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  1. Logically Incorrect Arguments.Vladimír Svoboda & Jaroslav Peregrin - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (3):263-287.
    What do we learn when we find out that an argument is logically incorrect? If logically incorrect means the same as not logically correct, which in turn means not having a valid logical form, it seems that we do not learn anything too useful—an argument which is logically incorrect can still be conclusive. Thus, it seems that it makes sense to fix a stronger interpretation of the term under which a logically incorrect argument is guaranteed to be wrong. In this (...)
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  • Turing's Fallacies.Timm Lampert - manuscript
    This paper reveals two fallacies in Turing's undecidability proof of first-order logic (FOL), namely, (i) an 'extensional fallacy': from the fact that a sentence is an instance of a provable FOL formula, it is inferred that a meaningful sentence is proven, and (ii) a 'fallacy of substitution': from the fact that a sentence is an instance of a provable FOL formula, it is inferred that a true sentence is proven. The first fallacy erroneously suggests that Turing's proof of the non-existence (...)
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  • A Measure of Inferential-Role Preservation.A. Paseau - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2621-2642.
    The point of formalisation is to model various aspects of natural language. Perhaps the main use to which formalisation is put is to model and explain inferential relations between different sentences. Judged solely by this objective, a formalisation is successful in modelling the inferential network of natural language sentences to the extent that it mirrors this network. There is surprisingly little literature on the criteria of good formalisation, and even less on the question of what it is for a formalisation (...)
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  • On Exhibiting Representational Validity.Alexandra Zinke - 2015 - Synthese 192 (4):1157-1171.
    We can distinguish two non-equivalent ways in which a natural language argument can be valid: it can be interpretationally or representationally valid. However, there is just one notion of classical first-order validity for formal languages: truth-preservation in all classical first-order models. To ease the tension, Baumgartner suggests that we should understand interpretational and representational validity as imposing different adequacy conditions on formalizations of natural language arguments. I argue against this proposal. To that end, I first show that Baumgartner’s definition of (...)
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  • A Case Study on Computational Hermeneutics: E. J. Lowe’s Modal Ontological Argument.David Fuenmayor & Christoph Benzmueller - manuscript
    Computers may help us to better understand (not just verify) arguments. In this article we defend this claim by showcasing the application of a new, computer-assisted interpretive method to an exemplary natural-language ar- gument with strong ties to metaphysics and religion: E. J. Lowe’s modern variant of St. Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God. Our new method, which we call computational hermeneutics, has been particularly conceived for use in interactive-automated proof assistants. It aims at shedding light on the (...)
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  • Logical Expressivism, Logical Theory and the Critique of Inferences.Georg Brun - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4493-4509.
    The basic idea of logical expressivism in the Brandomian tradition is that logic makes inferential relations explicit and thereby accessible to critical discussion. But expressivists have not given a convincing explanation of what the point of logical theories is. Peregrin provides a starting point by observing a distinction between making explicit and explication in Carnap’s sense of replacing something unclear and vague by something clear and exact. Whereas logical locutions make inferential relations explicit within a language, logical theories use formal (...)
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