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Words without knowledge [Book Review]

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):686–694 (2005)

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Semantic pathology and the open pair.James A. Woodbridge & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):695–703.details In Vagueness and Contradiction (2001), Roy Sorensen defends and extends his epistemic account of vagueness. In the process, he appeals to connections between vagueness and semantic paradox. These appeals come mainly in Chapter 11, where Sorensen offers a solution to what he calls the no-no paradox—a “neglected cousin” of the more famous liar—and attempts to use this solution as a precedent for an epistemic account of the sorites paradox. This strategy is problematic for Sorensen’s project, however, since, as we establish, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations
Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox.Patrick Greenough - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547 - 563.details Consider the following sentences: The neighbouring sentence is not true. The neighbouring sentence is not true. Call these the no-no sentences. Symmetry considerations dictate that the no-no sentences must both possess the same truth-value. Suppose they are both true. Given Tarski’s truth-schema—if a sentence S says that p then S is true iff p—and given what they say, they are both not true. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both true. Suppose they are both false. Given Tarski’s falsity-schema—if a sentence S (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Dialetheism, semantic pathology, and the open pair.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):395 – 416.details Over the past 25 years, Graham Priest has ably presented and defended dialetheism, the view that certain sentences are properly characterized as true with true negations. Our goal here is neither to quibble with the tenability of true, assertable contradictions nor, really, with the arguments for dialetheism. Rather, we wish to address the dialetheist's treatment of cases of semantic pathology and to pose a worry for dialetheism that has not been adequately considered. The problem that we present seems to have (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 20 citations
No consistent way with paradox.B. Armour-Garb - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):66-75.details In ‘A Consistent Way with Paradox’, Laurence Goldstein (2009) clarifies his solution to the liar, which he touts as revenge immune . In addition, he (Ibid.) responds to one of the objections that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (2006) raise against certain solutions to the open pair and argues that his proffered solution to the liar family of paradoxes undermines what they (Ibid.) call the dialetheic conjecture . In this paper, after critically evaluating Goldstein’s response to A-G&W, I turn to his proposed (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
A consistent way with paradox.Laurence Goldstein - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):377 - 389.details Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist), avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language. Download Export citation Bookmark 15 citations
No-no. Paradox and consistency.Dan López de Sa & Elia Zardini - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):472 - 478.details Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations

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