De las muchas interpretaciones de la mecánica cuántica (MC), pocas han sido tan divulgadas como la de Everett. Esta formulación se supone realista y libre de los problemas que aquejan a la interpretación de Copenhague. En el presente trabajo, mostramos los problemas semántico-ontológicos que implican las formulaciones actuales de esta interpretación y discutimos el problema que presenta con respecto a las cantidades conservadas y las simetrías subyacentes al modelo de espacio-tiempo adoptado. Concluimos que en sus expresiones usuales, la teoría de (...) Everett es inconsistente. (shrink)

This brief review of Mario Bunge’s research on physics begins with an analysis of his masterpiece Foundations of Physics, and then it discusses his other contributions to the philosophy of physics. Following that is a summary of his more recent reactions to scientific discoveries in physics and a discussion of his position about non-locality in quantum mechanics, as well as his changing opinions on the nature of spacetime. The paper ends with a brief assessment of Bunge’s legacy concerning the foundations (...) of physics. (shrink)

I present a discussion of some issues in the ontology of spacetime. After a characterisation of the controversies among relationists, substantivalists, eternalists, and presentists, I offer a new argument for rejecting presentism, the doctrine that only present objects exist. Then, I outline and defend a form of spacetime realism that I call event substantivalism. I propose an ontological theory for the emergence of spacetime from more basic entities. Finally, I argue that a relational theory of pre-geometric entities can give rise (...) to substantival spacetime in such a way that relationism and substantivalism are not necessarily opposed positions, but rather complementary. In an appendix I give axiomatic formulations of my ontological views. (shrink)

The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent secondary (...) quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events. (shrink)

I argue that there are no physical singularities in space–time. Singular space–time models do not belong to the ontology of the world, because of a simple reason: they are concepts, defective solutions of Einstein’s field equations. I discuss the actual implication of the so-called singularity theorems. In remarking the confusion and fog that emerge from the reification of singularities I hope to contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities and limits of the theory of general relativity.

A supertask consists in the performance of an infinite number of actions in a finite time. I show that any attempt to carry out a supertask will produce a divergence of the curvature of spacetime, resulting in the formation of a black hole. I maintain that supertaks, contrarily to a popular view among philosophers, are physically impossible. Supertasks, literally, collapse under their own weight.

I present a formal ontological theory where the basic building blocks of the world can be either things or events. In any case, the result is a Parmenidean worldview where change is not a global property. What we understand by change manifests as asymmetries in the pattern of the world-lines that constitute 4-dimensional existents. I maintain that such a view is in accord with current scientific knowledge.

Axiomatization is uncommon outside mathematics, partly for being often viewed as embalming, partly because the best-known axiomatizations have serious shortcomings, and partly because it has had only one eminent champion, namely David Hilbert. The aims of this paper are to describe what will be called dual axiomatics, for it concerns not just the formalism, but also the meaning of the key concepts; and to suggest that every instance of dual axiomatics presupposes some philosophical view or other. To illustrate these points, (...) a theory of solidarity will be crafted and axiomatized, and certain controversies in both classical and quantum physics, as well as in the philosophy of mind, will be briefly discussed. The upshot of this paper is that dual axiomatics, unlike the purely formal axiomatics favored by the structuralists school, is not a luxury but a tool helping resolve some scientific controversies. (shrink)