The first question raised in this article concerns the central points of Husserl's phenomenological psychology. They consist essentially of the following: a re-questioning of the types of objects encountered to their mode of being experienced, and an emphasis on the non-empirical character of this type of psychology. A criticism then follows that Husserl's analyses are too general; they are more ontologically than psychologically interesting. It is further criticized that Husserl's phenomenological psychology is primarily oriented toward the problems of gnosology and (...) not so much at the problems of the everyday behavior of man. Nevertheless, the critique of Husserl affirms that phenomenological psychology is important for theoretical psychology insofar as Husserl very clearly develops the principles of concept-formation of psychology as a science. If phenomenological psychology is to be concrete and applicable to psychology, one must ask which are the concrete types of objects from which one has to go back to consciousness. These types of objects have been identified as work-tasks. This conception of phenomenological psychology accords with its eidetical character since the individual mode of performance of a work-task is in general largely irrelevant. To prove this conception from another viewpoint, the analysis of some French phenomenologists were scrutinized. First of all, it was shown how Politzer, one of the first French phenomenolo. (shrink)

RESUME Dans cet article, j’aborde la perspective idéaliste de la « Phénoménologie de la perception » pour montrer que, dans cet ouvrage, l’expérience du corps propre est décrite à partir de la vision du cogito. Pour expliciter cet idéalisme, j’analyse la principale voix donnée au corps au début de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty: la voix pathologique. Les troubles de Schneider rendent explicite son impuissance symbolique, et cette impuissance est vraiment l’impuissance du corps. Le sujet malade est un être soumis à (...) la normativité immédiate de la vie, raison par laquelle il peut découvrir à chaque moment la finitude et la fragilité de l’existence. J’évoque par contre les notes du cours au Collège de France, de 1954-1955, sur la passivité et les cours sur la Nature, de 1957-1958, lorsque Merleau-Ponty examine la vie et la naissance du sens à partir d’une perspective tout à fait différente. J’analyse aussi la lecture qu’il a faite du « cas Dora » pour montrer que le philosophe trouve dans l’hystérie une expérience symbolique très particulière. Cette expérience exige la compréhension de la puissance symbolique du corps propre, l’abandon de la position idéaliste et la découverte du pouvoir de l’hystérique de narrer l’expérience de l’être. ABSTRACT In this article, I approach the idealistic perspective of the “Phenomenology of Perception” to show that in that work the experience of the body is described from a vision of the cogito. To explain this idealism, I asses the main voice given to the body in the beginning of the thought of Merleau-Ponty: the pathological voice. Schneider’s disturbances make explicit its symbolic powerlessness, and that powerlessness is in fact the body’s powerlessness. The sick is a being submitted to the immediate normativity of life, reason by which he can find out at every moment the finitude and fragility of existence. On the other hand, I evoke the course notes from Collège de France, of 1954-1955, about passivity, and the courses about Nature, of 1957-1958, when Merleau-Ponty analyses life and the birth in the sense from an entirely different perspective. Also, I analyze the reading of what he to “case Dora” to show that the philosopher finds in hysteria a very particular symbolic experience. This experience requires understanding the symbolic power of the body itself, the abandonment of the idealist position and the discovery of the power of the hysteric of narrating the experience of being. (shrink)

Having spent 40 years as a psychologist in academia with a minority perspective at odds with the culture of his profession, the author was requested to reflect upon his experiences in order to offer advice to younger colleagues of the same persuasion. There are indeed prices to be paid when one's values place one outside the established view within the discipline of psychology, but remaining true to oneself is never theless posited as the highest value. The chief drawback of marginality (...) is the lack of the possibility of being placed within a normative university setting where the training of the next generation of scholars with similar values can take place. Basically, one encounters the resistances that sociology of knowledge factors offer rather than intrinsic resistances to the minority theoretical perspective. Five theoretical notions that met political resistance are listed and seven advisory comments are offered for young potentially marginal psychologists. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta um esboço de programa de pesquisa sobre a recepção filosófica da psicanálise, baseado em uma dupla proposta: 1) a formulação de uma história dessa recepção, 2) a possibilidade de extrair dessa história, um método. A argumentação se desenvolve em duas direções: i) na caracterização geral das maiores tradições de recepção filosófica da psicanálise — as tradições alemã, anglo-saxã e francesa —, seguida da análise específica dos trabalhos da filosofia brasileira da psicanálise e do freudismo filosófico francês; ii) (...) na discussão de questões metodológicas: a) de história, b) de método e c) de locus, que constituem o problema de saber se uma história da recepção filosófica da psicanálise pode nos fornecer, ou não, um novo método de pensamento. A principal conclusão do trabalho é a de que um programa de pesquisa sobre a recepção filosófica da psicanálise, concebido nos termos aqui propostos – história e método –, deve ser levado adiante especialmente pela recepção filosófica brasileira da psicanálise, isto é, tudo indica que é do conjunto de pesquisas realizadas no Brasil que poderá surgir uma “história e método da recepção filosófica da psicanálise”. (shrink)

The problem of narrative validity is discussed in reference to psychologists' criticisms of verbal report data and in dialogue with Jean-Paul Sartre's understanding of self-knowledge in general and of self-deception in particular. Sartre's notion of "purifying reflection" is invoked as a way of seeing through the distortions and deceptions inherent in narrative accounts of lived experience. Excerpts from empirically-based phenomenological investigations of desire and sexual compliance will be used as illustrations of both the content and process of phenomenologically-based narrative research.

El presente artículo analiza el periodo de conformación de la filosofía de Georges Canguilhem (1926-1939). Se concentra en la elaboración temprana de sus ideas relativas a la teoría del valor y de la autonomía de la acción humana. Dos aspectos de esta filosofía son tomados en consideración. En primer lugar, el vinculo que mantiene el entendimiento con los hechos que forman parte de la realidad, observando la incidencia de esta filosofía del valor y de la acción en el dominio de (...) tres disciplinas pertenecientes a las ciencias sociales (psicología, sociología, historia). Un segundo momento del texto analiza el espacio asignado por estas elaboraciones al psicoanálisis, teoría que Canguilhem asocia a los fundamentos de la dimensión política y ética de esta filosofía. (shrink)