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Intuition, self-evidence, and understanding

Stratton-Lake Philip

In Landau Russ Shafer (ed.), Oxford Studes in Meta Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 28-44 (2016)

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Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2022 - In Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details The chapter introduces and characterizes the notion of fittingness. It charts the history of the relation and its relevance to contemporary debates in normative and metanormative philosophy and proceeds to survey issues to do with fittingness covered in the volume’s chapters, including the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relations between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of issues to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Moral Knowledge Without Knowledge of Moral Knowledge.David Kaspar - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):155-172.details Most people believe some moral propositions are true. Most people would say that they know that rape is wrong, torturing people is wrong, and so on. But despite decades of intense epistemological study, philosophers cannot even provide a rudimentary sketch of moral knowledge. In my view, the fact that we have very strong epistemic confidence in some fundamental moral propositions and the fact that it is extremely difficult for us to provide even the basics of an account of moral knowledge (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The Seeming Account of Self-Evidence: An Alternative to Audian Account.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):261-284.details In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of “adequate understanding”. I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence which (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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