The aim of this dissertation is to offer and defend a correspondence theory of truth. I begin by critically examining the coherence, pragmatic, simple, redundancy, disquotational, minimal, and prosentential theories of truth. Special attention is paid to several versions of disquotationalism, whose plausibility has led to its fairly constant support since the pioneering work of Alfred Tarski, through that by W. V. Quine, and recently in the work of Paul Horwich. I argue that none of these theories meets the correspondence (...) intuition---that a true sentence or proposition in some way corresponds to reality---despite the explicit claims by each to capture this intuition. I distinguish six versions of the correspondence theory, and defend two against traditional objections, standardly taken as decisive against them, and show, plainly, that these two theories capture the correspondence intuition. Due to the importance of meeting this intuition, only these two theories stands a chance of being a satisfactory theory of truth. I argue that the version of the correspondence theory incorporating a simple semantic representation relation is preferable to its rival, for which the representation relation is complex. I present and argue for a novel version of this correspondence theory according to which truth is a correspondence property sensitive to semantic context. One consequence of this context-sensitivity is that an ungrounded sentence does not express a proposition. In addition to accounting for the similarity between the Liar and Truth-Teller sentences, this theory of truth is immune to the Liar Paradox, including empirical versions. It is argued that the Liar Paradox is devastating to all of the other theories above, and even formal theories of truth designed to solve it, such as the revision and vagueness theories. Customized versions of the Liar Paradox besetting this theory are handled by its context-sensitivity, and by enforcing the distinction between truth and truth value. This same pair of considerations also yields solutions to Lob's Paradox and Grelling's Paradox. Arguments similar to those given to defend this correspondence theory show that with one minor alteration, Kripke's fixed point theory may be used to model this correspondence notion of truth. (shrink)

This paper presents an argument for metaphysical realism, understood as the claim that the world has structure that would exist even if our cognitive activities never did. The argument is based on the existence of a structured world at a time when it was still possible that we would never evolve. But the interpretation of its premises introduces subtleties: whether, for example, these premises are to be understood as assertions about the world or about our evidence, internally or externally, via (...) assertibility conditions or truth conditions – and what sorts of beings are included in the `we' upon whose cognitions the antirealist supposes the structure of the world to depend. I argue that antirealism can provide no defensible, fully articulated interpretation of the premises that either shows them not to be true or defeats the reasoning. (shrink)

Amie Thomasson has defended a view called Easy Ontology, according to which most ontological questions can be answered straightforwardly using conceptual truths and empirical knowledge. Furthermore, she claims that this deflationary meta-ontology does not commit her to any form of anti-realism. In this paper I identify a problem with Thomasson’s account of quantification, according to which everything we quantify over falls under a sortal. Thomasson’s defence of the easiness of answering ontological questions relies on a certain thesis about the hierarchical (...) order of sortals, but the case for the compatibility of Easy Ontology and realism suggests that this thesis is actually false. (shrink)

I want to promote what I shall call ‘the identity theory of truth’. I suggest that other accounts put forward as theories of truth are genuine rivals to it, but are unacceptable. A certain conception of thinkables belongs with the identity theory’s conception of truth. I introduce these conceptions in Part I, by reference to John McDowell’s Mind and World; and I show why they have a place in an identity theory, which I introduce by reference to Frege. In Part (...) II, I elaborate on the conception of thinkables, with a view to demonstrating that the identity theory’s conception of truth is defensible. Part III is concerned with the theory’s relation to some recent work on the concept of truth: I hope to show that the identity theorist not only has a defensible conception of truth, but also, in the present state of play, has appropriate ambitions. (shrink)

RESUMO: Hilary Putnam procurou solapar o relativismo cognitivo, mediante acusações de incoerência autodestrutiva. A concepção de Thomas Kuhn de desenvolvimento do conhecimento científico ocupa um lugar de destaque nesse empreendimento crítico, e a incomensurabilidade entre paradigmas rivais constitui o núcleo da disputa. Putnam afirmou que a incomensurabilidade é autorrefutante, levando em conta apenas sua dimensão semântica. Este artigo examina essa investida antirrelativista. Considero dois sentidos de autorrefutação, o material e o formal, e defendo que essa acusação não atinge a referida (...) formulação semântica. Adicionalmente, mostro que a dimensão epistemológica da incomensurabilidade também não é afetada. ABSTRACT: Hilary Putnam sought to undermine cognitive relativism by charging it with self- destructive incoherence. Thomas Kuhn's conception of the development of scientific knowledge occupies a prominent place in that critical endeavor, and the incommensurability between rival paradigms constitutes the core of the dispute. Putnam claimed that incommensurability is self- refuting, taking into account only its semantic dimension. This article examines this anti-relativist attack. I consider two senses of self-refutation, the material and the formal, and argue that they do not affect the semantic formulation of incommensurability. Additionally, I show that the epistemological dimension of incommensurability is also unaffected. (shrink)

In his new paper, “Eligibility and Inscrutability,” J. R. G. Williams presents a surprising new challenge to David Lewis’ theory of interpretation. Although Williams frames this challenge primarily as a response to Lewis’ criticisms of Putnam’s model-theoretic argument, the challenge itself goes to the heart of Lewis’ own account of interpretation. Further, and leaving Lewis’ project aside for a moment, Williams’ argument highlights some important—and some fairly general—points concerning the relationship between model theory and semantic determinacy.

I present two generalizations of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism. The first replaces Putnam's model theory with some new, and substantially simpler, model theory, while the second replaces Putnam's model theory with some more accessible results from astronomy. By design, both of these new arguments fail. But the similarities between these new arguments and Putnam's original arguments illuminate the latter's overall structure, and the flaws in these new arguments highlight the corresponding flaws in Putnam's arguments.

Investiga-se a possibilidade de uma abordagem do fenômeno do pluralismo lógico a partir de uma perspectiva inspirada no pensamento de Quine. A matematização da lógica termina por levar à flexibilização da teoria lógica, logo surgindo, não apenas sistemas complementares e alternativos à lógica clássica, mas também a questão da admissibilidade de mais do que um sistema lógico. A tal posição se dá o nome “pluralismo lógico”. Quine foi um destacado defensor da lógica clássica a partir de uma perspectiva monista, ainda (...) que admitisse em princípio a possibilidade de sua revisão. Pode-se, contudo, investigar se as linhas gerais do pensamento quineano são compatíveis com uma perspectiva pluralista. Algumas possibilidades são levantadas tomando em consideração propostas como as teorias pluralistas de Carlo Dalla Pozza e Richard Epstein. Conclui-se que, embora Quine não concebesse a possibilidade de apoiar o pluralismo lógico, a sua filosofia ajuda a enquadrar e avaliar as maneiras de estudar o assunto. (shrink)

3.2.2. The principle of conceptual containment ........................... 116 3.3.3. The physical human subject or the “I” ............................... 119 3.4. The hyperverse and its EDWs – the antimetaphysical foundation of the EDWs perspective ........................................... 150 Part II. Applications Chapter 4. Applications to some notions from philosophy of mind .. 159 4.1. Levels and reduction vs. emergence ............................................. 160 4.2. Qualia, Kant and the “I” ............................................................... 181 4.3. Mental causation and supervenience ............................................ 190 Chapter 5. Applications to some notions from cognitive science (...) ...... 200 5.1. Computationalism ........................................................................ 200 5.2. Connectionism .............................................................................. 211 5.3. The dynamical system approach .................................................. 223 5.4. Robotics ........................................................................................ 232 5.5. Dichotomies concerning the notion of mental representation and processing .............................................................................. 243 5.6. The EDWs perspective and some key elements in cognitive science .......................................................................................... 249 5.7. The relation between key elements and some philosophical distinctions ................................................................................... 264 5.8. Cognitive neuroscience ................................................................ 267 5.9. The status of any living entity ...................................................... 277 Chapter 6. Applications to some notions from philosophy of science and science ............................................................................ 281 6.1. A glance at logical positivism ...................................................... 285 6.2. Carnap’s linguistic frameworks .................................................... 289 6.3. Carnap vs. Gödel or syntactic vs. semantic .................................. 292 6.4. Carnap vs. Quine or rational reconstruction vs. naturalized epistemology ................................................................................ 295 6.5. Quine’s ontological relativity ....................................................... 296 6.6. Goodman’s relativity .................................................................... 298 6.7. Putnam and the rejection of the “thing-in-itself” .......................... 299 6.8. Friedman’s relative constitutive a priori principles....................... 301 6.9. Some notions from quantum mechanics ....................................... 305 6.10. The status of the external non-living epistemologically different entities ....................................................................................... 343 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 361 References .............................................................................................. 369. (shrink)