- Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.details
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How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):41–53.details
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Self-Knowledge in “Deciding to Believe”.Laurie Pieper - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (3):493-510.details
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A reduction of doxastic logic to action logic.Heinrich Wansing - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (1-2):267-283.details
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Motivated irrationality and divided attention.Robert Dunn - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):325 – 336.details
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(2 other versions)Attitudes, agency and first-personality.Robert Dunn - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):295-319.details
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Natural language and virtual belief.Keith Frankish - 1998 - In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 248.details
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Resolving to Believe: Kierkegaard’s Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Agency Evidentialism: Trust and Doxastic Voluntarism.Snježana Prijić-Samaržija - 2018 - Rivista di Estetica 69:68-84.details
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Robert Holcot on Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief.Mark Boespflug - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (4):617-636.details
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Conflicts of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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Neural and Environmental Modulation of Motivation: What's the Moral Difference?Thomas Douglas - 2018 - In David Birks & Thomas Douglas (eds.), Treatment for Crime: Philosophical Essays on Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology.John Turri, David Rose & Wesley Buckwalter - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2507-2537.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Seeing to it that an agent forms a belief.Heinrich Wansing - 2002 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 10:185.details
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A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.details
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A Critique of Holyer's Volitionalism.Louis P. Pojman - 1984 - Dialogue 23 (4):695-700.details
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(2 other versions)Attitudes, agency and first-personality.Robert Dunn - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):295-319.details
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Compatibilism and doxastic control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.details
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Doxastic Decisions, Epistemic Justification, and The Logic of Agency.Heinrich Wansing - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):201-227.details
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Deciding to Believe Again.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):523 - 547.details
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Finding a high road: The moral case for salvific pluralism. [REVIEW]Kenneth Einar Himma - 2002 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 52 (1):1-33.details
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Acceptance and Managerial Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (3):359-378.details
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The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Meylan - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):877-893.details
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