Despite the criticism of Karl Popper's falsifiability theory for the demarcation between science and non-science, mainly pseudo-science, this criterion is still very useful, and perfectly valid after it was perfected by Popper and his followers. Moreover, even in his original version, considered by Lakatos as "dogmatic", Popper did not assert that this methodology is an absolute demarcation criterion: a single counter-example is not enough to falsify a theory; a theory can legitimately be saved from falsification by introducing an auxiliary hypothesis. (...) Compared to Kuhn's theory of revolutions, which he himself later dissociated from it transforming it into a theory of "micro-revolutions," I consider that Popper's demarcation methodology, along with the subsequent development proposed by him, including the corroboration and the verisimilitude, though imperfect, is not only valid today, but it is still the best demarcation methodology. For argumentation, I used the main works of Popper dealing with this issue, and his main critics and supporters. After a brief presentation of Karl Popper, and an introduction to the demarcation problem and the falsification methodology, I review the main criticisms and the arguments of his supporters, emphasizing the idea that Popper has never put the sign of equality between falsification and rejection. Finally, I present my own conclusions on this issue. CONTENTS -/- Abstract Introduction 1 The demarcation problem 2 Pseudoscience 3 Falsifiability 4 Falsification and refutation 5 Extension of falsifiability 6 Criticism of falsifiability 7 Support of falsifiability 8 The current trend Conclusions Bibliography Notes -/- DOI: 10.58679/MM99220. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn criticized falsifiability because it characterized "the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts," and it cannot be generalized. In Kuhn's view, a delimitation criterion must refer to the functioning of normal science. Kuhn objects to Popper's entire theory and excludes any possibility of rational reconstruction of the development of science. Imre Lakatos said that if a theory is scientific or non-scientific, it can be determined independently of the facts.He proposed a modification of (...) Popper's criterion, which he called "sophisticated (methodological) falsification". DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30572.82568. (shrink)

For many, Rorty was a postmodern relativist and Popper was a positivist and Cold War liberal ideologue. The argument developed here rejects such views and explores how Rorty?s work is best understood from a Popperian problem-solving perspective. It is argued that Rorty erred in seeking justification for beliefs, unlike Popper who replaced the search for justification with criticism. Nonetheless, Rorty?s arguments about post-Nietzschean theory and reformism function as important updates to Popper?s arguments about methodological essentialism and piecemeal social engineering, respectively.

Abstract This paper aims to analyse Karl Popper's conception of ?three worlds?, and especially the problem of world 3?the world of objective knowledge. Firstly, I try to explain Popper's turn to ontological questions which I link to his antipsychologism and to issues raised by the development of logic after World War II. I then consider Popper's concept of the autonomy of world 3 and his attempt to introduce world 3 as a world of knowledge without a knowing subject. I conclude (...) that Popper did not succeed in unifying his central idea of autonomy of knowledge with the requirement of the creative role of the critical subject carrying out the evolution of knowledge. I see the core of this contradiction especially in his co?existing ideas of the timeless existence of world 3 and the elimination of the subject from it. The attempt to desubjectivize the realm of objective knowledge leads to a philosophically unbalanced standpoint which presupposes a creative subject and at the same time neglects it. Finally, I question Popper's account of the growth of world 3. Popper considers only cognitive motivations, and excludes a broad range of motivating factors which originate in the problems which we face in our lives, and affect our cognitive interests in world 3. (shrink)

Popper’s theory of World 3 is often regarded as incongruent with his defense of methodological individualism. This article criticizes this widespread view. Methodological individualism is said to be at odds with three crucial assumptions of the theory of World 3: the impossibility of reducing World 3 to subjective mental states because it exists objectively, the view that the mental functions cannot be explained by assuming that individuals are isolated atoms, and the idea that World 3 has causal power and influences (...) both individual minds and actions. This article demonstrates that the inconsistency thesis stems from a confusion between methodological individualism as understood by Popper and reductionism. The reasons for this confusion are analyzed and clarified. It is argued that two variants of methodological individualism can be distinguished, and that unlike psychologistic individualism, Popper’s nonatomistic individualism is fully consistent with his theory of World 3. (shrink)

Popper proposed his theory of objective knowledge to eliminate subjectivist epistemologies. Popper’s objectivism culminated in the theory of the autonomous World 3 characterized by its independence from the subjective factors belonging to World 2. I argue that Popper did not succeed in unifying his idea of the autonomy of knowledge with the requirement of the creative role of the critical subject in cognition. Moreover, his effort to desubjectivize knowledge undermined the vital importance of the critical activity that ensures the dynamism (...) of the growth of knowledge. In this respect, Popper suppressed the most interesting feature of his philosophical contribution. (shrink)

Beginning by offering a conceptual analysis of change – a statement of what change of any kind is – the paper sets out to examine possible ways of understanding a very common and important variety of change that may be called ‘evolutionary’. These changes include anything from the production of a clay pot on a potter's wheel to the emergence of a system of management, or from the effects of an analgesic drug to the development of a new programme of (...) care. As few philosophers have discussed such topics, theories are borrowed from the philosophy of science that attempt to explain the development and rationality of science. The ideas of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn are discussed and criticized, before turning to evolutionary theories: Darwinian and Lamarckian. The paper ends by offering a model that, it is hoped, may help in thinking about a wide range of changes. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag wird ausgeführt, daß Poppers Falsifikationskriterium einen logischen Fehler enthält. Die Regeln deduktiver Ableitung sind selbst für ihre Durchführung von induktiver Ableitung abhängig. Um das "Criterion of Flasification" für gültig zu erklären, beruft sich Popper auf diese Regeln deduktiver Ableitung. Es wird weiter gezeigt, daß eine Untersuchung aktueller wissenschaftlicher Gesetze nicht die These beweist, daß die wissenschaftlichen Gesetze universale Feststellungen von unbeschränktem Horizonte in der Zeit und im Zeitraum sind. Die Anerkennung dieser Tatsache scheint im Zusammenhang der wissenschaftlichen (...) Forschung die Wichtigkeit des Problems der Induktion sehr zu verkleinern. (shrink)

The primary instrument of dispute management in political liberalism is a form of political thinking and talking that tries to reconcile opposed positions with an impartial settlement based on fair arrangements and mutual respect, one that is careful to treat rival views equitably, and reasoned through from start to finish with open methods that lead to a public justification understandable to the disputants. But this model of reasoning is notoriously deficient in resolving disputes among radically different communities. A more effective (...) form of political reasoning for these disputes that yet respects the background values of liberalism is found in the languages of state depicted in realist accounts of international relations. These languages avoid liberal appeals to be reasonable, reciprocity controlled by moral criteria, and the quest for common reasons. They represent a deliberative search for an accord that will meet the interests of the disputing parties as they define these interests and understand the settlements, and in this sense are welcome models to manage divisive issues in pluralist democracies. A complete version of political reasoning would contain both liberal and realpolitik models and a mechanism to adjudicate the appropriate uses of each model. (shrink)

Science seems to develop by inducing new knowledge from observation. However, it is hard to find a rational justification for induction. Popper offers one attempt to resolve this problem. Nursing theorists have tended to ignore or reject Popper, often on the false belief that he is a logical positivist (and hence hostile to qualitative research). Logical positivism claims that meaningful sentences containing any empirical content should ultimately be reducible to simple, observation statements. Popper refutes positivism by showing that there are (...) no such simple statements. He is not a positivist. For Popper, the scientist begins with problems and puts forward trial solutions. These are subjected to rigorous testing aimed at falsifying them. A new theoretical position is then reached in which the scientist knows either that the trial solutions are false or that they have not yet been falsified. Science is characterized by the fact that it tests its ideas through attempted falsification. Nonscience tests its ideas through attempted refutation. Nursing theory is a mixture of science and non-science. Popper’s method requires rigorous testing of theory in both realms. As such, some nursing theory should be discarded. Popper’s view faces at least two important criticisms. One is that a scientist can always reject an apparent falsification by instead altering some auxiliary hypothesis (e.g. denying the accuracy of the falsifying observation). Popper can deal with this argument by saying that defence of a theory in this way will eventually break down if the theory is false. The second criticism is that Popper’s method does ultimately draw upon induction. This criticism is true, but his method can be usefully adapted. An adapted from of Popper’s philosophy of science provides a good basis for nursing theory. (shrink)

A major virtue of the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation is its commitment to reasonableness and rationality as central criteria of argumentative quality. However, the account of these key notions offered by the originators of this theory, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, seems to us problematic in several respects. In what follows we criticize that account and suggest an alternative, offered elsewhere, that seems to us to be both independently preferable and more in keeping with the epistemic approach to arguments (...) and argumentation we favor. (shrink)

Whether educational research should employ the ‘scientific method’ has been a recurring issue in its history. Hence, textbooks on research methods continue to perpetuate the idea that research students ought to choose between competing camps: ‘positivist’ or ‘interpretivist’. In reference to one of the most widely referred to educational research methods textbooks on the market—namely Research Methods in Education by Cohen, Manion, and Morrison—this paper demonstrates the misconception of science in operation and the perversely false dichotomy that has become enshrined (...) in educational research. It then advocates a new approach, and suggests that the fixation with ‘science’ versus ‘non-science’ is counterproductive, when what is actually required for good inquiry is a critical approach to knowledge claims. (shrink)

We must allow that knowledge can be transmitted. But to allow this is to allow that an individual can know a proposition despite lacking any evidence for it and reaching belief by an unreliable means. So some explanation is required as to how knowledge rather than belief is transmitted. This paper considers two non-individualistic explanations: one in terms of knowledge existing autonomously, the other in terms of it existing as a property of communities. And it attempts to decide what is (...) at issue between these explanations. (shrink)

I cite manuscripts from my own collations. Information about most of these manuscripts, and explanation of the symbols by which I designate them, may be found in A. Turyn, The Byzantine Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Euripides , K. Matthiessen, Studien zur Textüberlieferung der Euripideischen Hekabe , and D. J. Mastronarde and J. M. Bremer, The Textual Tradition of Euripides' Phoinissai . I shall discuss the affiliations and the relative value of these manuscripts on a later occasion. For the (...) present no knowledge of these matters is needed. I refer to modern editions by the names of their editors: Wecklein = N. Wecklein , Wecklein = N. Wecklein , Di Benedetto = V. Di Benedetto , Biehl = W. Biehl , Willink = C. W. Willink , West = M. L. West . Studies refers to my Studies on the Text of Euripides. (shrink)