- Doxastic Voluntarism.Mark Boespflug & Elizabeth Jackson - 2024 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
(1 other version)Are We Pre-Theoretically Committed to Doxastic Voluntarism?Nikolaj Nottelmann, Anthony Booth & Rune Lomholt - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1077-1098.details
|
|
The Belief Norm of Academic Publishing.Wesley Buckwalter - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
|
|
(1 other version)Are We Pre-Theoretically Committed to Doxastic Voluntarism?Nikolaj Nottelmann, Anthony Booth & Rune Lomholt - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1-22.details
|
|
Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails
|
|
Intentional action without knowledge.David Rose, Alfred Mele & Romy Vekony - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1231-1243.details
|
|
The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy.Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.) - 2023 - Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.details
|
|
Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating.Roberto Fumagalli - 2021 - Theory and Decision 91 (3):337-356.details
|
|
Impossible intentions.Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (4):319-332.details
|
|
Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
|
|
Inability and obligation in intellectual evaluation.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):475-497.details
|
|
Mind-Brain Dichotomy, Mental Disorder, and Theory of Mind.Wesley Buckwalter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):511-526.details
|
|
Moderate scientism in philosophy.Buckwalter Wesley & John Turri - 2018 - In Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels & Rene van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Blurring two conceptions of subjective experience: Folk versus philosophical phenomenality.Anthony F. Peressini - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):862-889.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2181-2199.details
|
|
(1 other version)The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief.Patrick Bondy - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1761-1781.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
|
|
(1 other version)Neuroscientific Prediction and the Intrusion of Intuitive Metaphysics.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7).details
|
|
Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?Blake Roeber - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):839-866.details
|
|
The Paradox of Impossible to Know Assertion.Rafał Palczewski & Patryk Popławski - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-18.details
|
|
Toxic intentions.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1448-1461.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Patrick Bondy - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-21.details
|
|