This paper investigates the determinacy of mathematics. We begin by clarifying how we are understanding the notion of determinacy before turning to the questions of whether and how famous independence results bear on issues of determinacy in mathematics. From there, we pose a metasemantic challenge for those who believe that mathematical language is determinate, motivate two important constraints on attempts to meet our challenge, and then use these constraints to develop an argument against determinacy and discuss a particularly popular approach (...) to resolving indeterminacy, before offering some brief closing reflections. We believe our discussion poses a serious challenge for most philosophical theories of mathematics, since it puts considerable pressure on all views that accept a non-trivial amount of determinacy for even basic arithmetic. (shrink)

We prove that a enumerable degree is contiguous iff it is locally distributive. This settles a twenty-year old question going back to Ladner and Sasso. We also prove that strong contiguity and contiguity coincide, settling a question of the first author, and prove that no $m$-topped degree is contiguous, settling a question of the first author and Carl Jockusch [11]. Finally, we prove some results concerning local distributivity and relativized weak truth table reducibility.

Arguments to the effect that Church's thesis is intrinsically unprovable because proof cannot relate an informal, intuitive concept to a mathematically defined one are unconvincing, since other 'theses' of this kind have indeed been proved, and Church's thesis has been proved in one direction. However, though evidence for the truth of the thesis in the other direction is overwhelming, it does not yet amount to proof.

This article defends a modest version of the Physical Church-Turing thesis (CT). Following an established recent trend, I distinguish between what I call Mathematical CT—the thesis supported by the original arguments for CT—and Physical CT. I then distinguish between bold formulations of Physical CT, according to which any physical process—anything doable by a physical system—is computable by a Turing machine, and modest formulations, according to which any function that is computable by a physical system is computable by a Turing machine. (...) I argue that Bold Physical CT is not relevant to the epistemological concerns that motivate CT and hence not suitable as a physical analog of Mathematical CT. The correct physical analog of Mathematical CT is Modest Physical CT. I propose to explicate the notion of physical computability in terms of a usability constraint, according to which for a process to count as relevant to Physical CT, it must be usable by a finite observer to obtain the desired values of a function. Finally, I suggest that proposed counterexamples to Physical CT are still far from falsifying it because they have not been shown to satisfy the usability constraint. (shrink)

We prove that if an incomplete computably enumerable set has the the universal splitting property then it is low2. This solves a question from Ambos-Spies and Fejer [1] and Downey and Stob [7]. Some technical improvements are discussed.

We consider the question of randomness of the probability ΩU[X] that an optimal Turing machine U halts and outputs a string in a fixed set X. The main results are as follows: ΩU[X] is random whenever X is $\Sigma _{n}^{0}$-complete or $\Pi _{n}^{0}$-complete for some n ≥ 2. However, for n ≥ 2, ΩU[X] is not n-random when X is $\Sigma _{n}^{0}$ or $\Pi _{n}^{0}$ Nevertheless, there exists $\Delta _{n+1}^{0}$ sets such that ΩU[X] is n-random. There are $\Delta _{2}^{0}$ sets (...) X such that ΩU[X] is rational. Also, for every n ≥ 1, there exists a set X which is $\Delta _{n+1}^{0}$ and $\Sigma _{n}^{0}$-hard such that ΩU[X] is not random. We also look at the range of ΩU as an operator. We prove that the set {ΩU[X]: X ⊆ 2<ω} is a finite union of closed intervals. It follows that for any optimal machine U and any sufficiently small real r, there is a set X ⊆ 2<ω recursive in ∅′ ⊕ r, such that ΩU[X] = r. The same questions are also considered in the context of infinite computations, and lead to similar results. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it is more difficult to see how Godel's incompleteness theorems and related consistency proofs for formal systems are consistent with the views of formalists, mechanists and traditional intuitionists than it is to see how they are consistent with a particular form of mathematical realism. If the incompleteness theorems and consistency proofs are better explained by this form of realism then we can also see how there is room for skepticism about Church's Thesis and the (...) claim that minds are machines. (shrink)

We show that the partial order of Σ0 3-sets under inclusion is elementarily definable with parameters in the semilattice of r.e. wtt-degrees. Using a result of E. Herrmann, we can deduce that this semilattice has an undecidable theory, thereby solving an open problem of P. Odifreddi.

A typical approach to semantics for relevance (and other) logics: specify a class of algebraic structures and take amodelto be one of these structures, α, together with some function or relation which associates with every formulaAa subset ofα. (This is the approach of, among others, Urquhart, Routley and Meyer and Fine.) In some cases there are restrictions on the class of subsets of α with which a formula can be associated: for example, in the semantics of Routley and Meyer [1973], (...) a formula can only be associated with subsets which are closed upwards. It is natural to take apropositionof α to be such a subset of α, and, further, to take the propositional quantifiers to range over these propositions. (Routley and Meyer [1973] explicitly consider this interpretation.) Given such an algebraic semantics, we call (following Routley and Meyer [1973], who follow Henkin [1950]) the above-described interpretation of the quantifiers theprimaryinterpretation associated with the semantics. (shrink)

We show how in the hierarchies${F_\alpha }$of Fieldian truth sets, and Herzberger’s${H_\alpha }$revision sequence starting from any hypothesis for${F_0}$ that essentially each${H_\alpha }$ carries within it a history of the whole prior revision process.As applications we provide a precise representation for, and a calculation of the length of, possiblepath independent determinateness hierarchiesof Field’s construction with a binary conditional operator. We demonstrate the existence of generalized liar sentences, that can be considered as diagonalizing past the determinateness hierarchies definable in Field’s recent (...) models. The ‘defectiveness’ of such diagonal sentences necessarily cannot be classified by any of the determinateness predicates of the model. They are ‘ineffable liars’. We may consider them a response to the claim of Field that ‘the conditional can be used to show that the theory is not subject to “revenge problems”.’. (shrink)

We show that, in the partial ordering of the computably enumerable computable Lipschitz degrees, there is a degree a>0a>0 such that the class of the degrees which do not cup to a is not bounded by any degree less than a. Since Ambos-Spies [1] has shown that, in the partial ordering of the c.e. identity-bounded Turing degrees, for any degree a>0a>0 the degrees which do not cup to a are bounded by the 1-shift a+1a+1 of a where a+1 (...) that the elementary theories of the partial orderings and differ. (shrink)

The article presents several examples of different mathematical structures and interprets their properties related to the existence of universal functions. In this context, relations between the problem of totality of elements and possible forms of universal functions are analyzed. Furthermore, some global and local aspects of the mentioned functional systems are distinguished and compared. In addition, the paper attempts to link universality and totality with the dynamic and static properties of mathematical objects and to consider the problem of limitations in (...) the construction of structures combining harmoniously the availability of information at the local and global level. (shrink)