by a misunderstanding.L. Macchi & M. Bagassi - 2015 - Thinking and Reasoning 21 (1):147-164.
    In our view, the way of thinking involved in insight problem solving is very close to the process involved in the understanding of an utterance, when a misunderstanding occurs. In this case, a more appropriate meaning has to be selected to resolve the misunderstanding , the default interpretation has to be dropped in order to “restructure”, to grasp another meaning which appears more relevant to the context and the speaker's intention. A new conception of unconscious, implicit thought emerges, informed by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Williamson’s Abductive Case for the Material Conditional Account.Robert van Rooij, Karolina Krzyżanowska & Igor Douven - 2023 - Studia Logica 111 (4):653-685.
    InSuppose and Tell, Williamson makes a new and original attempt to defend the material conditional account of indicative conditionals. His overarching argument is that this account offers the best explanation of the data concerning how people evaluate and use such conditionals. We argue that Williamson overlooks several important alternative explanations, some of which appear to explain the relevant data at least as well as, or even better than, the material conditional account does. Along the way, we also show that Williamson (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (2):269-295.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Belief bias is stronger when reasoning is more difficult.Janie Brisson, Pier-Luc de Chantal, Hugues Lortie Forgues & Henry Markovits - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (3):385-403.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is the new paradigm a new paradigm? Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023).Igor Douven - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (3):383-388.
    Many cognitive psychologists have come to regard graded belief as fundamental to our understanding of how humans reason and many have also come to think of probability theory as providing at least part of the norms of correct reasoning. David Over has characterized this development as the emergence of a new paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. The target article argues that the choice of this term was unwarranted and also that it has done more harm than good. This commentary argues (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Abductive conditionals as a test case for inferentialism.Patricia Mirabile & Igor Douven - 2020 - Cognition 200 (C):104232.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The specificity of terms affects conditional reasoning.Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda & Markus Knauff - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (1):72-93.
    Conditional inferences can be phrased with unspecific terms (“If a person is on a diet, then the person loses weight. A person is on a diet. The person loses weight”) or specific terms (“If Anna is on a diet, then Anna loses weight. Anna is on a diet. Anna loses weight”). We investigate whether the specificity of terms affects people's acceptance of inferences. In Experiment 1, inferences with specific terms received higher acceptance ratings than inferences with unspecific terms. In Experiments (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • New normative standards of conditional reasoning and the dual-source model.Henrik Singmann, Karl Christoph Klauer & David Over - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Conceptual clarity and empirical testability: Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023).Nicole Cruz - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (3):396-408.
    Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2022) criticise the use of the term “new paradigm” in the psychology of reasoning and raise important issues about how to advance research in the field. In this commentary I argue that for the latter it would be helpful to clarify further the concepts that reasoning theories rely on, and to strengthen the links between the theories and the empirical observations that would and would not be compatible with them.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Imaging deductive reasoning and the new paradigm.Mike Oaksford - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Conceptual spaces and the strength of similarity-based arguments.Igor Douven, Shira Elqayam, Peter Gärdenfors & Patricia Mirabile - 2022 - Cognition 218 (C):104951.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The new psychology of reasoning: A mental probability logical perspective.Niki Pfeifer - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):329-345.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • Development and necessary norms of reasoning.Henry Markovits - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why the Conjunction Effect Is Rarely a Fallacy: How Learning Influences Uncertainty and the Conjunction Rule.Phil Maguire, Philippe Moser, Rebecca Maguire & Mark T. Keane - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How many laypeople holding a popular opinion are needed to counter an expert opinion?Jos Hornikx, Adam J. L. Harris & Jordy Boekema - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (1):117-128.
    ABSTRACTIn everyday situations, people regularly receive information from large groups of people and from single experts. Although lay opinions and expert opinions have been studied extensively in isolation, the present study examined the relationship between the two by asking how many laypeople are needed to counter an expert opinion. A Bayesian formalisation allowed the prescription of this quantity. Participants were subsequently asked to assess how many laypeople are needed in different situations. The results demonstrate that people are sensitive to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Moral judgment as reasoning by constraint satisfaction.Keith J. Holyoak & Derek Powell - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e156.
    May's careful examination of empirical evidence makes a compelling case against the primacy of emotion in driving moral judgments. At the same time, emotion certainly is involved in moral judgments. We argue that emotion interacts with beliefs, values, and moral principles through a process of coherence-based reasoning (operating at least partially below the level of conscious awareness) in generating moral judgments and decisions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Categorical induction from uncertain premises: Jeffrey's doesn't completely rule.Constantinos Hadjichristidis, Steven A. Sloman & David E. Over - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (4):405-431.
    Studies of categorical induction typically examine how belief in a premise (e.g., Falcons have an ulnar artery) projects on to a conclusion (e.g., Robins have an ulnar artery). We study induction in cases in which the premise is uncertain (e.g., There is an 80% chance that falcons have an ulnar artery). Jeffrey's rule is a normative model for updating beliefs in the face of uncertain evidence. In three studies we tested the descriptive validity of Jeffrey's rule and a related probability (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Uncertain deduction and conditional reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Valerie A. Thompson & David E. Over - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • The Suppression of Inferences From Counterfactual Conditionals.Orlando Espino & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (4):e12827.
    We examine two competing effects of beliefs on conditional inferences. The suppression effect occurs for conditionals, for example, “if she watered the plants they bloomed,” when beliefs about additional background conditions, for example, “if the sun shone they bloomed” decrease the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens (from “the plants did not bloom” to “therefore she did not water them”). In contrast, the counterfactual elevation effect occurs for counterfactual conditionals, for example, “if she had watered the plants they would (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The ecological rationality of explanatory reasoning.Igor Douven - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 79 (C):1-14.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Bayesian reasoning with ifs and ands and ors.Nicole Cruz, Jean Baratgin, Mike Oaksford & David E. Over - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • New ambitions for a new paradigm: Putting the psychology of reasoning at the service of humanity.Jean-François Bonnefon - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):381-398.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Uncertainty and the de Finetti tables.Jean Baratgin, David E. Over & Guy Politzer - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):308-328.
    The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning adopts a Bayesian, or prob- abilistic, model for studying human reasoning. Contrary to the traditional binary approach based on truth functional logic, with its binary values of truth and falsity, a third value that represents uncertainty can be introduced in the new paradigm. A variety of three-valued truth table systems are available in the formal literature, including one proposed by de Finetti. We examine the descriptive adequacy of these systems for natural language (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations