Judgment and imagination in Habermas' theory of law

Philosophy and Social Criticism 41 (10):1069-1091 (2015)
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Recent debates in political theory display a renewed interest in the problem of judgment. This article critically examines the different senses of judgment that are at play in Jürgen Habermas’ theory of law. The article offers a new critical reading of Habermas’ account of the legitimacy of law, and a revisionary interpretation of the reconstructive approach to political theory that underpins it. Both of these are instrumental to an understanding of what is involved in judging the legitimacy of law that is richer than has been recognized thus far by both critics and defenders of Habermas

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Thomas Fossen
Leiden University


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