John Stuart Mill didn’t take his life; but he could have done it. Had he done it when he was twenty, we would have never known what he thought about it. But he didn’t. And many years later he wrote about nature, God, religion and autonomy. My aim in this article is to show how his thoughts about nature and theism affect in fact his stance about autonomy to commit suicide.

The question, “Why has Harriet Taylor MM appeared in the history of philosophy as she has?” has several answers. The answers intertwine the personality and polities of Harriet, the sexism of those who wrote of her, misunderstandings of the means and meaning of her collaboration with John Stuart Mill, and the disturbing challenge of her questioning.

This paper analyses J.S. Mill's theory on the relationships between individual autonomy and State powers. It will be argued that there is a significant discrepancy between Mill's general liberal statements aimed to secure individual largest possible autonomy and the specific examples which provide the government with quite wide latitude for interference in the public and private spheres. The paper outlines the boundaries of government interference in the Millian theory. Subsequently it describes Mill's elastic paternalism designed to prevent people from inflicting (...) harm upon others as well as upon themselves, from soft paternalism on issues like compulsory education to hard paternalism on very private matters such as marriage, having children, and divorce by consent. (shrink)

ABSTRACT John Stuart Mill’s posthumously published Three Essays on Religion have been seen as standing in a problematical relationship with his better‐known works, especially On Liberty, which emphasize the negative sides of Mill’s approach to religion. The Three Essays are less easy to characterize. A careful reading shows Mill’s concern to subject religious views to rational scrutiny, but also to acknowledge the important and largely beneficent role religion has played, and presumably will continue to play, in human affairs. This role (...) will not, Mill predicts, continue to be that of keeping selfish impulses in check. Rather, it will be to inspire people to assist a benevolent but, plainly, less‐than‐omniscient deity; and, as well, to spark an imaginative identification with an ongoing process of intellectual and moral perfection that transcends our mortal lives. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with John Stuart Mill’s democratic theory. In chapter I, I examine the relations between political philosophy and political theory and science before providing a detailed outline of the aims of the dissertation. In chapter II, I argue that in order to reconcile the concepts of progress and equality within a utilitarian theory, a Millian political system needs to devise institutions that promote general happiness, protect individual autonomy, safeguard society from mediocrity. Chapter III discusses what different authors (...) have said about Mill and liberty, then explores James Mill’s theory of education and Coleridge’s influence on John Stuart Mill’s thought. I conclude by criticising Richard Arneson’s interpretation according to which the Considerations and On Liberty are inconsistent, and some of Gregory Claeys’ conclusions on Mill and paternalism. Chapter IV explores the methodology of the social sciences and the philosophy of history as found in Mill’s writings; then it considers Mill’s thought in regard to his father’s Radical proposals. I also discuss at some length the idea of the tyranny of the majority. Chapter V begins with a discussion of Hanna Pitkin’s theory of representation. I then provide a critical account of Richard Krouse and Nadia Urbinati’s interpretations of Mill. I conclude by arguing that, in a Millian democracy, the higher is the degree of complexity or the need for expertise in dealing with affairs, the greater is the bearing of the principle of competence in assessing whether a representative should act as a trustee or a delegate. I also introduce the idea of rational debate as a sort of ‘influence multiplier’, arguing that this would help to make a democracy rational and effective along Millian lines. In the last two chapters, I stress the relevance of Mill’s political philosophy as for some contemporary issues (nationalism, European federalism, current social and economic changes) while suggesting some potential further investigations, and summarise my conclusions. (shrink)

This article reviews the basic elements in John Stuart thought on freedom of expression, public opinion and the role of journalism in a democratic society, ideas bringing together and consolidating a tradition which began in the seventeenth century and continues through to the present day. It also considers Mill’s thought in relation with the views of thinkers who came before him, Milton and Jefferson, for example, and his contemporary, Tocqueville. Among the core ideas in Mill’s writings are the “harm principle”, (...) his approximation to the idea of truth, and his account of how political debate should be carried out. His extensive body of work has given rise to intense debate which is still lively today. As Isaiah Berlin emphasised, “[...] the critics of Mill have, on the whole, exceeded the number of his defenders. Nevertheless, the inner citadel – the central thesis – has stood the test”. (shrink)