Different languages carve the world in different categories. They also encode events in different ways, conventionalize different metaphorical mappings, and differ in their rule-based metonymies and patterns of meaning extensions. A long-standing, and controversial, question is whether this variability in the languages generates a corresponding variability in the conceptual structure of the speakers of those languages. Here we will present and discuss three interesting general proposals by focusing on representative authors of such proposals. The proposals are the following: first, that (...) the effect of language in conceptualization is general and deep; second, that the effect is local, transient, shallow and easily revisable; and third, that there is no proper effect of language on conceptualization, although there is surely some cognitive impact of language: many conceptual tasks engage language one way or another. (shrink)

We discuss four interconnected issues that we believe have hindered investigations into how language may affect thinking. These have had a tendency to reappear in the debate concerning linguistic relativity over the past decades, despite numerous empirical findings. The first is the claim that it is impossible to disentangle language from thought, making the question concerning “influence” pointless. The second is the argument that it is impossible to disentangle language from culture in general, and from social interaction in particular, so (...) it is impossible to attribute any differences in the thought patterns of the members of different cultures to language per se. The third issue is the objection that methodological and empirical problems defeat all but the most trivial version of the thesis of linguistic influence: that language gives new factual information. The fourth is the assumption that since language can potentially influence thought from “not at all” to “completely,” the possible forms of linguistic influence can be placed on a cline, and competing theories can be seen as debating the actual position on this cline. We analyze these claims and show that the first three do not constitute in-principle objections against the validity of the project of investigating linguistic influence on thought, and that the last one is not the best way to frame the empirical challenges at hand. While we do not argue for any specific theory or mechanism for linguistic influence on thought, our discussion and the reviewed literature show that such influence is clearly possible, and hence in need of further investigations. (shrink)

Typical spatial descriptions, such as “The car is in front of the house,” describe the position of a located object (LO; e.g., the car) in space relative to a reference object (RO) whose location is known (e.g., the house). The orientation of the RO affects spatial language comprehension via the reference frame selection process. However, the effects of the LO's orientation on spatial language have not received great attention. This study explores whether the pure geometric information of the LO (e.g., (...) its orientation) affects spatial language comprehension using placing and production tasks. Our results suggest that the orientation of the LO influences spatial language comprehension even in the absence of functional relationships. (shrink)

While geocentric and relative frames of reference have figured prominently in the literature on spatial language and cognition, the intrinsic frame of reference has received less attention, though various subtypes of the intrinsic frame have been proposed. This paper presents a revised classification of the intrinsic frame, distinguishing between three subtypes: a ‘direct’ subtype, an ‘object-centered’ subtype and a ‘figure-anchored’ subtype, with a cross-cutting distinction between ‘function-based’ and ‘shape-based’ systems. In addition, the ‘FIBO’ system in Dhivehi is analyzed as an (...) example of a borderline case, with some important features of the intrinsic frame but also some differences, presenting a challenge for existing frame of reference classifications. The rotational properties of these various systems are also considered. The analysis underscores the considerable diversity within intrinsic systems but also points to a closer relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic frames than has previously been appreciated. This may have implications for broader theoretical issues including how frames of reference are acquired, how speech communities come to use different frames and whether patterns of frame use in discourse shape patterns of non-verbal frame use. (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.