Impossible antecedents entered the scene of medieval logic around the 1120s and soon started to dominate this scene, becoming one of the most debated issues from the second half of the twelfth century onwards. This article focuses on theories of counterpossibles from this period and aims to offer an overview of the different responses offered by twelfth-century logicians on whether everything, something, or nothing follows from an impossible statement. Rather than trying to historically reconstruct the positions of the different authors (...) – an operation that may be premature given the insufficient notions we still have of the authorship and dating of sources – I aim to provide a provisional map of the main arguments that were advanced in favour of or against the ex impossibili quodlibet principle. The article also aims to show that the strategies developed by twelfth-century logical schools in their approach to counterpossibles survive in logical discussions of the same topic during the thirteenth and the early fourteenth century, especially in the syncategoremata and sophistaria traditions. (shrink)

In a few texts, Thomas Aquinas says that the first operation of the intellect pertains to (respicit) “the quiddity of a thing” whereas the second operation pertains to “the to be itself of a thing” (esse). But Aquinas also says that quiddities are to the intellect as color is to the power of sight. Statements such as these seem to have led Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson to see esse as the proper object of the intellect’s second operation. Against this (...) conclusion, Fr Régis and Ralph McInerny have argued—using Aquinas’s In I Peryermenias, lecture 5—that since ‘is’ is a verb and ‘is’ signifies existence, but all verbs signify the first operation of the intellect, we must be able to form a concept of existence in the first operation of the intellect. This paper does three things. First, it analyzes the nature of the claim made by Maritain and Gilson. Second, it shows from internal textual evidence that “respicit ipsum esse rei” cannot mean what Maritain and Gilson take it to mean. The second operation of the intellect cannot have a proper object distinct from the object of the first operation, which is quiddities. Finally, this paper provides an alternative interpretation of In I Peryermenias, lecture 5, to the one given by McInerny. In that text, Aquinas does not speak about a particular concept of existence in the first operation of the intellect and signified by the verbs ‘is’ or ‘exists.’ Rather, he uses the word ‘esse’ in indirect speech to include generally any form or act joined to a subject by the copula, ‘is.’ Aquinas’s focus is not on what ‘esse’ or ‘est’ signifies, but on the mode in which it signifies (per modum actualitas) absent additional qualifying terms. The conclusion of this paper is that, although the esse contrasted with essence in Aquinas’s metaphysics corresponds to a concept in the intellect’s first operation, nevertheless, like the notions of blindness and of genus, this esse cannot fall properly within the intellect’s object. (shrink)

A questão "se uma elocução perde seu significado com a destruição das coisas "surge como uma questão sobre o valor-verdade de declarações com um termo vazio como sujeito, a saber, como um subproblema do sofisma "Se 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal' é verdade quando não há homem algum ". Neste trabalho, trarei as discussões conforme elas se apresentam em "De signis" IV.2 de Roger Bacon, em "Quaestiones logicales", q. 2–3 de Peter John Olivi, no OHNEA de Boethius of Dacia, (...) e no OHNEA de Anonymus Alani. Tais textos nos apresentam quatro modos diversos de nos relacionarmos com a questão sobre significação para OHNEA e, assim, com quatro posições diferentes sobre a relação entre significação e referência vazia. Usarei Anonymus Alani como o fio conductor de minha análise, inserindo outras posições onde tal se fizer relevante.The question 'whether an utterance loses its signification with the destruction of things ' is raised as a question about the truth-value of assertions with an empty term as a subject, namely as a sub-problem of the sophism 'Whether "omnis homo de necessitate est animal" is true when no man exists '. In this paper, I shall introduce the discussions as they are present in Roger Bacon's "De signis" IV.2, Peter John Olivi's "Quaestiones logicales", q. 2–3, Boethius of Dacia's OHNEA, and Anonymus Alani's OHNEA. These texts present us with four different ways of relating the question about signification to OHNEA, and therefore with four different positions regarding the relation between signification and empty reference. I shall use Anonymus Alani as the guiding thread of my analysis, inserting other positions where it is relevant. (shrink)

The studies that make up this book were written and brought together to honor the memory of Jan Pinborg. His unexpected death in 1982 at the age of forty-five shocked and saddened students of medieval philosophy everywhere and left them with a keen sense of disappoint ment. In his fifteen-year career Jan Pinborg had done so much for our field with his more than ninety books, editions, articles, and reviews and had done it all so well that we recognized him (...) as a leader and counted on many more years of his scholarship, his help, and his friendship. To be missed so sorely by his international colleagues in an academic field is a mark of Jan's achievement, but only of one aspect of it, for historians of philosophy are not the only scholars who have reacted in this way to Jan's death. In his decade and a half of intense productivity he also acquired the same sort of special status among historians of linguistics, whose volume of essays in his memory is being G. L. Bursill-Hall almost simultane published under the editorship of ously with this one. Sten Ebbesen, Jan's student, colleague, and successor as Director of the Institute of Medieval Greek and Latin Philology at the University of Copenhagen, has earned the gratitude of all of us by memorializing Jan 1 in various biographical sketches, one of which is accompanied by a 2 complete bibliography of his publications. (shrink)

Resumo: Pedro Hispano define os sincategoremas como expressões que revelam de que maneira os sujeitos e os predicados estão de fato relacionados nas proposições, contribuindo assim para o estabelecer o que elas significam e fixar as condições de verdade e as formas lógicas correspondentes. Entre as expressões que ele julga serem sincategoremáticas, ‘não’, ‘e’, ‘ou’, ‘se’, ‘todo’ e ‘necessário’ se destacam atualmente como constantes lógicas. Todavia, opondo-se a grande parte dos lógicos contemporâneos para quem tais expressões possuem um significado fixo (...) na medida em que integram as formas lógicas das respectivas proposições, Pedro Hispano admite que seu significado pode ser modificado quando a expressões do mesmo tipo credita a capacidade de atuarem em determinados contextos como categoremas. Além disso, ao defender que as expressões ora em questão explicitam as formas lógicas das proposições mediante a articulação dos categoremas a elas associados, ele também demonstra divergir dos principais critérios de demarcação das constantes lógicas atualmente vigentes que não preveem a atribuição de tal comportamento a expressões desse tipo. Portanto, não resta dúvida de que a teoria de Pedro Hispano sobre os sincategoremas enriquece a nossa compreensão ainda insuficiente da natureza das constantes lógicas e contribui para a resolução do problema da demarcação de tais expressões.: According to Petrus Hispanus, syncategoremata are expressions that determine how subjects and predicates are actually related in propositions. They contribute to establishing what the categoremata mean and to specifying the truth conditions of the corresponding logical forms. Among the expressions Peter of Spain thinks of as syncategorematic, ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if’, ‘all, and ‘necessary’ are nowadays considered to be logical operators. But unlike the contemporary logicians who argue that these expressions have fixed meanings because they belong to the logical forms of the corresponding propositions, Peter of Spain allows that their meanings can be modified, attributing to them the ability to act in certain contexts as categoremata. In addition, he argues that these expressions make explicit the logical forms through the articulation of corresponding propositions’ categoremata; thus he also diverges from the main contemporary criteria of demarcation of logical constants, which does not allow that these expressions have such behavior. Therefore, there is no doubt that Hispanus’ theory of the syncategoremata enriches our still insufficient understanding of the logical constants and contributes to the resolution of the problem of the demarcation of such expressions. (shrink)