We study statements about countable and well-ordered unions and their relation to each other and to countable and well-ordered forms of the axiom of choice. Using WO as an abbreviation for “well-orderable”, here are two typical results: The assertion that every WO family of countable sets has a WO union does not imply that every countable family of WO sets has a WO union; the axiom of choice for WO families of WO sets does not imply that the countable union (...) of countable sets is WO. (shrink)

We show that Dependent Choice is a sufficient choice principle for developing the basic theory of proper forcing, and for deriving generic absoluteness for the Chang model in the presence of large cardinals, even with respect to $\mathsf {DC}$ -preserving symmetric submodels of forcing extensions. Hence, $\mathsf {ZF}+\mathsf {DC}$ not only provides the right framework for developing classical analysis, but is also the right base theory over which to safeguard truth in analysis from the independence phenomenon in the presence of (...) large cardinals. We also investigate some basic consequences of the Proper Forcing Axiom in $\mathsf {ZF}$, and formulate a natural question about the generic absoluteness of the Proper Forcing Axiom in $\mathsf {ZF}+\mathsf {DC}$ and $\mathsf {ZFC}$. Our results confirm $\mathsf {ZF} + \mathsf {DC}$ as a natural foundation for a significant portion of “classical mathematics” and provide support to the idea of this theory being also a natural foundation for a large part of set theory. (shrink)

We write and for the cardinalities of the set of finite sequences and the set of finite subsets, respectively, of a set which is of cardinality. With the axiom of choice (), for every infinite cardinal but, without, any relationship between and for an arbitrary infinite cardinal cannot be proved. In this paper, we give conditions that make and comparable for an infinite cardinal. Among our results, we show that, if we assume the axiom of choice for sets of finite (...) sets, then for every Dedekind‐infinite cardinal and the condition that is Dedekind‐infinite cannot be weakened to weakly Dedekind‐infinite. (shrink)

It is a long standing open problem whether or not the Axiom of Countable Choice implies the fragment of Martin's Axiom either in or in. In this direction, we provide a partial answer by establishing that the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem in conjunction with the Countable Union Theorem does not imply restricted to complete Boolean algebras in. Furthermore, we prove that the latter (formally) weaker form of and the Δ‐system Lemma are independent of each other in.We also answer open questions (...) from Tachtsis [16] which concern the status of restricted to complete Boolean algebras in certain Fraenkel–Mostowski permutation models of and we strengthen some results from the above paper. (shrink)

In set theory without the Axiom of Choice (), we investigate the problem of the placement of Łoś's Theorem () in the hierarchy of weak choice principles, and answer several open questions from the book Consequences of the Axiom of Choice by Howard and Rubin, as well as an open question by Brunner. We prove a number of results summarised in § 3.

In set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate the deductive strength of the principle “every topological space with the minimal cover property is compact”, and its relationship with certain notions of finite as well as with properties of linearly ordered sets and partially ordered sets.

In set theory without the Axiom of Choice ( $\mathsf {AC}$ ), we investigate the open problem of the deductive strength of statements which concern the existence of almost disjoint and maximal almost disjoint (MAD) families of infinite-dimensional subspaces of a given infinite-dimensional vector space, as well as the extension of almost disjoint families in infinite-dimensional vector spaces to MAD families.

We show that the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem () does not imply the Nielsen‐Schreier Theorem () in, thus strengthening the result of Kleppmann from “Nielsen‐Schreier and the Axiom of Choice” that the (strictly weaker than ) Ordering Principle () does not imply in. We also show that is false in Mostowski's Linearly Ordered Model of. The above two results also settle the corresponding open problems from Howard and Rubin's “Consequences of the Axiom of Choice”.

Let DO denote the principle: Every infinite set has a dense linear ordering. DO is compared to other ordering principles such as O, the Linear Ordering principle, KW, the Kinna-Wagner Principle, and PI, the Prime Ideal Theorem, in ZF, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without AC, the Axiom of Choice. The main result is: Theorem. $AC \Longrightarrow KW \Longrightarrow DO \Longrightarrow O$ , and none of the implications is reversible in ZF + PI. The first and third implications and their irreversibilities were (...) known. The middle one is new. Along the way other results of interest are established. O, while not quite implying DO, does imply that every set differs finitely from a densely ordered set. The independence result for ZF is reduced to one for Fraenkel-Mostowski models by showing that DO falls into two of the known classes of statements automatically transferable from Fraenkel-Mostowski to ZF models. Finally, the proof of PI in the Fraenkel-Mostowski model leads naturally to versions of the Ramsey and Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski theorems involving sets that are both ordered and colored. (shrink)

A Hausdorff space is called effectively Hausdorff if there exists a function F—called a Hausdorff operator—such that, for every with,, where U and V are disjoint open neighborhoods of x and y, respectively. Among other results, we establish the following in, i.e., in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory without the Axiom of Choice (): is equivalent to “For every set X, the Cantor cube is effectively Hausdorff”. This enhances the result of Howard, Keremedis, Rubin and Rubin [13] that is equivalent to “Hausdorff (...) spaces are effectively Hausdorff” in. The Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem and the statement “For every infinite set X, the Stone space of the Boolean algebra is effectively Hausdorff” are mutually independent. In particular, the latter statement is not provable in. The Axiom of Choice for non‐empty subsets of () is equivalent to each of “Separable Hausdorff spaces are effectively Hausdorff” and “The Cantor cube is effectively Hausdorff”. The Principle of Dependent Choices in conjunction with the Axiom of Choice for continuum sized families of non‐empty subsets of does not imply the axiom of choice for partitions of. The latter independence result fills the gap in information in Howard and Rubin's book “Consequences of the Axiom of Choice”. The axiom of countable choice for non‐empty subsets of is equivalent to each of “Denumerable Hausdorff spaces are effectively Hausdorff”, “Denumerable T3 spaces are completely normal” and “Denumerable Tychonoff spaces are Urysohn”. (shrink)

In \(\textbf{ZF}\), the well-known Fichtenholz–Kantorovich–Hausdorff theorem concerning the existence of independent families of _X_ of size \(|{\mathcal {P}} (X)|\) is equivalent to the following portion of the equally well-known Hewitt–Marczewski–Pondiczery theorem concerning the density of product spaces: “The product \({\textbf{2}}^{{\mathcal {P}}(X)}\) has a dense subset of size |_X_|”. However, the latter statement turns out to be strictly weaker than \(\textbf{AC}\) while the full Hewitt–Marczewski–Pondiczery theorem is equivalent to \(\textbf{AC}\). We study the relative strengths in \(\textbf{ZF}\) between the statement “_X_ has (...) no independent family of size \(|{\mathcal {P}}(X)|\) ” and some of the definitions of “_X_ is finite” studied in Levy’s classic paper, observing that the former statement implies one such definition, is implied by another, and incomparable with some others. (shrink)

In the context of [Formula: see text], we analyze a version of Hindman’s finite unions theorem on infinite sets, which normally requires the Axiom of Choice to be proved. We establish the implication relations between this statement and various classical weak choice principles, thus precisely locating the strength of the statement as a weak form of the [Formula: see text].