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Expert Knowledge by Perception

Philosophy 95 (3):309-335 (2020)

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  1. Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):481-508.
    Perceptual experiences are not immediately responsive to reasons. You see a stick submerged in a glass of water as bent no matter how much you know about light refraction. Due to this isolation from reasons, perception is traditionally considered outside the scope of epistemic evaluability as justified or unjustified. Is perception really as independent from reasons as visual illusions make it out to be? I argue no, drawing on psychological evidence from perceptual learning. The flexibility of perceptual learning is a (...)
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  • Perceptual learning.Zoe Jenkin - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (6):e12932.
    Perception provides us with access to the external world, but that access is shaped by our own experiential histories. Through perceptual learning, we can enhance our capacities for perceptual discrimination, categorization, and attention to salient properties. We can also encode harmful biases and stereotypes. This article reviews interdisciplinary research on perceptual learning, with an emphasis on the implications for our rational and normative theorizing. Perceptual learning raises the possibility that our inquiries into topics such as epistemic justification, aesthetic criticism, and (...)
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  • Honing the Haptics of the Heart: A New Defence of the Perceptual Theory of Emotion.Brandon Yip - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    According to the perceptual theory of emotion, emotions are evaluative perceptions. However, emotions involve us in a way that regular perception does not and this has led to two influential objections to the perceptual theory have emerged. According to the first objection, the perceptual theory is false because the phenomenology of emotion is the phenomenology of response. According to the second objection, the perceptual theory is false because emotions are susceptible to evaluations of rationality and reason-responsiveness. In this essay, I (...)
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  • Aesthetic perception and the puzzle of training.Madeleine Ransom - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-25.
    While the view that we perceive aesthetic properties may seem intuitive, it has received little in the way of explicit defence. It also gives rise to a puzzle. The first strand of this puzzle is that we often cannot perceive aesthetic properties of artworks without training, yet much aesthetic training involves the acquisition of knowledge, such as when an artwork was made, and by whom. How, if at all, can this knowledge affect our perception of an artwork’s aesthetic properties? The (...)
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  • Perceptual Learning, Categorical Perception, and Cognitive Permeation.Daniel Burnston - 2021 - Dialectica 75 (1).
    Proponents of cognitive penetration often argue for the thesis on the basis of combined intuitions about categorical perception and perceptual learning. The claim is that beliefs penetrate perceptions in the course of learning to perceive categories. I argue that this "diachronic" penetration thesis is false. In order to substantiate a robust notion of penetration, the beliefs that enable learning must describe the particular ability that subjects learn. However, they cannot do so, since in order to help with learning they must (...)
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  • The perceptual learning of socially constructed kinds: how culture biases and shapes perception.Madeleine Ransom - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (11):3113-3133.
    Some kinds are both socially constructed and perceptible, such as gender and race. However, this gives rise to a puzzle that has been largely neglected in social constructionist accounts: how does culture shape and bias what we perceive? I argue that perceptual learning is the best explanation of our ability to perceive social kinds, in comparison to accounts that require a person acquire beliefs, theories, or concepts of the kind. I show how relatively simple causal factors known to influence perceptual (...)
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  • Perceptual reports and the impossibility of perceiving god.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Is it possible to hear God, feel God act, or see that God is doing something in the world? Of course, if God does not exist, no such reports could be true. But some philosophers have argued that even if God exists, it is not possible for such reports to be true since God is supposed to be a maximally perfect immaterial spirit. Here I explore the issue by framing discussion in terms of three kinds of perceptual reports. After clarifying (...)
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  • Thinking mechanistically about perceptual learning: Broad consequences for philosophy of mind.Daniel C. Burnston & Madeleine Ransom - 2025 - Mind and Language 40 (2):195-214.
    Traditionally, philosophy of psychology has individuated mental states functionally or semantically. These approaches have shaped many of the debates surrounding cognitive architecture and perceptual experience. We argue that understanding perceptual learning requires a mechanistic approach, which focuses on the structure of the mental representations underlying learned perceptual abilities. We articulate the mechanistic approach, then show how it differs from functional and semantic approaches with regards to important debates about high‐level contents, cognitive permeation, and non‐conceptual content. Finally, we argue that our (...)
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  • Perceptual Learning.Connolly Kevin - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1:1-35.
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  • Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?Harmen Ghijsen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):132-147.
    Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks-related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of (...)
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  • How Politics Shapes the Value of Perceptual Experience: From Epistemic to Prudential Value.James Gulledge - 2025 - In Yorgos Karagiannopoulos, Vasiliki Polykarpou & Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier, Epistemic Resistance, Radical Politics, Positionality: How Social Movements Inform Philosophy. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter Brill.
    The political realm helps determine the nature of the environments we frequent and so shapes the ways perception learns from those environments. Our perceptual-experiential capacities are thereby sensitive to the political realm. Some perpetual learning that is sensitive to the political realm results in individuals being able to have more valuable perceptual experiences. Perceptual learning that is sensitive to the political realm often increases the epistemic and prudential value of perceptual experience. I conclude that norms of fairness apply to our (...)
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