This thesis proposes a perspective on language and its development by starting from two approaches. The first is the ecological-enactive approach to cognition. In opposition to the widespread idea that cognition is information-processing in the brain, the ecological-enactive approach explains human cognition in relational terms, as skilful interactions with a sociomaterial environment shaped by practices. The second is the metalinguistic approach to language, which holds that reflexive or metalinguistic language use – talking about talking – is crucial for understanding language (...) and its development. In particular, I defend two theses: 1. A child’s initial communicative behaviour can be explained in terms of attentional actions: social actions that function by directing someone else’s attention. 2. In order for the child’s communicative behaviour to be sensitive to key properties of language, such as semantic content and normativity, she needs to learn metalinguistic skills. The development of this ecological-enactive perspective on language serves two functions. First, the ecological-enactive approach started by considering basic behaviour, such as locomotion and grasping. An approach in the cognitive sciences, however, should be able to account for the full gamut of human cognition. If the perspective developed in this thesis is viable, this is a contribution to extending the ecological-enactive approach to typically human forms of cognition. Second, this perspective throws new light on philosophical problems concerning language. In the different chapters, I deal with questions concerning the nature of linguistic knowledge, explanations of communicative behaviour, and the origins of semantic content and linguistic normativity. (shrink)

La eficacia es el fenómeno según el cual el procesamiento subyacente al reconocimiento léxico genera un outputlingüístico recién cuando se cuenta con toda la información lingüística suficiente y satisfactoria, y con independencia respecto de la información no lingüística. En este artículo pretendo mostrar que el modelo de Tyler y Marslen-Wilson para el reconocimiento oral de las palabras desatiende el fenómeno de la eficacia. Tal como desarrollaré, la deficiencia explicativa del modelo se originaría en una determinada manera de concebir a las (...) representaciones. (shrink)

Contra Wilkins & Wakefield, we argue that an evolutionarily inspired approach to language must consider different facets of language (i.e., more than syntax and semantics), and must explore the possibility of nonhuman precursors. Several examples are discussed, illustrating the power of the comparative approach in illuminating our understanding of language evolution.

Conditional universals have always interested linguists more than unrestricted universals, which are often impossible to demonstrate empirically because categories cannot be defined in a cross-linguistically meaningful way. But deep dependencies have not been confirmed by more recent empirical research, and those universals with solid empirical support mostly relate to scalar patterns that can plausibly be related to processing cost.

The confirmatory nature of the empirical evidence used to establish UG effects in L2 development is considered. Specific issues are also raised concerning the internal validity of Epstein et al.'s findings. It is concluded that the role of UG in adult L2 development will only be established when researchers better understand the interaction between the development of UG-constrained structural knowledge and the development of overall L2 proficiency.

Criticism of sex differences in mathematical ability and sex roles in sociobiology and the pernicious influence of these ideas on education.

Although Geary's partitioning of mathematical abilities into those that are biologically primary and secondary is an advance over most sociobiological theories of cognitive sex differences, it remains untestable and ignores the spatial nature of women's traditional work. An alternative model based on underlying cognitive processes offers other advantages.

The contribution to L2-acquisition which comes from UG is conceptually distinct from that which comes from L1 (or from L1 and L2 jointly), but it is difficult to tease the two apart. The workings of deep, core principles (e.g., locality and subjacency) are so massively evident in L1 and L2 as to be of questionable use in the search for the contribution which is purely of UG.

The implications of Epstein et al.'s critical evaluation of much of the existing literature on L2-acquisition extends far beyond the domain they discuss. I argue that similar methodological clarification is urgently needed in analyses of the role of UG in L1-acquisition, as well as in discussions in such seemingly “distant” areas as the study of language change.

“Hardwired” is a term commonly used to describe the properties of certain behaviors or brain regions. As its usage has increased exponentially in the past 50 years, both in popular media and the scholarly literature, the concept appears to have gained a cloak of respectability in scientific discourse. However, its specific meaning is difficult to pinpoint. In this paper, I examine how “hardwired” has been used in the psychological and neuroscientific literature. The analysis reveals two major themes: one centers on (...) certain purported characteristics of behaviors or brain regions, such as fixedness; the other places these and other characteristics within an evolutionary framework. Overall, the analysis reveals a degree of overlap between “hardwiring” and the folk biology concept of innateness. Various complications arise from such overlap, casting doubts on the usefulness and legitimacy of “hardwired” in scientific discourse. (shrink)

The conclusion that language is not really innate or modular is based on several fallacies. I show that the target article confuses communicative skills with linguistic abilities, and that its discussion of brain/language relations is replete with factual errors. I also criticize its attempt to contrast biological and linguistic principles. Finally, I argue that no case is made for the “alternative” approach proposed here.

Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono trivialize the question of access to universal grammar in second language acquisition by arguing against a straw-man version of the no-access position and by begging the question of how second language (L2) knowledge is represented in the mind/brain of an adult L2 learner. They compound their errors by employing a research methodology that fails to provide any relevant evidence.

The evidence that L2 learners have full access to UG is not convincing. The following will be shown: (1) The argument that L2 learners “expect” L2 to have particular properties rests on the conceptual confusion ofhaving the concept of language(in the sense of knowing the meaning of “language”) withhaving accessto UG. (2) The claim that L2 acquisition takes place under the constraints imposed by universal principles lacks empirical support. (3) The assumption that L2 learners assign new parameter values is based (...) on a problematic example and remains unclear. (shrink)

Geary proposes a sociobiological hypothesis of how sex differences in math and spatial skills might have jointly arisen. His distinction between primary and secondary math skills is noteworthy, and in some ways analogous to the closed versus open systems postulated to exist for language. In this commentary issues concerning how genes might affect complex cognitive skills, the interpretation of heritability estimates, and prior research abilites are discussed.

De acuerdo con la tradición dominante de la teoría generativa, la creatividad lingüística es la capacidad de producir infinitas oraciones a partir de un conjunto finito de instrucciones sintácticas. Aunque esta idea de creatividad ha sido aceptada y festejada, sólo se trata de manejar una secuencia de categorías y escoger en cada paso un miembro de cada categoría. En efecto, la así llamada creatividad generativa no es más que una operación secuencial que ofrece opciones para cada punto de la secuencia, (...) y esto es comparable a la operación secuencial en la que completamos la bandeja con la comida disponible en el comedor. De hecho, la creatividad generativa no puede dar cuenta de los procesos verdaderamente creativos, por ejemplo de la invención de palabras nuevas o nombres originales. Por el contrario, el enfoque neurocognitivo asumido por la teoría de redes relacionales sí puede dar cuenta estos procesos genuinamente creativos. En este trabajo se mostrará cómo es el proceso neurocognitivo gracias al cual se crean y se entienden nombres cuya originalidad se basa en la ambigüedad deliberada. (shrink)

The resent paper reviews three phases in the literature on cognition and colour, and also Luria's (1976) observations of the effects that literacy and/or schooling have on colour naming and colour categorization. It is argued that Luria's own interpretation of his findings is partiafly flawed by inconsistency, and by ethnocentric presuppositions concerning mediation and abstraction. A revised interpretation is proposed that draws on Gibson's (1950, 1966) contrast between direct and indirect perceptions. It is suggested that language usage and cultural practices (...) come to exert a joint effect upon the experience of colour by selectively directing attention towards or away from the various perceptible aspects of coloured objects. (shrink)

The principles of sexual selection were used as an organizing framework for interpreting cross-national patterns of sex differences in mathematical abilities. Cross-national studies suggest that there are no sex differences in biologically primary mathematical abilities, that is, for those mathematical abilities that are found in all cultures as well as in nonhuman primates, and show moderate heritability estimates. Sex differences in several biologically secondary mathematical domains are found throughout the industrialized world. In particular, males consistently outperform females in the solving (...) of mathematical word problems and geometry. Sexual selection and any associated proximate mechanisms influence these sex differences in mathematical performance indirectly. First, sexual selection resulted in greater elaboration in males than in females of the neurocognitive systems that support navigation in three-dimensional space. Knowledge implicit in these systems reflects an understanding of basic Euclidean geometry, and may thus be one source of the male advantage in geometry. Males also use more readily than females these spatial systems in problem-solving situations, which provides them with an advantage in solving word problems and geometry. In addition, sex differences in social styles and interests, which also appear to be related in part to sexual selection, result in sex differences in engagement iii mathematics-related activities, thus further increasing the male advantage in certain mathematical domains. A model that integrates these biological influences with sociocultural influences on the sex differences in mathematical performance is presented in this article. (shrink)

The male advantage in certain mathematical domains contributes to the difference in the numbers of males and females that enter math-intensive occupations, which in turn contributes to the sex difference in earnings. Understanding the nature and development of the sex difference in mathematical abilities is accordingly of social as well as scientific concern. A more complete understanding of the biological contributions to these differences can guide research on educational techniques that might someday produce more equal educational outcomes in mathematics and (...) other academic domains. (shrink)

Descriptive semantic theories purport to characterize the meanings of the expressions of languages in whatever complexity they might have. Foundational semantics purports to identify the kind of considerations relevant to establish that a given descriptive semantics accurately characterizes the language used by a given individual or community. Foundational Semantics I presents three contrasting approaches to the foundational matters, and the main considerations relevant to appraise their merits. These approaches contend that we should look at the contents of speakers’ intuitions; at (...) the deep psychology of users and its evolutionary history, as revealed by our best empirical theories; or at the personal‐level rational psychology of those subjects. Foundational Semantics II examines a fourth view, according to which we should look instead at norms enforced among speakers. The two papers aim to determine in addition the extent to which the approaches are really rival, or rather complementary. (shrink)

This paper contrasts two influential theoretical accounts of language change and evolution – Iterated Learning and Social Coordination. The contrast is based on an experiment that compares drawings produced with Garrod et al’s ‘pictionary’ task with those produced in an Iterated Learning version of the same task. The main finding is that Iterated Learning does not lead to the systematic simplification and increased symbolicity of graphical signs produced in the standard interactive version of the task. A second finding is that (...) Iterated Learning leads to less conceptual and structural alignment between participants than observed for those in the interactive condition. The paper concludes with a comparison of the two accounts in relation to how each promotes signs that are effi cient, systematic and learnable. (shrink)

We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.

The social psychologist George Herbert Mead and the cognitive linguist Noam Chomsky both investigated the nature of language and mind during the 20th century. They approached the issues broadly, pursuing both philosophical and scientific lines of reasoning and evidence. This comparative analysis of Mead and Chomsky identifies fourteen questions that summarize their collective effort, and which animated much of the debate concerning language and mind in the 20th century. These questions continue to be relevant to 21st century inquiries. This paper (...) identifies which questions have been resolved and which have not, and discusses each in the context of relevant literature. The net result is a set of questions that inform interdisciplinary-minded inquiries today into the nature of language and mind. (shrink)

Like the information patterns that evolve through. biological processes, mental representations or memes evolve through adaptive exploration and transformation of an information space through variation, selection, and transmission. However since memes do not contain instructions for their replication our brains do it for them, strategically, guided by a fitness landscape that reflects both internal drives and a worldview that forms through meme assimilation. This paper presents a tentative model for how an individual becomes a meme evolving agent via the emergence (...) of an autocatalytic network of sparse, distributed memories, and discusses implications for complex creative thought processes and why they are unique to humans. A hypothetical scenario for the evolutionary dynamics of a given meme in a society of interacting individuals is presented. (shrink)

We challenge the notion that differences in spatial ability are the best or only explanation for observed sex differences in mathematical word problems. We suggest two ideas from the study of autism: sex differences in theory of mind and in central coherence.

Both autonomy and local specificity are compatible with observed interconnectivity at the cell level when considering two different levels: cell assemblies and brain systems. Early syntactic structuring processes in particular are likely to representan autonomous module in the language/brain system.

The current conception of the relation between UG and the grammar of a language rules out the no-access hypothesis, but does not distinguish between the full-access and partial-access hypotheses. The former raises the issue of why language acquisition in child and adult should be so different. The evidence presented in Epstein et al.'s target article seems inconclusive regarding a choice between hypotheses.

Human cognition is unique in the way in which it relies on combinatorial (or compositional) structures. Language provides ample evidence for the existence of combinatorial structures, but they can also be found in visual cognition. To understand the neural basis of human cognition, it is therefore essential to understand how combinatorial structures can be instantiated in neural terms. In his recent book on the foundations of language, Jackendoff described four fundamental problems for a neural instantiation of combinatorial structures: the massiveness (...) of the binding problem, the problem of 2, the problem of variables, and the transformation of combinatorial structures from working memory to long-term memory. This paper aims to show that these problems can be solved by means of neural “blackboard” architectures. For this purpose, a neural blackboard architecture for sentence structure is presented. In this architecture, neural structures that encode for words are temporarily bound in a manner that preserves the structure of the sentence. It is shown that the architecture solves the four problems presented by Jackendoff. The ability of the architecture to instantiate sentence structures is illustrated with examples of sentence complexity observed in human language performance. Similarities exist between the architecture for sentence structure and blackboard architectures for combinatorial structures in visual cognition, derived from the structure of the visual cortex. These architectures are briefly discussed, together with an example of a combinatorial structure in which the blackboard architectures for language and vision are combined. In this way, the architecture for language is grounded in perception. Perspectives and potential developments of the architectures are discussed. Key Words: binding; blackboard architectures; combinatorial structure; compositionality; language; dynamic system; neurocognition; sentence complexity; sentence structure; working memory; variables; vision. (shrink)

Geary's project faces the severe methodological difficulty of tracing the biological effects of gender on mathematical ability in a system that is massively open. Two methodological stratagems he uses are considered. The first is that pancultural sex differences are biological in nature, which is dubious in the domain of mathematics, since it is completely culture-bound. The second is that sociosexual differences are partly caused by biosexual differences, which renders his thesis unfalsifiable and empirically empty.

There is a basic division in the philosophy of mathematics between realist, ‘platonist’ theories and anti-realist ‘constructivist’ theories. Platonism explains how mathematical truth is strongly objective, but it does this at the cost of invoking mind-independent mathematical objects. In contrast, constructivism avoids mind-independent mathematical objects, but the cost tends to be a weakened conception of mathematical truth. Neither alternative seems ideal. The purpose of this paper is to show that in the philosophical writings of Henri Poincaré there is a coherent (...) argument for an interesting position between the two traditional poles in the philosophy of mathematics. Relying on a semi-Kantian framework, Poincaré combines an epistemological and metaphysical constructivism with a more realist account of the nature of mathematical truth. (shrink)

Wilkins & Wakefield suggest that changes in the hominid brain made it uniquely “preadaptive” for language, yet no precursor functions served as adaptive substrates to the emergence of language. We present contrary evidence that the ability to discriminate and process rapid and complex auditory information is a cross-species function subserving communication processes including, but not limited to, human speech perception. We suggest that auditory temporal processing served as an evolutionary precursor to speech processing and consequent language development in humans.

Research on the early development of fundamental cognitive and language capacities has focused almost exclusively on infants from middle-class families, excluding children living in poverty who may experience less cognitive stimulation in the first years of life. Ignoring such differences limits our ability to discover the potentially powerful contributions of environmental support to the ontogeny of cognitive and language abilities.

Recent studies demonstrated that 15-month-olds selectively respond to others’ beliefs. According to an epistemic mentalist interpretation, this attests that 15-month-olds possess a rudimentary capacity to attribute beliefs. Weaker interpretations suggest instead that infants are only sensitive to others’ beliefs because they can detect their proximal correlates. These two opposed interpretations often appeal to principled objections. In contrast, I argue that the dispute can be brought back to its empirical basis if we clearly explain what it means having ‘tacit’ or ‘implicit’ (...) knowledge of a theory. I introduce a definition of tacit knowledge based on the notion of structural similarity, and I discuss some crucial experiments that may be conducted to assess the validity of the epistemic mentalist interpretation. (shrink)

The target article draws on evolutionary theory to formulate a biosocial model of sex differences in quantitative abilities. Unfortunately, the data do not support some of the crucial hypotheses. The male advantage in geometry is not appreciably greater than the male advantagi in algebra, and the greater male variability in mathematics cited by Gear is not cross-culturally invariant.

The target article advanced the null, unified and widely misinterpreted generative hypothesis regarding second language (L2) acquisition. Postulating that UG (Universal Grammar) constrains L2 knowledge growth does not entail identical developmental trajectories for L2 and first language (LI) acquisition; nor does it preclude a role for the L1. In embracing this hypothesis, we maintain a distinction between competence and performance. Those who conflate the two repeat fundamental and by no means unprecedented misconstruals of the generative enterprise, and more specifically, of (...) the empirical content of the null hypothesis regarding L2 linguistic knowledge growth. We hope to have identified certain common goals, the adoption of which might constitute a firm foundation for continued productive interdisciplinary development of contemporary theoretical and experimental L2 acquisition research. (shrink)

Analyses of bodies of data usually omit some relevant studies. Geary omits some studies looking at functional correlates of basic biological data, studies of developmental implications for functioning, and the recent achievement of acceleration of cognitive development.

A systematic theory of naturalism, bridging metaphysics and the science of complexity and emergence.

Stephen Pinker sets out over a dozen arguments in The language instinct (Morrow, New York, 1994) for his widely shared view that natural language is inadequate as a medium for thought. Thus he argues we must suppose that the primary medium of thought and inference is an innate propositional representation system, mentalese. I reply to the various arguments and so defend the view that some thought essentially involves natural language. I argue mentalese doesn't solve any of the problems Pinker cites (...) for the view that we think in natural language. So I don't think I think the way he thinks I think. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on one of the many issues raised in Geary's target article: the importance of gender differences in spatial ability to gender differences in mathematics. I argue that the evidence for the central role of spatial ability in mathematical ability, or in gender differences in it, is tenuous at best.

Hominid-like morphology in habiline cranial endocasts does not necessarily imply the presence of language capacity. The cortical zone in question is not associated exclusively with language in humans, and its emergence in habilines might indicate the evolution of other cognitive functions special to humans that were preconditions for the later evolution of language.

Three issues are addressed in this commentary. (1) Wilkins & Wakefield are commended for placing the complex behavior they discuss within an evolutionary matrix. (2) They err on a number of points in regard to their treatment of this complex behavior. These involve (a) their emphasis on the evolution of conceptual structure rather than language, (b) their equation of meaning with reference, (c) their minimalist view of learning theory, and (d) their separation of the evolution of speech from that of (...) language. (3) They adopt a framework for neural preconditions that has been clearly discredited on both behavioral and neuroanatomical grounds. Finally, recent research involving modern neuroimaging techniques casts further doubt on the authors' postulated functions for the neural areas they discuss. (shrink)