Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Communicating in Contextual Ignorance.Alex Davies - forthcoming - Synthese.
    When A utters a declarative sentence in a context to B, typically A can mean a proposition by the sentence, the sentence in context literally expresses a proposition (i.e. has a truth-condition), there are propositions A and B can agree the sentence literally expressed, and B can acquire knowledge from this testimonial exchange. In recent work on linguistic communication, each of these four platitudes has been challenged, and on the same basis: viz. on the ground that exactly which proposition the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Narrative testimony.Rachel Fraser - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    Epistemologists of testimony have focused almost exclusively on the epistemic dynamics of simple testimony. We do sometimes testify by ways of simple, single sentence assertions. But much of our testimony is narratively structured. I argue that narrative testimony gives rise to a form of epistemic dependence that is far richer and more far reaching than the epistemic dependence characteristic of simple testimony.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Linguistic Understanding and Testimonial Warrant.Joey Pollock - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    How much linguistic understanding is required for testimonial knowledge acquisition? One answer is that, so long as we grasp the content expressed by the speaker, it does not matter if our understanding of it is poor. Call this the ‘Liberal View’ of testimony. This approach looks especially promising when combined with the thesis that we share a public language that makes it easy to grasp the right content. In this paper, I argue that this picture is epistemically problematic. Poor linguistic (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Testimonial Worth.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2391-2411.
    This paper introduces and argues for the hypothesis that judgments of testimonial worth are central to our practice of normatively appraising speech. It is argued that judgments of testimonial worth are central both to the judgement that an agent has lied, and to the acceptance of testimony. The hypothesis that, in lying, an agent necessarily displays poor testimonial worth, is shown to resolve a new puzzle about lying, and the recalcitrant problem raised by the existence of bald faced lies, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Do We Hear Meanings? – Between Perception and Cognition.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (x):1-33.
    ABSTRACTIt is often observed that experiences of utterance understanding are what surfaces in hearer’s consciousness in the course of language comprehension. The nature of such experiences has been...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Testimonial Knowledge and Context-Sensitivity: A New Diagnosis of the Threat.Alex Davies - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):53-69.
    Epistemologists typically assume that the acquisition of knowledge from testimony is not threatened at the stage at which audiences interpret what proposition a speaker has asserted. Attention is instead typically paid to the epistemic status of a belief formed on the basis of testimony that it is assumed has the same content as the speaker’s assertion. Andrew Peet has pioneered an account of how linguistic context sensitivity can threaten the assumption. His account locates the threat in contexts in which an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation