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For Science in the Social Sciences

Mind 90 (357):151-153 (1981)

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  1. Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos.João Miguel Biscaia Branquinho, Desidério Murcho & Nelson Gonçalves Gomes (eds.) - 2006 - São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Martins Fontes.
    Esta enciclopédia abrange, de uma forma introdutória mas desejavelmente rigorosa, uma diversidade de conceitos, temas, problemas, argumentos e teorias localizados numa área relativamente recente de estudos, os quais tem sido habitual qualificar como «estudos lógico-filosóficos». De uma forma apropriadamente genérica, e apesar de o território teórico abrangido ser extenso e de contornos por vezes difusos, podemos dizer que na área se investiga um conjunto de questões fundamentais acerca da natureza da linguagem, da mente, da cognição e do raciocínio humanos, bem (...)
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  • Imputing Intentionality: Popper, Demarcation and Darwin, Freud and Marx.Steven Yearley - 1984 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (4):337.
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  • Cutting cakes: A study of psychologists' social categorisations.Jonathan Potter - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):17 – 33.
    This paper is about the ways in which psychologists categorise themselves into collectivities. It reports a study of the use of the categories 'mechanist' and 'humanist' in the transcript of an international psychology conference. The analysis documents: (1) the flexibility of category definition with respect to the subject matter, research methods and metaphysical assumptions of the putative membership; (2) the involvement of categories in practical tasks of criticism and evaluation; (3) some of the procedures used to warrant these categories as (...)
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  • Situational logic and its reception.I. C. Jarvie - 1998 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (3):365-380.
    Popper holds to the unity of scientific method: any differences between natural and social science are a product of theory, not a pretheoretical premise. Distin guishing instead pure and applied generalizing sciences, Popper focuses on the different role of laws in each. In generalizing social science, our tools are the logic of the situation, including the rationality principle, and unintended conse quences. Situations contain individuals, but also social entities not reducible to individuals: conspiracy theory is the extreme form of individualism. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Reviews. [REVIEW]C. W. Kilmister - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (2):206-210.
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  • The representational theory of learning and its pedagogic relevance.Christopher Winch - 1997 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 29 (2):67–82.
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  • How to justify a backing’s eligibility for a warrant: the justification of a legal interpretation in a hard case.Shiyang Yu & Xi Chen - 2023 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 31 (2):239-268.
    The Toulmin model has been proved useful in law and argumentation theory. This model describes the basic process in justifying a claim, which comprises six elements, i.e., claim (C), data (D), warrant (W), backing (B), qualifier (Q), and rebuttal (R). Specifically, in justifying a claim, one must put forward ‘data’ and a ‘warrant’, whereas the latter is authorized by ‘backing’. The force of the ‘claim’ being justified is represented by the ‘qualifier’, and the condition under which the claim cannot be (...)
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  • In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenism.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Economics and Philosophy 8 (1):1-21.
    Many of the things that we try to explain, in both our common sense and our scientific engagement with the world, are capable of being explained more or less finely: that is, with greater or lesser attention to the detail of the producing mechanism. A natural assumption, pervasive if not always explicit, is that other things being equal, the more finegrained an explanation, the better. Thus, Jon Elster, who also thinks there are instrumental reasons for wanting a more fine-grained explanation, (...)
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  • Contingent Realism—Abandoning Necessity.Malcolm Williams - 2011 - Social Epistemology 25 (1):37-56.
    In recent years, realism?particularly critical realism?has become an important philosophical and methodological foundation for social science. A key feature is that of natural necessity, but this coexists alongside an acceptance of contingency in the social world. I argue in this paper that there cannot be any natural necessity in the social world, but rather the real nature of the social world is that it is contingent. This need not lead to an abandonment of realism, and indeed I argue that a (...)
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  • * Psicologia Popular, Teoria da Decisão e Comportamento Humano Comum.António Zilhão - 2001 - Disputatio (10):1-21.
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  • Sigmund Freud: The Loss of Transparency.Friedel Weinert - 2008 - In Copernicus, Darwin, & Freud: revolutions in the history and philosophy of science. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 185–270.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud Some Views of Humankind Scientism and the Freudian Model of Personality The Social Sciences beyond Freud Evolution and the Social Sciences Freud and Revolutions in Thought Reading List Essay Questions.
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  • Naturalism, Explanation, and Akrasia.Ruth Weintraub - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (1):63-74.
    RésuméSi on la définit comme une action contraire au bon jugement de l'agent, l'action acrasique se trouve exclue par le principe selon lequel une personne a forcément l'intention de faire ce qu'elle juge devoir faire. Une fois ce principe rejeté, comme je le propose ici, le problème traditionnel de l'acrasie, qui est celui de sa possibilité même, s'évanouit. Je soutiens, cependant, qu'un problème plus limité semble se poser si nous admettons que les actions acrasiques doivent s'expliquer par des raisons, et (...)
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  • On the relevance of statistical relevance theory.Stephen Turner - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (2):195-205.
    In Salmon's discussion of his account of statistical relevance and statistical explanation there is a peculiarity in the selection of examples. Where he wishes to show that statistical accounts are reasonably treated as explanatory, he draws examples from the social sciences, such as juvenile delinquency. But when he explains the concept of 'causal' relevance, the examples are selected from the natural sciences. This conceals difficulties with salmon's account of causality in the face of multiple causes such as are characteristic of (...)
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  • II.Paul E. Tibbetts - 1981 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (4):503-509.
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  • 自然主義論争の構図について——吉田敬『社会科学の哲学入門』の批判的検討(On the Naturalism/Interpretivism Debate: A Critical Review of Kei Yoshida's Philosophy of the Social Sciences: An Introduction).Yuya Shimizu & Yuta Kobayashi - 2023 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 56 (1):111–128.
    Kei Yoshida’s recent book Philosophy of the Social Sciences: An Introduction is the first introductory textbook on the philosophy of the social sciences written in Japanese. It concisely expounds on a wide range of topics in the discipline, while its explication of those topics is not impartial or neutral as the author himself says. This paper gives a critical review of the book. The first half of it briefly overviews and assesses the book as a whole. The latter half of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Reviews. [REVIEW]David-Hillel Ruben - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (2):210-217.
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  • Understanding anthropologists.Michael Luntley - 1982 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):199 – 216.
    In this paper I show how to treat problems in the philosophy of the social sciences, in particular anthropology, without the need to settle questions in the theory of meaning about realism and anti?realism. In doing this, I show how it is possible, contrary to received opinion, to ward off conceptual relativism without adoption of realist semantics. The argument involves sketching the feasibility of a viable non?realist concept of objectivity. Having distinguished the required notion of objectivity, I then bring this (...)
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  • III Die gesellschaftliche Orientierung des wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts Starnberger Studien I.Christian Lenhardt - 1981 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (4):509-513.
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  • Rethinking Social Criticism: Rules, Logic and Internal Critique.Stephen Kemp - 2003 - History of the Human Sciences 16 (4):61-84.
    The ‘cultural turn’ in social thought, and the rise of interpretive modes of social analysis, have raised the issue of how social criticism can legitimately be undertaken given the central role of actors’ understandings in constituting social reality. In this article I examine this issue by exploring debates around Winch’s interpretive approach. I suggest that Winch’s arguments usefully identify problems with external criticism, that is, criticism that attempts to contrast actors’ beliefs with the social world as it really is. However, (...)
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  • The Failure of the Best Arguments against Social Reduction (and What That Failure Doesn't Mean).Todd Jones - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):547-581.
    In this paper, I will argue that the most systematic arguments for the impossibility of reducing of social facts are not, in fact, good arguments. The best of these, the multiple realizability argument, has been very successful in convincing people to be non-reductionists in the philosophy of mind, and can plausibly be adapted to argue for anti-reductionism in the social sciences. But it, like the other arguments for the impossibility of social reduction, cannot deliver. Any preference we have for social (...)
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  • The necessity of theology and the scientific study of religious beliefs.Fred D'agostino - 1993 - Sophia 32 (1):12-30.
    An earlier version of this paper was prepared for a University of New England Social Sciences Seminar on ‘Religion and the Social Sciences’, organized by Professor of Philosophy peter forrest, to which it was presented on 14 June 1989.
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  • Social Science and the Mental.Alan J. Nelson - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):194-209.
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  • (1 other version)Nové filosofie sociální vědy: Realistická alternativa.William Outhwaite - 2007 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 29 (3-4):5-38.
    This text provides a detailed examination of realism as a philosophy of natural science and its implications for the practice of social science. It also summarises some of the central themes of realism and its relations with other philosophical traditions. Realism is seen as essentially an ontological doctrine which means that it shares with neo-pragmatism a critique of the predominantly epistemological stress – most evident in rationalism – of much recent philosophy. It is argued that on the relation between science (...)
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  • Pure, mixed, and spurious probabilities and their significance for a reductionist theory of causation.David Papineau - 1989 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13:307-348.
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