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  1. Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (7):e12850.
    Academics across widely ranging disciplines all pursue knowledge, but they do so using vastly different methods. Do these academics therefore also have different ideas about when someone possesses knowledge? Recent experimental findings suggest that intuitions about when individuals have knowledge may vary across groups; in particular, the concept of knowledge espoused by the discipline of philosophy may not align with the concept held by laypeople. Across two studies, we investigate the concept of knowledge held by academics across seven disciplines (N (...)
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  • Why Do Children Who Solve False Belief Tasks Begin to Find True Belief Control Tasks Difficult? A Test of Pragmatic Performance Factors in Theory of Mind Tasks.Lydia P. Schidelko, Michael Huemer, Lara M. Schröder, Anna S. Lueb, Josef Perner & Hannes Rakoczy - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    The litmus test for the development of a metarepresentational Theory of Mind is the false belief task in which children have to represent how another agent misrepresents the world. Children typically start mastering this task around age four. Recently, however, a puzzling finding has emerged: Once children master the FB task, they begin to fail true belief control tasks. Pragmatic accounts assume that the TB task is pragmatically confusing because it poses a trivial academic test question about a rational agent’s (...)
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  • Knowledge before belief.Jonathan Phillips, Wesley Buckwalter, Fiery Cushman, Ori Friedman, Alia Martin, John Turri, Laurie Santos & Joshua Knobe - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:e140.
    Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations ofbeliefs,which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations ofknowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one does not even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across cognitive science, (...)
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  • The Path to Fully Representational Theory of Mind: Conceptual, Executive, and Pragmatic Challenges.Annelise Pesch, Andrei D. Semenov & Stephanie M. Carlson - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • What Do False-Belief Tests Show?Pierre Jacob - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):1-20.
    In a paper published in Psychological Review, Tyler Burge has offered a unified non-mentalistic account of a wide range of social cognitive developmental findings. His proposal is that far from attributing mental states, young children attribute to humans the same kind of internal generic states of sensory registration that biologists attribute to e.g. snails and ticks. Burge’s proposal deserves close attention: it is especially challenging because it departs from both the mentalistic and all the non-mentalistic accounts of the data so (...)
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  • The knowledge (“true belief”) error in 4- to 6-year-old children: When are agents aware of what they have in view?Michael Huemer, Lara M. Schröder, Sarah J. Leikard, Sara Gruber, Anna Mangstl & Josef Perner - 2023 - Cognition 230 (C):105255.
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  • Do non-human primates really represent others’ ignorance? A test of the awareness relations hypothesis.Daniel J. Horschler, Laurie R. Santos & Evan L. MacLean - 2019 - Cognition 190 (C):72-80.
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  • Young children's conceptions of knowledge.Rachel Dudley - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12494.
    How should knowledge be analyzed? Compositionally, as having constituents like belief and justification, or as an atomic concept? In making arguments for or against these perspectives, epistemologists have begun to use experimental evidence from developmental psychology and developmental linguistics. If we were to conclude that knowledge were developmentally prior to belief, then we might have a good basis to claim that belief is not a constituent of knowledge. In this review, I present a broad range of developmental evidence from the (...)
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