This talk, delivered at De l''autopoièse à la neurophénoménologie: un hommage à Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18–20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis.

Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.” I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective notion of personhood.

The three social practices – democracy, philosophy and sport – are more similar than we might initially suspect. They can be described as ‘essentially agonistic social practices’, that is, they are manifestations of ‘agon’ (contest). The possibility to participate in agonistic social practices derives from the human condition, i.e. from the necessity to care for one’s existence, which requires ongoing attention and decision-making, and which sometimes means going against others. We call this character of human existence by the ancient Greek (...) term ‘polemos’ (struggle), which can be manifested through various types of agon. If society cherishes agonistic social practices, it enables its citizens to compete to prove themselves and achieve goals (e.g. to push through a persuasive argument, or to win in sport) in a respectful, peaceful and productive way. Believed to have played a significant role in ancient Greece, agon presents itself in both intellectual and physical forms – in philosophy, democratic politics and sport – suggesting that the relationship between these practices is deep-rooted and significant. This paper explores the idea that developing our understanding of polemos and agon can enhance our experience of agonistic social practices and enable our existence to proceed in a more free, pro-social and enriching way. (shrink)

Continual pressure on managers, their efficiency, and the need to search for novel solutions to problems can lead to psychologically demanding situations. In efforts to understand the main obstacles to work and to effectively manage work-related processes, and in the need to achieve personal development, new approaches that are based on existential philosophies emerge. The aim of this article is to highlight the ways in which existential approaches have been used or discussed in management and to show that existential themes (...) and their applications in management can also be found in the Eastern tradition of thought. The paper presents six case vignettes from management practice that use Western and Eastern existential insights and offer recommendations for self-development of managers. The paper concludes that although it is difficult or impossible to create a unified framework of existential philosophy of management because of the diversity of existential approaches and because of the problematic nature of comparing Eastern and Western philosophies, it is possible to work towards gathering applicable insights and values. (shrink)

This paper explores the topic of movement in relation to the human being (anthropos). This topic will be presented from the point of view of phenomenology and related to the area of sport. Firstly, I shall briefly present a description of the human being as static, within which mechanistic, physical movement is ascribed to the body. Secondly, I shall present a different conception of the human being ? the human being as movement ? using a phenomenological approach to the human (...) being based on the early work of Martin Heidegger, and on the philosophy of Jan Pato?ka, highlighting some of their ideas most closely related to the existence of the human being and the exploration of the topic of human movement. I shall refer to this concept of the human being with a word that I have coined for the purpose, uniting the human being (anthropos) and movement (kinesis) ? kinanthropos. Finally, from this phenomenological account of movement, I shall suggest some indicators for the enrichment of our thinking about sport. (shrink)

Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called “phenomenology” in the context of sport. Objective: The goal is to show how and why the phenomenological method is very often misused in the sportrelated research. Methods: Interpretation of the key texts, explanation of their meaning. Results: The confrontation of concrete sport-related texts with the original meaning of the key phenomenological notions shows mainly three types of misuse – the confusion of phenomenology with immediacy, with an epistemologically subjectivist stance (phenomenalism), (...) and with empirical research oriented towards objects in the world. Conclusions: Many of the discussed authors try to take over the epistemological validity of phenomenology for their research, which itself is not phenomenological, and it seems that this is because they lack such a methodological foundation. The authors believe that an authentically phenomenological analysis of sport is possible, but it must respect the fundamental distinctions that differentiate phenomenology from other styles of thinking. (shrink)

This article responds to a call from Philosophy of Management (Vandekerckhove 2020) to open a discussion on the contribution of Albert Camus’s work to management. The aim of this article is to argue that Camus’s sense of cyclicality related to the recurrence of crises is particularly important for existential management. This idea is embodied primarily by Camus’s famous retelling of the myth of Sisyphus, which is not only a provocative metaphor of his thoughts, as discussed by many authors, but is (...) also an inspiring expression of the idea of ​​revolt, which is further developed in Camus’s later work. The article focuses on recent updates to Camus’s Sisyphean revolt in existentially oriented approaches to management. These are mainly the concepts of the existential manager, an analysis of managerial lived experience within existential hermeneutic phenomenology, and the perspective of an absurd organization. Camus’s motif of cyclicality represents a stimulating framework for analysing lived managerial experience, which is characterized by alternating phases of success and failure. The article also draws attention to other important motives in Camus’s work, such as avoiding extremes and idealistic constructs, and expressing the value of human life as a basis for ethical behaviour. All the mentioned motives are closely related to the concept of revolt. This article also provides several explanatory comments on the editorial, which help to take a closer look at Camus’s style of thinking and avoid possible misinterpretations. In this respect, the distinction between Camus’s approach and forms of existentialism is particularly important. (shrink)

This article examines the concept of existence underlying Carl Schmitt’s political philosophy—a concept is that Heidegger largely shares. Can such a conception do justice to our political life? Or is it, in fact, inimical to it? The crucial issue here is that of political identity and the role that violence plays in its formation. The article concludes by examining Jan Patočka’s account of existence as motion and applying it to our political commitments.

Care of the soul is arguably the core concept in Patočka’s phenomenology. However, what is the soul? In this paper I seek to determine its ontological meaning, connecting the concept of caring for the soul with that of the movement of existence. Starting from Patočka’s affirmative presentation of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato, I interrogate the “orthodox” Platonic concept of caring for the soul and develop an alternative notion, putting emphasis on action in the world. I demonstrate the impossibility of identifying (...) the third movement with true existence, or with the care for the soul, whether conceived as the performance of philosophy or as political action. Finally, I outline a reinterpreted concept of care for the soul in which the self-moving of the soul is not ontologically prior to responding. The soul is inherent in action; and it is free only as responding to the world and responsible only in being free. (shrink)

This essay unpacks Johann Arnason’s theory of culture. It argues that the culture problematic remains the needle’s eye through which Arnason’s intellectual project must be understood, his recent shift to foreground the interplay of culture and power (as the religio-political nexus) notwithstanding. Arnason’s approach to culture is foundational to his articulation of the human condition, which is articulated here as the interaction of a historical cultural hermeneutics and a macro-phenomenology of the world as a shared horizon. The essay discusses Arnason’s (...) elucidation of his theory of culture as a contribution to debates on the ‘meaning of meaning’. It traces its beginnings from his critique of Habermas’s theory of modernity to its development via a trialogue with Max Weber, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Cornelius Castoriadis. It argues that Arnason's theory of culture moves beyond socio-centric perspectives, and, in so doing, offers a critique of what we might call sociological solipsism. In decentring society/anthropos, a more nuanced understanding of the human condition as a unity in diversity is achieved. The essay concludes with a discussion of some tensions in Arnason’s understanding of culture, and argues for the importance for incorporating a qualitative notion of ‘movement’ in order to make sense of historical novelty and social change. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss and compare the possibility of thinking that which is most worth our thought in Deleuze’s What Is Philosophy? and Heidegger’s course lectures in What Is Called Thinking?. Both authors criticize the history of philosophy in similar ways in order to reconsider what should be taken as the nature and task of philosophical thinking. For Deleuze, true thinking is the creation of concepts, but what is most worth our thought in fact cannot be thought. For Heidegger, (...) Being calls on us think, and to think rightly is to be underway toward thinking itself, a grateful heeding of Being. In this paper I explore the very possibility to think that which is most worth our thought. I will argue that although for both authors proper thinking as such is possible, thinking what is most worth our thought seems remarkably both possible as impossible. (shrink)

This paper is based on the work of Pierre de Coubertin and his view of Olympism. It deals with Coubertin's distinction between two kinds of sport: Olympic sport and world championship sport. I shall examine these two possibilities with respect both to education through sport and to how one lives one's life, and I shall show the necessity of choosing between them, with reference to Coubertin's closing remarks in his speech at the 1925 Olympic Congress in Prague: ?Fair or temple (...) ? sportsmen must make their choice; they cannot expect to frequent both one and the other ? let them choose!? (Coubertin 2000f, 559). I shall address the topic of the choice between these two kinds of sport through the two metaphors in the above quotation: ?fair?, in the sense of a market, or in ancient Greek agora; and ?temple?. Since this is also a choice of the way one lives one's life, the ideas will be worked out from within the philosophy of existence, particularly from the work of Jan Pato?ka, who develops the idea of different ?movements of human existence? in connection with different overall life directions that one might follow. The notion of ?fair? (or agora) is characterised by a human being's following of the prevailing patterns, norms and aims prescribed by society, without much reflection upon his or her individual aims and attitudes. It is described in Heideggerian terms as inauthenticity and in Pato?ka's idea of the second life movement, which is characterised by work, struggle, competition, comparisons, endless striving and self-assertion. Within sport, this is represented by wanting to win at all costs, lack of respect, self-promotion and striving for rewards. The notion of ?temple? is contrasted with the above mentioned character of the fair and is related to a certain clarity about one's existence and striving, one's doing and thinking, as described in Pato?ka's third movement of existence. Within the context of sport this is instantiated as a kind of self-development based on self-understanding and critical reflection, and it is illustrated by Olympism and Olympic sport. (shrink)

A wave of interest in Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault as bio-political thinkers was initiated by publication of Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer. The intellectual connection of these two figures is, however, broader than their bio-political considerations. Arendt and Foucault both offer detailed accounts of an ethico-political self. Both Arendt’s and Foucault’s later work explores the meaning of living ethically and politically. By examining the relationship between self, ethics and politics, I suggest there are two general points of convergence in Arendt (...) and Foucault regarding the ethico-political self: (1) a shared suspicion of ethical or political systems presented as universally applicable; (2) the attempt to undermine prescriptive moral and political models by fostering a dynamic and critical self-relationship. In the shared attempt to develop a dynamic ethico-political attitude Arendt and Foucault present their respective alternatives to universally applicable moral and political structures, which both consider to be potentially dangerous. (shrink)

This is the Introduction to a collected volume.

In his Heretical Essays, Jan Patočka introduces the concept of the solidarity of the shaken. He argues that it emerges in the conditions of political violence—the frontline experience. Moreover, Patočka brings into discussion the puzzling concepts of day, night, metanoia and sacrifice, which only further problematise the idea. Researching how other thinkers have examined the phenomenon of the frontline experience, it becomes obvious that Patočka did not invent the obscure vocabulary ex nihilo. Concepts such as frontline experience, sacrifice and the (...) metaphors of the day and night were commonly used by thinkers in the inter-war and post-war eras in their examination of community. This study aims to reconstruct the idea of the solidarity of the shaken as contextualized within a broader scholarly debate on the concept of community. Through the critical dialogue between Patočka’s works and the works of Ernst Jünger and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, this study will portray how Patočka, in his discourse on the frontline experience, follows the usual pattern of overcoming one’s individuality, transcending and opening up to the constitution of solidarity. This paper will argue that Patočka defined the solidarity of the shaken in an attempt to revive the positive aspects of a community and break with the regressive uses to which it was put in the twentieth century. (shrink)

At the beginning of his book Body, Community, Language, World, Jan Patočka claims that the human body has never been considered worthy of reflection throughout the entire (Western) philosophical tradition. Human corporeity has been largely excluded from philosophical reflections since the times of Plato’s conception of the human as a being divided between a mortal body and an immortal soul. Yet there is one thinker who had, as early as the nineteenth century, described the history of philosophy, from Plato to (...) Hegel, as a history of the loss of human corporeity. This philosopher was Ludwig Feuerbach. While Patočka follows the path of phenomenological anthropology, Feuerbach tries to return the sense of corporeity to the human being through the rehabilitation of sensuous perceptions and emotions. Despite their different approaches to the problem, Patočka and Feuerbach both agree with the notion that intersubjectivity, based on the corporeity of two autonomous subjects, stands outside of any cognitive pattern. They both persist in their efforts to bring the human body back into philosophy as a relevant source of experience because they both understand that the human body remains a universal symbol across all cultures and societies. (shrink)

This article examines the recent work of the sociologist Arpad Szakolczai as he attempts to conceptualize the programme of ‘reflexive historical sociology’ in the ‘life-works’ of Max Weber, Eric Voegelin and Michel Foucault as well as Norbert Elias, Lewis Mumford and Franz Borkenau. Particular attention is paid to the innovative manner in which the work of the anthropologist Victor Turner is used to explore the biographies of these social theorists as in effect performative life-works in which crucial liminal periods and (...) experiences are seen as facilitating new understandings. It is suggested that the life-work approach to social theory adds an important reflexive dimension to the analysis of social thought. (shrink)

In ‘Wondering the world directly’, Erin Manning criticizes phenomenology by drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the problems of his own project and the criticisms of José Gil. Manning claims that phenomenology goes ‘wrong’ in its privileging of the subject and processes of intentionality: the ‘consciousness–object distinction’. While phenomenology on this understanding alone is inadequate to account for movement and the body, process philosophy has the ‘ability to create a field for experience that does not begin and end with a human (...) subject’. This article responds to Manning’s criticism by arguing that phenomenology never intended to perpetuate a concept of subject that fixes an inexorable gap between itself and objects. A historical assessment of subjectivity and intentionality in the work of five different authors, alongside critical points that address Manning’s misconstrual of phenomenology, leads to an understanding of movement that need not ‘outrun the subject’ or become a precarious limit to perceptual experience because of its primacy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There has been much discussion about the sense of ownership recently. It is a very controversial topic and even minimal consensus seems hard to achieve. In this paper we attempt to assess the prospects of achieving a better understanding of what is meant by 'sense of body ownership'. In order to do so, we begin by addressing an objection on which the notion itself might depend, coming from the distinction between 'inflationary' and 'deflationary' accounts of the sense of body (...) ownership. Once the path is clear, we will consider some influential ways of approaching the issue, which propose grounding the sense of ownership in the spatiality of bodily sensations, the affective dimension of bodily experience, and in its spatial dimension, among other things. We expect the results of our discussion will allow us to both identify the strongest candidates for an account of the sense of body ownership and to determine the challenges that must be met by competing explanations. RESUMEN Recientemente se ha discutido mucho sobre el sentido de propiedad. Se trata de un tema muy controversial, en el que incluso consensos mínimos parecen difíciles de alcanzar. En este artículo intentamos abordar las perspectivas que existen de lograr una mejor comprensión de lo que significa "sentido de propiedad del cuerpo". Para tal fin, empezamos abordando una objeción de la que podría depender la noción misma, derivada de la distinción entre explicaciones 'inflacionarias' y 'deflacionarias' del sentido de propiedad del cuerpo. Una vez se haya despejado el camino, consideraremos algunas aproximaciones reconocidas al asunto, las cuales proponen fundamentar el sentido de propiedad en la espacialidad de las sensaciones corporales, en la dimensión afectiva de la experiencia corporal, en su dimensión espacial, entre otras. Esperamos que los resultados de nuestra discusión nos permitan al mismo tiempo identificar los candidatos más fuertes para explicar el sentido de propiedad del cuerpo y determinar los retos que deben enfrentar las explicaciones en contienda. (shrink)

Today it is said that we live in a condition of post-truth. In this essay, I will query this claim. In doing so, I do not intend to argue the contrary position, and neither will I attempt to offer some hope for a “return” to truth. Rather, my query will begin with an exploration of the assumptions behind the claim of post-truth and then consider an alternative notion of truth offered by Martin Heidegger and put into practice by Vaclav Havel. (...) Next, I consider how this Heideggerian/Havelian notion of truth is perhaps better thought in terms of thinking as articulated by Hannah Arendt, and a conception of ethics that runs close to Arendt’s thinking on thinking. Finally, the essay ends with the consideration that in the increasingly complex worlds of global and informational interconnectedness, perhaps what is most needed is not truth but thinking. That is, thinking that gives way to a sense of the world. (shrink)

In Jan Patočka’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity one can find clear influences of Merleau-Ponty. By both philosophers intersubjectivity is seen as a form of reversibility that has a primacy above personal subjectivity. But Patočka adds to this idea of reversibility the notion of surrender or dedication. In this article it is demonstrated how Patočka’s conception on surrender is developed in his idea of the three movements of human existence. Moreover, the understanding of intersubjectivity through surrender is presented as an important step (...) towards an answer to several points of critique on Merleau-Ponty’s views on intersubjectivity, that were brought to the fore by Claude Lefort. Finally, in this article several aspects of surrender are distinguished in order to give more insight in the functioning and effects of the third movement of human life. (shrink)

In this thesis the appropriate aesthetic evaluation of designed landscapes is explored. The overarching research question for this thesis is: What is an appropriate appreciation of a designed landscape as a designed landscape? This overarching research question is split into sub-questions. The first sub-question is: What is the current theoretical basis for the aesthetic evaluation of designed landscapes and does it provide appropriate arguments for aesthetic evaluations? Two important points about the aesthetic evaluation of designed landscapes were found in the (...) existing literature on environmental aesthetics and in critical evaluations of designed landscapes. Modern environmental aesthetics is focussed on natural environments as it has been shaped in response to early 20th century aesthetics, which was dominated by questions on art. The designed landscape phenomenologically related more to environments, but is ontologically closely related to artworks. Designed landscapes thus fall between two fields. The designed landscape has gone largely unacknowledged by philosophers and geographers. The lack of a specific theory for the appropriate appreciation of designed landscapes has made it easier for landscape architects and critics to miss out on the current insights of environmental aesthetics, leading to the inconsistent belief among landscape architects and landscape architecture critics that landscapes are scenic entities. Actual design criticism as offered in the Landscape Architecture Europe books is shown to be based on the inconsistent belief that aesthetic experiences of works of landscape architecture are mostly visual. To explore what an appropriate appreciation should be based in, first the ontology and phenomenology of one example, the post-war design for the landscape of Walcheren, is described and discussed. To explore its ontology, a literature research has revealed the design process and decisions. To explore the phenomenology, the descriptions of two walks on the island made by the author were analysed. The descriptions of ontology and phenomenology of Walcheren offer insights into the relevance for the aesthetic evaluation of this landscape of being designed and of the sensorial richness of this designed landscape. In both fields of ontology and phenomenology insights into aesthetic value go beyond the visible. The second and third part of the research answers the sub-questions about appropriate appreciation regarding respectively ontology and phenomenology of designed landscapes in general. The literature on topics adjacent to the field of landscape architecture, such as design and architecture aesthetics, was surveyed for aspects that might also be relevant for the aesthetic evaluation of landscape architecture. These aspects were then weighed according to a philosophical method of reasoning from first principles. Starting from a principle of appropriate appreciation, different cues were tested to see whether or not they have to be considered in such an appropriate appreciation. Following descriptions of the True Appreciation Principle (TAP) as provided by Lopes, cues were tested against the Appropriate Appreciation Principle for Designed Landscapes (AAP-DL): An appreciation of landscape L as a designed landscape is appropriate only as far as it does not depend counterfactually on any belief that is inconsistent with the truth about the nature of designed landscapes. Examples are provided where cues can influence one’s evaluation, and evaluation thus depends counterfactually on those taking those cues into account. If something might influence one’s evaluation one should consider it. The exploration has provided important cues for the aesthetic evaluation of designed landscapes. The findings are the base of an evaluative framework that takes into account the ontology and phenomenology of designed landscapes in order to evaluate designed landscapes according the AAP-DL. A discussion is provided on the importance of such an appropriate appreciation for different audiences. (shrink)