- Merit, fit, and basic desert.Daniel Haas - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):226-239.details
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In defense of hard-line replies to the multiple-case manipulation argument.Daniel Haas - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):797-811.details
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The standard argument for blame incompatibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):697-726.details
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Aristotle and the Virtues.Paula Gottlieb - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):258-260.details
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What Makes an Intuition a Compatibilist Intuition? A Response to Sripada.Moti Gorin - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1205-1215.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Alexander Gebharter, Maria Sekatskaya & Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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Freedom and Indoctrination.Michael Garnett - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2pt2):93-108.details
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Frankfurt cases and overdetermination.Eric Funkhouser - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.details
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Speaking freely: on free will and the epistemology of testimony.Matthew Frise - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1587-1603.details
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The assimilation argument and the rollback argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):395-416.details
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Neo-Frankfurtians and buffer cases: The new challenge to the principle of alternative possibilities.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.details
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Mind, Brain, and Free Will.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):255-258.details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Everyone thinks that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will and moral responsibility.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.details
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Event-causal libertarianism, functional reduction, and the disappearing agent argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):413-432.details
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A theory of the normative force of pleas.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):479-502.details
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Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.details
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Justice Without Retribution: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Stakeholder Views and Practical Implications.Farah Focquaert, Gregg Caruso, Elizabeth Shaw & Derk Pereboom - 2018 - Neuroethics 13 (1):1-3.details
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The Physiognomy of Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):381-417.details
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‘Ought-implies-can’, causal determinism and moral responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):244–250.details
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Morał z przykładów frankfurtowskich.John Martin Fischer, Marcin Iwanicki & Joanna Klara Teske - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (4):441-465.details
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Initial Design, Manipulation, and Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):255-270.details
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How Should Free Will Skeptics Pursue Legal Change?Marcelo Fischborn - 2017 - Neuroethics 11 (1):47-54.details
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Dennett on freedom.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (4):414-426.details
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Blame and Avoidability: A Reply to Otsuka.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):43 - 51.details
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Quaderns de filosofia V, 1.Quad Fia - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1).details
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A Critical Review of Methodologies and Results in Recent Research on Belief in Free Will.Esthelle Ewusi-Boisvert & Eric Racine - 2017 - Neuroethics 11 (1):97-110.details
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Wouldn’t It Be Nice: Enticing Reasons for Love.N. L. Engel-Hawbecker - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 195-214.details
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Undetermined Choices, Luck and the Enhancement Problem.Nadine Elzein - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2827-2846.details
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Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.Nadine Elzein - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):169-191.details
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Pereboom’s Frankfurt case and derivative culpability.Nadine Elzein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):553-573.details
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The demand for contrastive explanations.Nadine Elzein - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1325-1339.details
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Basic desert, conceptual revision, and moral justification.Nadine Elzein - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):212-225.details
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Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):35-62..details
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Rational Abilities and Responsibility.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):459-466.details
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Toward a plausible event-causal indeterminist account of free will.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):127-144.details
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Chance, Merit, and Economic Inequality: Rethinking Distributive Justice and the Principle of Desert.Joseph de la Torre Dwyer - 2019 - Springer Verlag.details
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Weak and strong luck egalitarianism.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2012 - Contemporary Political Theory 11 (2):153-171.details
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Almost pregnant: On probabilism and its moral uses in the social sciences.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):572-594.details
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Betting Against Compatibilism.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2010 - Res Publica 16 (4):383-396.details
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Betting against hard determinism.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2008 - Res Publica 14 (3):219-235.details
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The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism.Richard Double - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):411-422.details
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Variantism about responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.details
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Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist causation and compatibilist sourcehood.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1255-1276.details
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The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our Judgments of Responsibility.Felipe De Brigard & William J. Brady - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):259-269.details
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Tragic Choices and the Virtue of Techno-Responsibility Gaps.John Danaher - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (2):1-26.details
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Manipulation and constitutive luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2381-2394.details
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Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.details
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The Robustness Requirement on Alternative Possibilities.Taylor W. Cyr - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (3):481-499.details
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