Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 5, Page 703-725, June 2022. In this article, I argue that Habermas’s method of rational reconstruction faces limitations when it comes to analysing newly emerging and contested political practices. As rational reconstruction aims to criticize existing practices by determining their normative meaning as reflected in the participants’ idealizing presuppositions, it reaches its limits where emerging and contested practices make it impossible to identify a shared self-understanding and a single participants’ perspective. Using the example (...) of membership politics, I argue that this is often the case where nationally constituted forms of politics become controversial or are fundamentally questioned. Building on the work of Benhabib and Fraser, I develop an alternative reconstructive method of plural reconstruction, which modifies the basic premises of rational reconstruction, adjusting it to emerging and contested political contexts. (shrink)

Ante la reciente publicación de la última obra sistemática del filósofo alemán J. Habermas titulada _Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie_ (y su pronta traducción al español), el texto se propone mostrar las características fundamentales de la comprensión habermasiana sobre la misma actividad filosófica. Para esto, primero se describe la base teórica sobre la cual Habermas construye el sentido de sus reflexiones filosóficas, esto es, el sentido posmetafísico desde el cual Habermas desarrolla su pensamiento filosófico. Posteriormente, se exponen los tres roles (...) que Habermas asigna a la actividad filosófica y se concluye evidenciando las conexiones entre la filosofía posmetafísica de Habermas y la democracia; conexiones que nos permitirían caracterizar a la filosofía posmetafísica habermasiana como una filosofía democrática y, sobre esta base, leer mejor el supuesto «giro religioso» de la filosofía de Habermas. (shrink)

The Rawls–Habermas debate is having a revival. In this article I argue that both philosophers develop different freestanding conceptions of political legitimacy, and show how they diverge when it comes to how political legitimacy can be justified. Habermas is looking for a deeper justification than Rawls will allow for. I then proceed to show how the different meta-ethical positions yield two different versions of democratic theory, focusing in particular on rights and popular sovereignty. I demonstrate how both conceive of the (...) co-originality of private and public autonomy, and subsequently take issue with Habermas’ reading of Rawls. I argue that Rawls should not be understood as a natural rights theorist, that Habermas misunderstands the role of the original position, and that Rawls cannot be considered a strong constitutionalist. Thus, the real difference between Rawls and Habermas revolves around their different conceptions of political legitimacy. (shrink)

Resumo: O artigo pretende desenvolver a categoria de reconstrução, em dois momentos distintos da obra de Habermas: primeiro, em Conhecimento e interesse, e, depois, em Teoria da ação comunicativa. Para isso, recorre-se à tipologia das compreensões de reconstrução proposta por Robin Celikates. Pretende-se mostrar que a essa tipologia faltam elementos importantes que permitem primeiramente identificar pontos comuns entres aqueles projetos reconstrutivos, e, depois, sustentar que a segunda compreensão de reconstrução não implica, como quer Celikates, uma separação entre teoria e crítica.: (...) This article aims to discuss the category of reconstruction at two different periods in Habermas' work, first in "Knowledge and Interest" and second in The Theory of Communicative Action. To do this, we make use of the typology of the understandings of reconstruction proposed by Robin Celikates. We intend to show that this typology lacks important elements that allow the identification of commonalities in both of Habermas' reconstructive projects, and then argue that the second understanding of reconstruction does not imply, as Celikates claims, a separation between theory and critique. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of morality should be understood, in metaethical terms, as a constructivist theory. All constructivist theories face a Euthyphro-like dilemma arising from how they classify the constraints on their metaethical construction procedures: are they moral or non-moral? Many varieties of Kantian constructivism, such as Christine Korsgaard’s, classify the constraints as moral, albeit constitutive of human reason and agency in general. However, this constitutivist strategy is vulnerable to David Enoch’s ‘shmagency’ objection. The discourse theory of morality, by classifying (...) the constraints on the metaethical construction procedure and ) as non-moral, can avoid this problem. (shrink)

Social philosophy is a somewhat broad and imprecise term. In this article I discuss the social philosophy of Habermas, Foucault and Honneth, arguing that the latter’s work is an interesting, but not unproblematic, conception of the discipline. Following Habermas and Honneth, I argue that social philosophy should be reconstructive, but incorporate insights from Foucault. Specifically, reconstructive social philosophy can be both normative and descriptive, and at the same time establish a dialectical relationship between philosophy and the social sciences, thus fulfilling (...) the ambition for social philosophy originally put forward by Horkheimer. The thesis I defend in this article is that reconstructive social philosophy in Habermasian or Honnethian fashion has the resources available to accomplish this ambitious task. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas’s theories have received enormous attention in the public sphere as well as in political science. It is therefore surprising that his method, rational reconstruction, is not more debated. In political science the method is of particular interest because of its ambition to bridge the gap between empirical and normative approaches. In this article the author traces Habermas’s interest in rational reconstruction by going back to his writings on theory and practice and subsequently shows what the method’s main principles (...) are. He then specifies how this methodological conception is used in Habermas’s political theory. Finally, the introduction of an empirical design allows the author to discuss one of the fundamental tensions in Habermas’s approach: the hypotheses arrived at through rational reconstruction are empirical hypotheses but cannot be tested by empirical means. (shrink)

In The Crisis of the European Union Jürgen Habermas claims that the constituent power in the EU is shared between the community of EU citizens and the political communities of the member states. By his own account, Habermas arrives at this concept of a dual constituent subject through a rational reconstruction of the genesis of the European constitution. This explanation, however, is not particularly illuminating since it is controversial what the term ‘rational reconstruction’ stands for. This article critically discusses the (...) current state of research on rational reconstruction, develops a new reading of Habermas’ method and invokes this account for an explanation and evaluation of the notion of a European pouvoir constituant mixte. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas's theories have received enormous attention in the public sphere as well as in political science. It is therefore surprising that his method, rational reconstruction, is not more debated. In political science the method is of particular interest because of its ambition to bridge the gap between empirical and normative approaches. In this article the author traces Habermas's interest in rational reconstruction by going back to his writings on theory and practice and subsequently shows what the method's main principles (...) are. He then specifies how this methodological conception is used in Habermas's political theory. Finally, the introduction of an empirical design allows the author to discuss one of the fundamental tensions in Habermas's approach: the hypotheses arrived at through rational reconstruction are empirical hypotheses but cannot be tested by empirical means. (shrink)

Recent debates in political theory display a renewed interest in the problem of judgment. This article critically examines the different senses of judgment that are at play in Jürgen Habermas’ theory of law. The article offers a new critical reading of Habermas’ account of the legitimacy of law, and a revisionary interpretation of the reconstructive approach to political theory that underpins it. Both of these are instrumental to an understanding of what is involved in judging the legitimacy of law that (...) is richer than has been recognized thus far by both critics and defenders of Habermas. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that a common view of Habermas’s theory of public reason, which takes it to be similar to Rawls’s ‘proviso’, is mistaken. I explain why that mistake arises, and show that t...