This is the first part of the essay devoted to the story of logicism, in particular to its Fregean version. Reviewing the classical period of Fregean studies, we first point out some critical moments of Frege‘s argumentation in the Grundla­gen, in order to be able later to differentiate between its salvageable and defec­tive features. We work on the presumption that there are no easy, catego­rical an­swers to questions like “Is logicism dead?“: Wittgenstein’s cri­tique of the foundational program as well as (...) the remarkable neo-Fregean dis­cov­eries of Boolos and Wright have to be confronted with the effects which the logi­cistic idea actually had on logico­matemati­cal practice. But that is another story, a sequel to this es­say, the purpose of which is systematic rather than criti­cal. (shrink)

From 1905–1908 onward, Russell thought that his new ‘substitutional theory’ provided him with the right framework to resolve the set-theoretic paradoxes. Even if he did not finally retain this resolution, the substitutional strategy was instrumental in the development of his thought. The aim of this paper is not historical, however. It is to show that Russell's substitutional insight can shed new light on current issues in philosophy of mathematics. After having briefly expounded Russell's key notion of a ‘structured variable’, I (...) connect it to two ongoing discussions: the Caesar problem, and absolute generality. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap's 1930s philosophy of logic, including his adherence to the principle of tolerance, is discussed. What theses did Carnap commit himself to, exactly? I argue that while Carnap did commit himself to a certain multitude thesis—there are different logics of different languages, and the choice between these languages is merely a matter of expediency—there is no evidence that he rejected a language-transcendent notion of fact, contrary to what Warren Goldfarb and Thomas Ricketts have prominently argued. (In fact, it is (...) obscure just what Goldfarb and Ricketts claim about Carnap). Toward the end I critically discuss Michael Friedman's suggestion that Carnap believed in a relative a priori. (shrink)

The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting”. This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that solution. One such consequence, it argues, is that (...) Russell must abandon his commitment to propositions. (shrink)

Sequel to Part I. In these articles, I describe Cantor’s power-class theorem, as well as a number of logical and philosophical paradoxes that stem from it, many of which were discovered or considered (implicitly or explicitly) in Bertrand Russell’s work. These include Russell’s paradox of the class of all classes not members of themselves, as well as others involving properties, propositions, descriptive senses, class-intensions and equivalence classes of coextensional properties. Part II addresses Russell’s own various attempts to solve these paradoxes, (...) including strategies that he considered and rejected (limitation of size, the zigzag theory, etc.), as well as his own final views whereupon many purported entities that, if reified, lead to these contradictions, must not be genuine entities, but ‘logical fictions’ or ‘logical constructions’ instead. (shrink)

The article deals with Cantor's argument for the non-denumerability of reals somewhat in the spirit of Lakatos' logic of mathematical discovery. At the outset Cantor's proof is compared with some other famous proofs such as Dedekind's recursion theorem, showing that rather than usual proofs they are resolutions to do things differently. Based on this I argue that there are "ontologically" safer ways of developing the diagonal argument into a full-fledged theory of continuum, concluding eventually that famous semantic paradoxes based on (...) diagonal construction are caused by superficial understanding of what a name is. (shrink)

The period from 1900 to 1935 was particularly fruitful and important for the development of logic and logical metatheory. This survey is organized along eight "itineraries" concentrating on historically and conceptually linked strands in this development. Itinerary I deals with the evolution of conceptions of axiomatics. Itinerary II centers on the logical work of Bertrand Russell. Itinerary III presents the development of set theory from Zermelo onward. Itinerary IV discusses the contributions of the algebra of logic tradition, in particular, Löwenheim (...) and Skolem. Itinerary V surveys the work in logic connected to the Hilbert school, and itinerary V deals specifically with consistency proofs and metamathematics, including the incompleteness theorems. Itinerary VII traces the development of intuitionistic and many-valued logics. Itinerary VIII surveys the development of semantical notions from the early work on axiomatics up to Tarski's work on truth. (shrink)

Alberto Coffa used the phrase "the Copernican turn in semantics" to denote a revolutionary transformation of philosophical views about the connection between the meanings of words and the acceptability of sentences and arguments containing those words. According to the new conception resulting from the Copernican turn, here called "the Copernican view", rules of use are constitutive of the meanings of words. This view has been linked with two doctrines: (A) the instances of meaning-constitutive rules are analytically and a priori true (...) or valid; (B) to grasp a meaning is to accept its rules. The pros and cons of different versions of the Copernican view, ascribable to Wittgenstein, Carnap, Gentzen, Dummett, Prawitz, Boghossian and other authors, will be weighed. A new version will be proposed, which implies neither (A) nor (B). (shrink)

Michael Friedman maintains that Carnap did not fully appreciate the impact of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem on the prospect for a purely syntactic definition of analyticity that would render arithmetic analytically true. This paper argues against this claim. It also challenges a common presumption on the part of defenders of Carnap, in their diagnosis of the force of Gödel's own critique of Carnap in his Gibbs Lecture. The author is grateful to Michael Friedman for valuable comments. Part of the research (...) towards this paper was carried out while the author was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. The paper was presented to the Center's Fellowship Reunion Conference in Athens in 1992. It was committed for publication in the Proceedings of that conference, but those Proceedings never appeared. By the time it became evident that they would never appear, both the hard copy and the source file had been mislaid. The hard copy re-surfaced in 2007. The literature on this topic since 1992 appears to leave some space for the ideas and arguments presented here. Although the paper has been updated in light of the more recent literature, its basic thesis, presented in 1992, remains the same. Only 3 is new, questioning a basic presumption made by more recent commentators in their presentation of Gödel's criticism of Carnap in his Gibbs Lecture. For helpful comments on the current version, the author is indebted to Robert Kraut, Stewart Shapiro, and Adam Podlaskowski. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The paper critically scrutinizes the widespread idea that Russell subscribes to a "Universalist Conception of Logic." Various glosses on this somewhat under-explained slogan are considered, and their fit with Russell's texts and logical practice examined. The results of this investigation are, for the most part, unfavorable to the Universalist interpretation.

This book concerns the metasemantics of quantum mechanics (QM). Roughly, it pursues an investigation at an intersection of the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of language, and it offers a critical analysis of rival explanations of the semantic facts of standard QM. Two problems for such explanations are discussed: categoricity and permanence. New results include 1) a reconstruction of Einstein's incompleteness argument, which concludes that a local, separable, and categorical QM cannot exist, 2) a reinterpretation of Bohr's principle of (...) correspondence, grounded in the principle of permanence, 3) a meaning-variance argument for quantum logic, which follows a line of critical reflections initiated by Weyl, and 4) an argument for semantic indeterminacy leveled against inferentialism about QM, inspired by Carnap's work in the philosophy of classical logic. (shrink)

For several decades, Carnap's philosophy of mathematics used to be either dismissed or ignored. It was perceived as a form of linguistic conventionalism and thus taken to rely on the bankrupt notion of truth by convention. However, recent scholarship has revealed a more subtle picture. It has been forcefully argued that Carnap is not a linguistic conventionalist in any straightforward sense, and that supposedly decisive objections against his position target a straw man. This raises two questions. First, how exactly should (...) we characterise Carnap's actual philosophy of mathematics? Secondly, is his position an attractive alternative to established views? I will tackle these issues by looking at Carnap's response to the incompleteness theorems. Drawing on arguments put forward by Gödel and Beth, I show that some crucial aspects of Carnap's positive account have remained underdeveloped. Suggestions on what a full evaluation of Carnap's position requires are made. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap’s principle of tolerance states that there is no need to justify the adoption of a logic by philosophical means. Carnap uses the freedom provided by this principle in his philosophy of mathematics: he wants to capture the idea that mathematical truth is a matter of linguistic rules by relying on a strong metalanguage with infinitary inference rules. In this paper, I give a new interpretation of an argument by E. W. Beth, which shows that the principle of tolerance (...) does not suffice to remove all obstacles to the employment of infinitary rules. (shrink)

The Russell–Myhill theorem threatens a familiar structured conception of propositions according to which two sentences express the same proposition only if they share the same syntactic structure and their corresponding syntactic constituents share the same semantic value. Given the role of the principle of universal instantiation in the derivation of the theorem in simple type theory, one may hope to rehabilitate the core of the structured view of propositions in ramified type theory, where the principle is systematically restricted. We suggest (...) otherwise. The ramified core of the structured theory of propositions remains inconsistent in ramified type theory augmented with axioms of reducibility. This is significant because reducibility has been thought to be perfectly consistent with the ramified approach to the intensional antinomies. Nor is the addition of reducibility to ramified type theory sufficient to restore other intensional puzzles such as Prior’s paradox or Kripke’s puzzle about time and thought. (shrink)

Our relationship to the infinite is controversial. But it is widely agreed that our powers of reasoning are finite. I disagree with this consensus; I think that we can, and perhaps do, engage in infinite reasoning. Many think it is just obvious that we can't reason infinitely. This is mistaken. Infinite reasoning does not require constructing infinitely long proofs, nor would it gift us with non-recursive mental powers. To reason infinitely we only need an ability to perform infinite inferences. I (...) argue that we have this ability. My argument looks to our best current theories of inference and considers examples of apparent infinite reasoning. My position is controversial, but if I'm right, our theories of truth, mathematics, and beyond could be transformed. And even if I'm wrong, a more careful consideration of infinite reasoning can only deepen our understanding of thinking and reasoning. -/- (Note for readers: the paper's brief discussion of uniform reflection and omega inconsistency is misleading. The imagined interlocutor's argument makes an assumption about the PA-provability of provability generalizations that, while true for the Godel sentence's instances, is unjustified, in general. This means my position is stronger against this objection than the paper suggests, since omega inconsistent theories are not automatically inconsistent with their uniform reflection principles, you also need to assume the arithmetically true Pi-2 sentences.). (shrink)

This thesis explores the development of Bertrand Russell‘s theory of definite descriptions. It aims at demonstrating the connection between Russell‘s views on the subject of denoting and his attempt, in the period 1903-05, to develop a solution to 'the Contradiction'. The thesis argues that the discovery of the theory of descriptions, and the way in which it works, are best understood against the backdrop of Russell‘s work on the paradoxes. A new understanding of Russell‘s seminal paper 'On Denoting' is presented, (...) including a novel interpretation of the notorious 'Gray‘s Elegy Argument', in which Russell argues against his earlier theory of denoting. That Russell‘s work on denoting is connected to his work on the paradoxes is reasonably well-known: the nature of the connection has not, however, been adequately brought out in the literature. This is addressed through demonstrating the relationship between Russell‘s work on denoting and his development of the 'substitutional theory' of classes and relations. This theory eliminates classes and propositional functions in favour of matrices and substitutions. The role of the theory of descriptions in the development of the substitutional theory is commonly supposed to be merely that the theory of descriptions facilitates the ontological elimination of classes. But this elimination was equally possible on Russell‘s earlier theory of denoting. In the thesis it is suggested that the theory of descriptions brings with it a new conception of analysis, and that it is through the introduction of this new form of analysis—rather than through the elimination of classes—that the theory of descriptions facilitates the substitutional approach. (shrink)

This paper aims to shed light on the broader significance of Frege’s logicism against the background of discussing and comparing Wittgenstein’s ‘showing/saying’-distinction with Brandom’s idiom of logic as the enterprise of making the implicit rules of our linguistic practices explicit. The main thesis of this paper is that the problem of Frege’s logicism lies deeper than in its inconsistency : it lies in the basic idea that in arithmetic one can, and should, express everything that is implicitly presupposed so that (...) nothing is left unsaid. This, in fact, is the target of Wittgenstein’s critique. Rather than the Tractatus, with its claim that logicism attempts to say something that can only be shown, it is the Philosophical Investigations, with its argument by regress against the thesis that every rule which one can follow must be of an explicit nature, that is of real significance here. (shrink)

The book begins with a reconstruction of Aristotle's syllogistic as viewed by some of the well-known logicians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, that is, as expanded to include singular p...

After the works of Jaako Hintikka, David Stern and, more recently, Denis Perrin, the idea that there is a wittgensteinian reflection upon the time and that it is at the origin of the abandonment of the project of a phenomenological language is nothing surprising, but we cannot consider it established yet. It seems to me that an important element in this debate is in chapter VII of the Philosophical Remarks : indeed, we find there the very first sustained discussion on (...) the possibility of a phenomenological language —a discussion obviously centred on the question of time. Without aiming to propose an “alternative” reading of Wittgenstein’ reflections on time and the phenomenological language, I would like to bring to light the importance of this chapter for this problem and also try to show that the interpretation key must be looked for in a reductio ad absurdum whose base is the impossibility to measure time. (shrink)

Gregory Landini offers a detailed historical account of Frege's notations and the philosophical views that led Frege from Begriffssscrhrift to his mature work Grundgesetze, addressing controversial issues that surround the notations.

I present an argument for an interpretation of Kant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant's views on this topic (...) are of a much more Fregean bent than has traditionally been admitted or appreciated. I conclude by providing a sketch of how a better grasp of Kant's views on cognitive content in general can help bring into sharper relief what is, and what is not, at stake in the recent debates over whether Kant accepts a particular kind of cognitive content—namely, non-conceptual content. (shrink)

1. For simplicity, let the domain of our first-level quantifiers, ‘∀ x’ and so on, be words, and in particular just those words which are adjectives. And let the adjective ‘heterological’ be abbreviated just to As is well known, one cannot legitimately stipulate that Why not? Well, the obvious answer is that if is supposed to be an adjective, then this alleged stipulation would imply the contradiction But contradictions cannot be true, and it is no use stipulating that they shall (...) be. Do we need to say anything more? Russell would apparently wish to add this: the stipulation is illegitimate because it attempts to define the word by a quantification over all words, and the word is itself taken to be one of the words quantified over. That is how this supposed definition would infringe his vicious-circle principle . 1 It is of course true that if our quantification is taken to range only over words of a certain kind, say first-order adjectives, and if the word is taken to be a word of a different kind, say a second-order adjective, then the contradiction is avoided. For the supposed stipulation then has no implications for whether is or is not true of any second-order words. Russell imagines the stipulation to be strengthened by adding that is to be true only of first-order words, and hence that it is not true of itself. But no contradiction now results from this. However, one must ask: did we need this explanation in terms of the VCP? It may seem helpful, because there is an initial temptation to say that the original stipulation could not be illegitimate. This is because it is thought of as introducing a new word, and explaining what it means, and one is apt to think that we …. (shrink)

No chance of seeing her for another fortnight and it is 11 days since I saw her. Went solitary walk felt miserable but to some extent staved it off by reflecting on |$\langle$|Continuum Problem|$\rangle$|1The occasion for this review article on the life and accomplishments of Frank Ramsey is the publication in the last eight years of three important books: a biography of Frank Ramsey by his sister, Margaret Paul, a book by Steven Methven on aspects of Ramsey’s philosophy, and the (...) recent biography of Ramsey written by Cheryl Misak. In a companion piece [Mancosu, 2020] I discuss Ramsey’s contacts with logicians in continental Europe and publish previously unpublished letters from Ramsey to Abraham Fraenkel and to Heinrich Behmann.1. INTRODUCTIONFrank Plumpton Ramsey (1903–1930) will be well known to the readers of this journal. His contributions to philosophy, mathematics, and economics have left a lasting legacy. In mathematical logic and philosophy of mathematics, Ramsey’s solution to the paradoxes by means of a simple theory of types [1926a] and Ramsey’s theorem in combinatorics (both finite and infinite [1930]) are among Ramsey’s most celebrated contributions. Ramsey is a key presence in accounts of Wittgenstein’s, Russell’s, and Moore’s lives and work. It is well known that it was Ramsey who translated the Tractatus into English and wrote what is still considered a very insightful review [1923] of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein mentioned the importance of his conversations with Ramsey in 1929 in Cambridge as having influenced his transition to the views presented in the Philosophical Investigations. Ramsey also contributed, in 1924, to the second edition of Principia Mathematica (see [Linsky, 2011]). While Ramsey’s friendship with Moore does not have an analogous concrete precipitate as the work on the Tractatus or Principia Mathematica, it is evident from the correspondence and other documents that Ramsey’s work in philosophy (truth, propositions, universals, etc.) influenced Moore. Of course, the direction of influence goes also the other way around. Wittgenstein, Russell, and Moore, among others, were essential in shaping Ramsey’s approach to philosophy. (shrink)

In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintained that arithmetic consists of equations arrived at by the practice of calculating outcomes of operations$\Omega ^{n}(\bar {\xi })$defined with the help of numeral exponents. Since$Num$(x) and quantification over numbers seem ill-formed, Ramsey wrote that the approach is faced with “insuperable difficulties.” This paper takes Wittgenstein to have assumed that his audience would have an understanding of the implicit general rules governing his operations. By employing the Tractarian logicist interpretation that theN-operator$N(\bar {\xi })$and recursively defined arithmetic (...) operators$\Omega ^{n}(\bar {\xi })$are not different in kind, we can address Ramsey’s problem. Moreover, we can take important steps toward better understanding how Wittgenstein might have imagined emulating proof by mathematical induction. (shrink)

I present an argument for an interpretation ofKant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations ofKant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes toKant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading ofKant put forward byMcDowell and others, according to whichKant embraces a version ofRussellianism, I argue thatKant's views on this topic are of a much moreFregean bent than has (...) traditionally been admitted or appreciated. I conclude by providing a sketch of how a better grasp ofKant's views on cognitive content in general can help bring into sharper relief what is, and what is not, at stake in the recent debates over whether Kant accepts a particular kind of cognitive content—namely, non‐conceptual content. (shrink)

Frege’s _Basic Law V_ is inconsistent. The reason often given is that it posits the existence of an injection from the larger collection of first-order concepts to the smaller collection of objects. This article explains what is right and what is wrong with this diagnosis.

In his treatise Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Gottlob Frege tries to find a definition of number. First he rejects the idea that number could be a property of external objects. Then he comes with a suggestion that a numerical statement expresses a property of a concept, namely it indicates how many objects fall under the concept. Subsequently Frege rejects, or at least essentially modifies, also this definition, because in his view that a number cannot be a property – it should (...) be an object. In this article, I try to show that Frege’s first definition of number seems to be, despite his own opinion, much more promising than he supposed. I also argue that Frege’s argumentation against the empirical character of number is by no means convincing. (shrink)

It is a common thought that mathematics can be not only true but also beautiful, and many of the greatest mathematicians have attached central importance to the aesthetic merit of their theorems, proofs and theories. But how, exactly, should we conceive of the character of beauty in mathematics? In this paper I suggest that Kant's philosophy provides the resources for a compelling answer to this question. Focusing on §62 of the ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment’, I argue against the common view (...) that Kant's aesthetics leaves no room for beauty in mathematics. More specifically, I show that on the Kantian account beauty in mathematics is a non-conceptual response felt in light of our own creative activities involved in the process of mathematical reasoning. The Kantian proposal I thus develop provides a promising alternative to Platonist accounts of beauty widespread among mathematicians. While on the Platonist conception the experience of mathematical beauty consists in an intellectual insight into the fundamental structures of the universe, according to the Kantian proposal the experience of beauty in mathematics is grounded in our felt awareness of the imaginative processes that lead to mathematical knowledge. The Kantian account I develop thus offers to elucidate the connection between aesthetic reflection, creative imagination and mathematical cognition. (shrink)

Critical study of Michael Potter, Reason's Nearest Kin. Philosophies of Arithmetic from Kant to Carnap. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. x + 305 pages.

This volume aims to establish the starting point for the development, evaluation and appraisal of the phenomenology of mathematics.

This paper outlines an account of numbers based on the numerical equivalence schema (NES), which consists of all sentences of the form ‘#x.Fx=n if and only if ∃nx Fx’, where # is the number-of operator and ∃n is defined in standard Russellian fashion. In the first part of the paper, I point out some analogies between the NES and the T-schema for truth. In light of these analogies, I formulate a minimalist account of numbers, based on the NES, which strongly (...) parallels the minimalist (deflationary) account of truth. One may be tempted to develop the minimalist account in a fictionalist direction, according to which arithmetic is useful but untrue, if taken at face value. In the second part, I argue that this suggestion is not as attractive as it may first appear. The NES suffers from a similar problem to the T-schema: it is deductively weak and does not enable the derivation of any non-trivial generalizations. In the third part of the paper, I explore some strategies to deal with the generalization problem, again drawing inspiration from the literature on truth. In closing this paper, I briefly compare the minimalist to some other accounts of numbers. (shrink)

Les Remarques philosophiques sont la première tentative de mettre en oeuvre le programme qui découle de l’échec du projet du Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Le noyau de ce programme est donné par l’abandon de l’analyse des nombres avancée dans le Tractatus. Wittgenstein se rend compte que les nombres doivent se trouver à la base même du langage, dans la structure des propositions élémentaires. En même temps, il se rend compte qu’il est impossible de fournir la logique sousjacente au langage avant d’avoir procédé (...) à l’analyse. Le projet d’une investigation logique des phénomènes s’imposait, donc, même après l’abandon de l’idée d’un langage phénoménologique. The Philosophical Remarks is a first attempt at pursuing the philosophical agenda determined by the failure of the Tractarian project. The central point of this agenda is the abandonment of the analysis of number that had been given in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein realizes that numbers should be brought back to the basis of language, as part of the structure of the elementary propositions themselves. At the same time, he realizes that it is impossible to give the logic underlying our language before the process of logical analysis is carried out. He undertakes the project of a logical investigation of phenomena even after giving up the idea of a phenomenological language. (shrink)

The paper presents an interpretation of the thinking behind the early Wittgenstein's "general form of the proposition." It argues that a central role is played by the assumption that all domains of discourse are governed by the same laws of logic. The interpretation is presented partly through a comparison with ideas presented recently by Michael Potter and Peter Sullivan; the paper argues that the above assumption explains more of the key characteristics of the "general form of the proposition" than Potter (...) and Sullivan suppose, including, in particular, its claim that the bases from which all other propositions are derived must be elementary propositions. (shrink)

Philosophers love a priori knowledge: we delight in truths that can be known from the comfort of our armchairs, without the need to venture out in the world for confirmation. This is due not to laziness, but to two different considerations. First, it seems that many philosophical issues aren’t settled by our experience of the world — the nature of morality; the way concepts pick out objects; the structure of our experience of the world in which we find ourselves — (...) these issues seem to be decided not on the basis of our experience, but in some manner by things prior to (or independently of) that experience. Second, even when we are deeply interested in how our experience lends credence to our claims about the world, the matter remains of the remainder: we learn more about how experience contributes to knowledge when we see what knowledge is available independent of that experience. (shrink)

Objects appear to fall into different sorts, each with their own criteria for identity. This raises the question of whether sorts overlap. Abstractionists about numbers—those who think natural numbers are objects characterized by abstraction principles—face an acute version of this problem. Many abstraction principles appear to characterize the natural numbers. If each abstraction principle determines its own sort, then there is no single subject-matter of arithmetic—there are too many numbers. That is, unless objects can belong to more than one sort. (...) But if there are multi-sorted objects, there should be cross-sortal identity principles for identifying objects across sorts. The going cross-sortal identity principle, ECIA2 of Cook and Ebert (2005), solves the problem of too many numbers. But, I argue, it does so at a high cost. I therefore propose a novel cross-sortal identity principle, based on embeddings of the induced models of abstracts developed by Walsh (2012). The new criterion matches ECIA2’s success, but offers interestingly different answers to the more controversial identifications made by ECIA2. (shrink)

This dissertation makes two primary contributions. The first three chapters develop an interpretation of Carnap's Meta-Philosophical Program which places stress upon his methodological analysis of the sciences over and above the Principle of Tolerance. Most importantly, I suggest, is that Carnap sees philosophy as contiguous with science—as a part of the scientific enterprise—so utilizing the very same methods and subject to the same limitations. I argue that the methodological reforms he suggests for philosophy amount to philosophy as the explication of (...) the concepts of science through the construction and use of suitably robust meta-logical languages. My primary interpretive claim is that Carnap's understanding of logic and mathematics as a set of formal auxiliaries is premised upon this prior analysis of the character of logico-mathematical knowledge, his understanding of its role in the language of science, and the methods used by practicing mathematicians. Thus the Principle of Tolerance, and so Carnap's logical pluralism, is licensed and justified by these methodological insights. This interpretation of Carnap's program contrasts with the popular Deflationary reading as proposed in Goldfarb & Ricketts. The leading idea they attribute to Carnap is a Logocentrism: That philosophical assertions are always made relative to some particular language, and that our choice of syntactical rules for a language are constitutive of its inferential structure and methods of possible justification. Consequently Tolerance is considered the foundation of Carnap's entire program. My third chapter argues that this reading makes Carnap's program philosophically inert, and I present significant evidence that such a reading is misguided. The final chapter attempts to extend the methodological ideals of Carnap's program to the analysis of the ongoing debate between category- and set-theoretic foundations for mathematics. Recent criticism of category theory as a foundation charges that it is neither autonomous from set theory, nor offers a suitable ontological grounding for mathematics. I argue that an analysis of concepts can be foundationally informative without requiring the construction of those concepts from first principles, and that ontological worries can be seen as methodologically unfruitful. (shrink)

Dans ce texte, je pars de l’analyse intuitionniste de la vérité mathématique, « A est vrai si et seulement s’il existe une preuve de A » comme cas particulier de l’analyse de la vérité en termes de « vérifacteur », et je montre pourquoi Wittgenstein partageait celle-ci avec les intuitionnistes. Cependant, la notion de preuve à l’oeuvre dans cette analyse est, selon l’intuitionnisme, celle de la « preuve-comme-objet », et je montre par la suite, en interprétant son argument sur le (...) caractère « synoptique » des preuves, que Wittgenstein avait plutôt en tête une conception de la « preuve-comme-trace ».In this paper, I start with the intutionist analysis of mathematical truth, « A is true if and only if there exists a proof of A », as a particular case of the analysis of truth in terms of « truth-makers », and I show why Wittgenstein shared it with the intuitionists. However, the notion of proof at work in this analysis is, according to intuitionism, that of « proof-as-object », and I then show, with an interpretation of his argument on the « surveyability » of proofs, that, instead, Wittgenstein had in mind a notion of « proof-as-trace ». (shrink)

In Appendix B of Russell's The Principles of Mathematics occurs a paradox, the paradox of propositions, which a simple theory of types is unable to resolve. This fact is frequently taken to be one of the principal reasons for calling ramification onto the Russellian stage. The paper presents a detaiFled exposition of the paradox and its discussion in the correspondence between Frege and Russell. It is argued that Russell finally adopted a very simple solution to the paradox. This solution had (...) nothing to do with ramified types but marked an important shift in his theory of propositions. (shrink)

Semantic theories based on a hierarchy of types have prominently been used to defend the possibility of unrestricted quantification. However, they also pose a prima facie problem for it: each quantifier ranges over at most one level of the hierarchy and is therefore not unrestricted. It is difficult to evaluate this problem without a principled account of what it is for a quantifier to be unrestricted. Drawing on an insight of Russell’s about the relationship between quantification and the structure of (...) predication, we offer such an account. We use this account to examine the problem in three different type-theoretic settings, which are increasingly permissive with respect to predication. We conclude that unrestricted quantification is available in all but the most permissive kind of type theory. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to discuss Russell’s Theory of Denoting Concepts, mainly to see clearly why he adopted it and, especially, why he abandoned it. With regard to TDC, I detect three kinds of problems: ontological (the denotation of empty denoting concepts), logical (the infinite regress of meaning in the case of denoting concepts) and epistemological (the relation between denoting concepts and acquaintance). I will not consider here the first point, but only the last two. The chapter will (...) be thus divided into two main parts: in the first part I will present the inner logical difficulty of TDC, whereas in the second part I will discuss the connection of denoting concepts with the Principle of Acquaintance. (shrink)

Tries to identify some strands in the birth of analytic philosophy and to identify in consequence some of its distinctive features.

This paper puts forward and defends an account of mathematical truth, and in particular an account of the truth of mathematical axioms. The proposal attempts to be completely nonrevisionist. In this connection, it seeks to satisfy simultaneously both horns of Benacerrafs work on informal rigour. Kreisel defends the view that axioms are arrived at by a rigorous examination of our informal notions, as opposed to being stipulated or arrived at by trial and error. This view is then supplemented by a (...) Fregean account of the objectivity and our knowledge of abstract objects. It is then argued that the resulting view faces no insurmountable metaphysical or epistemic obstacles. (shrink)

For logicians and metaphysicians curious about the evolution of Russell's logic from The Principles of Mathematics to Principia Mathematica, no volume of the Collected Papers of Bertr...

Wittgenstein's conception of the general form of a truth function given in thesis 6 can be presented as a sort of a trade-off: the author of the Tractatus is unable to reconcile the simplicity of his original idea of a series of forms with the simplicity of his generalisation of Sheffer's stroke; therefore, he is forced to sacrifice one of them. As we argue in this paper, the choice he makes – to weaken the logical constraints put on the concept (...) of a series of forms, thus effectively metaphorising that concept for the sake of upholding the N-operation's role of generating the series – is unfortunate. An actual expansion of a series of truth functions as defined in 6 would require either making decisions at each step (Anscombe) or outwardly rejecting the concept of a series (Sundholm). However, neither is faithful to Wittgenstein's own fundamental intuitions regarding the nature of logic. For this reason, a different trade-off that prioritises upholding the basic features of a series of forms over the simplicity of the operation that generates that series seems to be much more reasonable. We offer such a trade-off by developing the schema already present in the Tractatus (5.101). The key element of our alternative solution is the construction of an operation that can perform the task of producing all consecutive truth functions of a given collection of atomic propositions as an invariant difference between any base and its successor throughout the series. We define it as a composition of three functions (in an algebraic sense): the first turns a symbol of a given truth function into a binary number, the second increments that number, the third turns the result back into a symbol of another truth function. We also show how the operation can be defined by means of a different notation without invoking binary arithmetic. (shrink)

This paper will deal with three questions regarding Carnap's transition from the position he held at the time of writing Syntax to the doctrines he held during his semantic phase: (1) What was Carnap's attitude towards truth at the time of writing Syntax? (2) What was Carnap's position regarding questions of reference and ontology at the time of writing Syntax? (3) Was Carnap's acceptance of Tarski's analysis of truth and reference detrimental to his philosophical project? Section 1 of this paper (...) will deal with the first of these questions. Special attention will be paid to identifying what it was that prevented Carnap from defining a truth predicate for descriptive languages in Syntax. Section 2 of this paper will deal with the question of Carnap's attitude towards reference and ontology in Syntax. It will be shown that the attempt in Syntax to address ontological questions is seriously defective. Section 3 of this paper addresses the last of the questions posed above. It is argued that in the light of what is established in Sections 1 and 2, Carnap could not have retained the position of Syntax with respect to truth and reference. (shrink)

This is the first part of the essay devoted to the story of logicism, in particular to its Fregean version. Reviewing the classical period of Fregean studies, we first point out some critical moments of Frege‘s argumentation in the Grundla­gen, in order to be able later to differentiate between its salvageable and defec­tive features. We work on the presumption that there are no easy, catego­rical an­swers to questions like “Is logicism dead?“: Wittgenstein’s cri­tique of the foundational program as well as (...) the remarkable neo-Fregean dis­cov­eries of Boolos and Wright have to be confronted with the effects which the logi­cistic idea actually had on logico­matemati­cal practice. But that is another story, a sequel to this es­say, the purpose of which is systematic rather than criti­cal. (shrink)