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  1. A Multiple Realization Thesis for Natural Kinds.Kevin Lynch - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):389-406.
    Two important thought-experiments are associated with the work of Hilary Putnam, one designed to establish multiple realizability for mental kinds, the other designed to establish essentialism for natural kinds. Comparing the thought-experiments with each other reveals that the scenarios in both are structurally analogous to each other, though his intuitions in both are greatly at variance, intuitions that have been simultaneously well received. The intuition in the former implies a thesis that prioritizes pre-scientific over scientific indicators for identifying mental kinds (...)
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  • Schlick, Carnap and Feigl on the Mind-Body Problem.Sean Crawford - 2022 - In Christoph Limbeck & Thomas Uebel (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism. Routledge. pp. 238-247.
    Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap and Herbert Feig are the most prominent of the positivists to formulate views on the mind-body problem (aside from Hempel’s one-off treatment in 1935). While their views differed from each other and changed over time they were all committed to some form of scientific physicalism, though a linguistic or conceptual rather than ontological form of it. In focus here are their views during the heyday of logical positivism and its immediate aftermath, though some initial scene-setting of (...)
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  • Mental States Are Like Diseases.Sander Verhaegh - 2019 - In Robert Sinclair (ed.), Science and Sensibilia by W. V. Quine: The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
    While Quine’s linguistic behaviorism is well-known, his Kant Lectures contain one of his most detailed discussions of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind. Quine clarifies the nature of his psychological commitments by arguing for a modest view that is against ‘excessively restrictive’ variants of behaviorism while maintaining ‘a good measure of behaviorist discipline…to keep [our mental] terms under control’. In this paper, I use Quine’s Kant Lectures to reconstruct his position. I distinguish three types of behaviorism in psychology (...)
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  • Analytic philosophy, 1925-1969: emergence, management and nature.Joel Katzav - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (6):1197-1221.
    This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925-1969. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers (...)
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  • Physicalism, behaviorism and phenomena.Herbert Hochberg - 1959 - Philosophy of Science 26 (April):93-103.
    The issue of materialism has recently been raised again. Mr. Putnam argues against philosophical behaviorism [4]. Such a position holds, as he construes it, that statements like ‘Jones is angry’ can be analyzed in solely behavioral terms. When one argues against philosophical behaviorism, he might be expected to distinguish this metaphysical position from behavior science. Putnam, however, does not make the distinction. Consequently he argues against both. I shall first state the distinction between these two different things, namely, philosophical behaviorism (...)
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  • Weberian ideal type construction as concept replacement.Raphael van Riel - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1358-1377.
    This paper contains a novel and coherent reading of Weberian ideal type construction, based on recent philosophical approaches to conceptual engineering. This reading makes transparent the dialectics of Weber's approach, resulting in a more nuanced interpretation of his methodological work. It will become apparent that Weber, when introducing his notion of an ideal type, did not merely summarize his views on methodology in the social sciences, but, rather, presented a two-step argument in favor of these views. The reconstruction will directly (...)
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  • (1 other version)Response to professor Putnam.William H. Hyde - 1979 - Philosophical Investigations 2 (4):73-75.
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  • Dispositions: Defined or reduced?Fred Wilson - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):184 – 204.
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  • On meaning the micro–state.William H. Hyde - 1981 - Philosophical Investigations 4 (1):25-34.
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  • Functionalism and logical analysis.Paul Livingston - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie Lynn Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 19.
    After more than thirty-five years of debate and discussion, versions of the functionalist theory of mind originating in the work of Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, and David Lewis still remain the most popular positions among philosophers of mind on the nature of mental states and processes. Functionalism has enjoyed such popularity owing, at least in part, to its claim to offer a plausible and compelling description of the nature of the mental that is also consistent with an underlying physicalist or (...)
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